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ABSTRACT 
The study will investigate how the workers of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in the 
Department of Roads and Stormwater (Eastern region) feel about their jobs in terms of job 
satisfaction. Furthermore, the study will investigate how they feel about commitment to the 
union, commitment to the organisation, and management satisfaction during and after the 
implementation of job task levels, which was the result of the wage curve agreement that was 
signed in 2010 and implemented in 2011.The first objective of the study is to describe the 
collective agreements that were signed in 2010 as a result of a need to categorise 
municipalities and evaluate jobs, and the consequences of the collective agreements on 
employees through the study of documents supplemented by interviews and questionnaires. 
The second objective is to investigate if there has been a change in attitudes of the 
employees in the Roads and Stormwater Department of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality after the implementation of the wage curve agreement. 
 
There are six research questions; two relate to the first objective, and these are (a) what was 
the nature of the wage curve and job evaluation collective agreement? and(b) what were the 
consequences of the implementation of the wage curve and job evaluation collective 
agreement of the employees of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality?  The other four 
questions related to the second objective, which led to the following research questions 
related to the attitudes of the employees and the change in these attitudes after the 
implementation of the collective agreement.  These four questions were (a) what was the 
change in employee attitudes post the introduction of the wage curve? in particular, the 
attitudes of organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union 
commitment, (b) what is the relationship between the sub-groups and employee attitudes pre 
the wage curve agreement implementation?(c) what is the relationship between sub-groups 
and employee attitudes post the wage curve agreement implementation? (d) what is the 
relationship between the sub-groups and the change in employee attitudes pre and post the 
wage curve agreement implementation? 
 
Quantitative and qualitative research methods were used in the study to analyse the strike 
process and to understand and describe the attitudes of all the participants in relation to the 
four constructs provided by Chaulk and Brown (2008).  Self-administered questionnaires will 
be given to participants, and there will be face-to-face interviews with the union officials and 
management.   
 
The findings relating to the first objective indicate that the employees were unhappy with the 
implementation of the wage curve collective agreement. The second objective showed that 
the changes in the attitudes of employees after the implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement were negative and that there was a significant decrease in 
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the level of organisational commitment, job satisfaction, union commitment and management 
satisfaction after the implementation. 
 
Key words: management satisfaction; job satisfaction; union commitment; organisational 
commitment; race; age; occupational level; length of service; gender; membership with union; 
wage curve; job evaluation; collective agreement 
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a) Casualisation– is a process whereby standard employment is being displaced by 
employment that is temporary or part-time or both (Maree, 2011). 
b) Externalisation– is a process whereby an employee is employed by one employer, 
usually a temporary employment service known as a labour broker in South Africa, who hires 
the employee out to another employer in whose workplace the employee actually performs 
the work (Maree, 2011). 
c) Section 57 employees– are persons who are employed according to the requirements of 
section 57 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act no. 32 of 2000). 
d) T-scale– is the new salary scale that was introduced at EMM as a result of the Job 
Evaluation Wage Curve Agreement.  The scale ranges from T2 (lowest paid) toT17 (highest 
paid). 
e) X-scale– is the old salary scale which employees view as paying employees high salaries. 
The scales ranged from X5 (being the highest paid) to X18 (lowest paid). 
f) Organisational commitment –is the relative strength of an individual’s identification with 
and involvement in a particular organisation and is characterised by a strong belief in and 
acceptance of the organisation’s goals and values (affective), a willingness to exert 
considerable effort on behalf of the organisation (continuance) and a strong desire to maintain 
membership in the organisation (normative) (Koh & Boo, 2004).   
g) Union commitment – is when employees view an industrial relations climate to be 
positive, and commitment to the employing organisation facilitates union commitment (Chaulk 
& Brown, 2008). 
h) Job and management satisfaction – job satisfaction is a positive, emotional reaction to 
one’s assessment of one’s job experience; the nature of the work, supervision, job 
responsibilities, and co-worker relationships all contribute to the level of job satisfaction 
(Chaulk & Brown, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This research builds on the research by Chaulk and Brown (2008) in order to describe the 
change in the relationship between employees and their union, and between employees and 
their management before and after strike action.  The relationship constructs that were used 
by Chaulk and Brown (2008) were organisational commitment, union commitment, job 
satisfaction, management satisfaction, and work unit climate.  According to Chaulk and Brown 
(2008), there is something missing from previous research on strikes, and that is, how union 
commitment is affected by a strike, i.e. do members become more committed to their union 
after a strike action or does their level of commitment decrease or remain the same? 
 
The focus of this research study is on the reaction of employees to the implementation of the 
collective agreement that was signed after the national municipal strike action that took place 
in 2010.  One of the outcomes of the strike was the signing of a job evaluation and wage 
curve collective agreement which introduced job grading and job evaluation. This is of interest 
because the collective agreements signed by South African Local Government 
Association(SALGA) and the two municipal unions, the South African Municipal Workers 
Union (SAMWU) and Independent Municipal and Allied Union (IMATU) during the bargaining 
process were later found by the unions not to be what was discussed and agreed upon by all 
parties.  The employees felt betrayed by their union representatives and management, and 
this had an impact on the relations between the employees and their union. 
 
The2009-2012 salary and wage collective agreement (Appendix 4) was signed by SALGA, 
SAMWU and IMATU, and the objective of the agreement was to deal with the wage curve and 
job evaluation process and to also provide salary adjustments and increases.  Section 6 (6.1) 
of the agreement provides that all employees would receive an annual increase based on the 
average CPI percentage, and this was for the period 1 February 2009 until 31 January 2010.  
Section 6 (6.5) stated that, if the average CPI was lower than 5% or higher than 10% for the 
period referred to in clauses 6.2 and 6.3, any party might be entitled to reopen the 
negotiations.  The parties also agreed to deal with the issue of the wage curve and job 
evaluation separately from the wage negotiations.  It seems then that subsection (6.5) led to 
SAMWU requesting SALGA to reopen the negotiations, and when SALGA refused, SAMWU 
went on a strike in 2010. 
 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Collective bargaining is an aspect of employee relations that provides a platform for parties in 
a work relationship to interact at a joint level and in a way that avoids and manages conflict.   
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Collective bargaining is regulated in South Africa by means of the Constitution, the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995 and International Labour Organisation through Conventions and 
Recommendations.  This means that collective bargaining in the private sector, public sector 
and the local government sector is regulated by the above legislation.  Collective bargaining 
in these sectors is then regulated by bargaining councils, which have representatives from the 
employer and the employees (Van der Walt, Le Roux & Govindjee, 2012).   
 
A strike remains part of collective bargaining, and as Barker (2007) puts it, strikes are an 
important part of collective bargaining and the power relationship between the employer and 
employee would be deformed without the right to strike.  In South African legislation, there are 
also processes that must be followed when employees decide to embark upon a strike action, 
whether it is through their bargaining structures or directly with an employer (those who do not 
belong to a bargaining council).  Strikes to resolve a dispute then bring about further conflict 
between the employer and the employee, and also sometimes amongst the employees 
themselves.  Conflict can be caused by employer-employee relations, wage disputes, scarce 
resources, differing goals, and diversity.  In a strike situation, conflict can escalate out of 
proportion, and it must be managed quickly. 
 
Conflict can also be caused by change in the organisation.  Organisations, in the case of the 
private sector, need to change in order to remain competitive, and in the case of the public 
sector, in order to promote efficient service delivery.  Change, however, needs to be managed 
so that whoever is impacted by such change can be able to adapt easily. The way change is 
brought about in the organisation might also lead to conflict. For instance, if the employer 
unilaterally decides to introduce a computerised system of doing work, this can lead 
employees to declare a dispute and to go on a strike because this might affect their jobs.  Job 
evaluation systems are also part of change that when implemented might affect employees, 
especially when the employees do not know how the outcomes will affect them. 
 
1.3. EKURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (EMM) is one of the metropolitan municipalities of South 
Africa and is situated in the Gauteng province.  According to the Categorisation and Job 
Evaluation Wage Curve Collective Agreement (2010-2012), EMM has been categorised as a 
‘Category A’ municipality (Appendix 5).  The name “Ekurhuleni” is a Tsonga word meaning 
“place of peace”.  EMM has various departments of which the Roads and Stormwater (R & 
SW) is one.  Before 2011, the R & SW included the Transport and Civil Works departments 
and was called Roads, Transport and Civil Works (RTCW), but due to organisational 
restructuring, the two departments were then split, and they now have their own Heads of 
Departments. 
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The R & SW is divided into three regions: Northern Region (Kempton Park, Edenvale and 
Tembisa); Southern Region (Germiston, Boksburg and Alberton) and the Eastern Region 
(Benoni, Springs, Nigel and Brakpan).  For the purpose of this research, the focus will mainly 
be on the Eastern Region, because it is where the researcher works and has access to the 
towns in the region and will sometimes refer to R &SW, which is actually the Eastern Region. 
 
The R & SW currently has 981 employees, and there are 232 employees in the Eastern 
Region.  Most of the workers are general workers who work most of the day on the roads and 
are divided into teams, and these teams have team leaders.  There is a team for Tar 
Patching, Road Construction, Stormwater and Mason, and then there is office staff consisting 
of Clerks, Driver Messengers and Storemen; these people work at the depots.  In the 
Regional Office, there are Engineers, Managers, Administrators and the Regional Director, 
who oversees all the depots. 
 
The R & SW is one of the departments whose jobs were evaluated according to the new 
agreement. Only a few (11) jobs were not evaluated because these jobs were finalised in July 
2013. This is a small number out of the total of 232.   
 
The process of evaluating jobs has affected recruitment, promotion and retention of staff at 
the Municipality. When a promotional post is advertised, employees are reluctant to apply, 
claiming that they earn more salary than the one advertised.  Employees who were with the 
Municipality before June 2010 earn more than the senior post that is advertised on the new 
scale. For example, a Senior Engineer earns more than a Manager: Project Management who 
is in the same department and a General Worker: Tar Patching earns more than a 
Supervisor: Tar Patching. As a result, the workers are not so enthusiastic to apply for 
promotional posts.  This also becomes difficult when acquiring and retaining talent because 
prospective candidates do not see EMM as an organisation to work for.  The implementation 
of the collective agreement has consequences for recruitment as well because when the 
Municipality decides to negotiate with the prospective applicant, they find that the applicant 
earns more than the last notch on the new scale (T-scale).  Consequently, the Municipality 
cannot better the salary as it cannot negotiate above the last notch on the new scale.  
 
1.3.1. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in 2010 
On 24 February 2010, EMM received a memorandum from striking SAMWU members 
because they believed that the then Mayor had poorly led the Municipality and, as a result, 
had to resign.  The union was also unhappy that many municipal jobs were outsourced 
without consulting the union.  It was not long after that when the SAMWU members embarked 
on a nationwide strike on 12 April 2010.  SAMWU’s demands included the extension of the 
Job Evaluation Collective Agreement and a wage cap on the salaries of the Councillors, 
Municipal Managers and section 57 employees (Annual Industrial Action Report, 2010).  
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SAMWU also said that the job evaluation and wage curve agreement should have come into 
effect in 2004 and wanted employees to get at least two years’ back pay. The strike ended on 
21 April 2010, when SAMWU, IMATU and SALGA signed an agreement.  From 1 July 2010, 
new salary scales (T-sales) based on the different categories of municipalities would be 
implemented.  Also, workers would be paid market-related salaries from 1 July 2010 even 
though they would be on a slightly lower wage curve than was initially proposed by SALGA 
(Annual Industrial Action Report, 2010).What seems to have not been explained or clear to 
the employees was that their salaries would be on a lower wage curve than expected. 
 
1.3.2. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in 2011 
The strike in 2011 was about a three-year wage agreement (2009-2012),where the parties 
had agreed that, if the CPI was up, any party was free to reopen the negotiations; however, 
the employer did not want to reopen the negotiations (See Appendix 4).Because of rising food 
costs, electricity and transport, and in the wake of escalating executive pay, workers 
demanded double-digit wage increases which were above the country’s inflation rate (Annual 
Industrial Action Report, 2011).The municipal workers returned to work after their three-week 
strike after SALGA refused to give in to their demands for an 18% increase, which was later 
reduced to a 10%increase (Annual Industrial Action Report, 2011). This was as a result of an 
earlier agreement which was still in force that allowed for a possibility of reopening of 
negotiations in the event of a rise in inflation.  According to the report, SALGA indicated that it 
could not afford the two-digit wage increase demands as it would have to raise the costs of 
services provided by municipalities and this would put pressure on the already-burdened 
citizens. The strike was not effective as it also failed to attract the normal support seen from 
similar strikes by SAMWU (Annual Industrial Action Report, 2011). 
 
Another strike that affected Ekurhuleni directly was when workers affiliated to SAMWU 
engaged in protest action on25 February 2011 in solidarity with seven of their colleagues who 
were dismissed following reports of an assault of a presiding officer during a disciplinary 
hearing. A contract worker at the Nigel Cemetery was allegedly assaulted by the striking 
workers and rescued by police before he was set alight (Annual Industrial Action Report, 
2011). 
 
1.3.3. Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality in 2012 
No strike action was recorded at EMM for 2012; however, there was strike action by SAMWU 
members in other local municipalities including Mafikeng Municipality, Ethekwini Municipality 
and Moqhaka Municipality in Kroonstad (Annual Industrial Action Report, 2012).  A wage 
settlement was concluded without strike incidents after a three-year wage deal was reached 
between SAMWU, IMATU and SALGA (Annual Industrial Action Report, 2012).  
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1.3.4. The Categorisation and Job Evaluation Wage Curve Agreement 
The categorisation and job evaluation wage curve agreement was signed on 21 April 2010 
(See Appendix 5).  The main objective of the agreement was to provide for the categorisation 
of municipalities, wage curves for the different categories of municipalities, and to provide for 
employees to receive new wage rates as a result of job evaluation.  The agreement was not 
implemented for existing employees at Roads and Stormwater Department; as a result, the 
existing employees stayed on the X-scale.  However, new employees that have joined the 
Municipality after the 1 July 2010 are employed on a T-scale, so if an employee moves on 
promotion or sideways to another position, they move to T-scales.  This means that 
promotional opportunities have been curtailed as there is no longer any financial advantage. 
Also, not all municipalities had evaluation results of posts on the TASK system and, therefore, 
did not implement the wage curve.  Because of this, both SAMWU and IMATU took the 
employer to the Labour Court in order to prevent SALGBC from implementing the wage curve 
agreement.  The court ruled in favour of the unions, but still, the ruling of the court has not 
been implemented by SALGA (see Appendix 6). 
 
1.4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
1.4.1. Problem statement 
The process and the implications of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
were not clearly explained to the employees, especially on how the changes would affect the 
categorisation of their jobs and the impact this would have on their salaries.  
 
1.4.2. Objectives 
First objective: To describe the collective agreements that were signed in 2010 as a result of 
a need to categorise municipalities and evaluate jobs and the consequences of the collective 
agreements on employees through the study of documents supplemented by interviews. 
 
Second objective: To investigate if there has been a change in attitudes of the employees in 
the Roads and Stormwater Department of Ekurhuleni after the implementation of the job 
evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. The key attitudes to be measured were: 
union commitment, organisational commitment, job satisfaction and management satisfaction. 
 
1.4.3. Research questions 
The first objective led to the following research questions: 
 
a) What was the nature of the wage curve and job evaluation collective agreement? 
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b) What were the consequences of the implementation of the wage curve and job 
evaluation collective agreement to the employees of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality? 
 
The second objective led to the following research questions related to the attitudes of the 
employees and the change in these attitudes after the implementation of the collective 
agreement: 
 
a) What was the change in employee attitudes post the introduction of the wage curve, 
in particular, the attitudes towards organisational commitment, job satisfaction, 
management satisfaction and union commitment? 
b) What is the relationship between the sub-groups and employee attitudes before the 
wage curve agreement implementation? 
c) What is the relationship between sub-groups and employee attitudes post the wage 
curve agreement implementation? 
d) What is the relationship between the sub-groups and the change in employee 
attitudes pre and post the wage curve agreement implementation? 
 
1.5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A research design is the plan which is used to obtain research participants and collect 
information from them for the purposes of solving a problem or proving a hypothesis (Welman 
& Kruger, 2001).  There are various methods that a researcher can use in order to collect the 
information and prove the hypothesis; it is up to the researcher to choose which method will 
be reliable and valid.  The nature of this research is descriptive, and structured self-
administered questionnaires (Appendix 3) were used.  Face-to-face interviews were also 
conducted using an interview guideline (Appendix 7 & 8) in order to collect the information 
from the employees of the Roads and Stormwater Department of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality. 
 
1.5.1. General approach 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods has been applied to collect 
both qualitative and quantitative data.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with some of 
the employees, and the others were given a self-administered questionnaire. 
 
1.5.2. Population and sampling 
The Roads and Stormwater Department of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality was selected 
for this study.  The Roads Department has eleven depots, and only four were selected.  
Purposive sampling was used to select these four depots as they were affected by the 
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implementation of the job and wage curve collective agreement, and all the employees of 
these depots constituted a sample. 
 
1.5.3. Measuring instruments 
The research instrument used was a questionnaire which included four constructs, which 
were organisational commitment, union commitment, job satisfaction and management 
satisfaction.  The questionnaire also requested the respondents to indicate some personal 
details such as age, race, years of service, and salary level scale.  The questionnaire was 
adapted from the work of Chaulk and Brown (2008) and Kigozi (2012).  Another measuring 
instrument used was an interview guide which was used to interview union representatives 
and the other to interview managers. 
 
1.5.4. Data collection 
Questionnaires were distributed to all employees at the various depots, and they had to drop 
off a completed questionnaire in the box that was provided.  Before the questionnaires were 
distributed, the researcher met with the employees during their lunch breaks to explain what 
the survey was about and the importance of completing the questionnaire.  Two interview 
guidelines were used to interview shopstewards and managers. 
 
1.5.5. Data analysis 
The responses from the questionnaires were captured on an Excel spreadsheet.  For 
descriptive statistics frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations were used to 
analyse the data. For inferential statistics student t-test was done and Cohen’s d rule was 
applied to the results. Further, where appropriate ANOVA and Scheffé tests were used to 
measure statistical differences for the impact of each sub-group on the organisational 
commitment, union commitment, job satisfaction and management satisfaction. 
 
1.6. STRUCTURE OF THE TREATISE 
The treatise is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 was an introduction outlying the research problem, objectives and questions, and 
briefly summarising the research design. 
 
In Chapter 2, the researcher reviews the literature relating to collective bargaining, strikes and 
conflict, the structure of bargaining in local government in South Africa, change management 
and the employee attitudes affected by strikes and the implementation of collective 
agreements.  The four constructs, which are organisational commitment, union commitment, 
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job satisfaction and management satisfaction and are encompassed in the questionnaire, are 
also discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
In Chapter 3, the researcher explains the research design and methods used for the study.  
The research questions and the main objectives of the study are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the research results; the results are presented in table form and are 
interpreted and discussed later on in the chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 summarises the main findings, draws conclusions and makes recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Collective bargaining is a process that ensures an economic exchange between the employer 
and the employee (Botha & Morajane, 2011).  Generally, collective bargaining is when parties 
bargain collectively in order to achieve or reach an agreement on certain issues relating to 
employers and employees.  This type of bargaining also involves some negotiations because 
the two parties need to negotiate to reach a settlement or to agree on issues.  If issues at the 
bargaining council are not resolved or the parties do not agree on the issues, the employees 
and their union may engage in a strike action to force an employer to agree to their demands 
as much as the employer can lockout the employees in order to force them to accept a 
demand. 
 
There are different views that theorists have regarding collective bargaining.  There are 
theorists who are called the Webbs, who coined the term collective bargaining (Jackson, 
1986).These theorists believed that collective bargaining is about negotiations that concern 
pay and conditions of employment between trade union and the employer.  Bendix (2010) 
states that this description may be insufficient as it does not highlight the interactive nature of 
the process, and it also fails to describe the dynamic nature of collective bargaining, its 
reliance on the power of the parties and its susceptibility to outside influences.  Flanders 
(1968 )  in Jackson (1986) also criticises Webb’s view by stating that collective bargaining is a 
rule-making activity that regulates individual bargaining and does not replace it, and it is best 
seen as a method of job regulation, which should be compared to unilateral regulation rather 
than to individual bargaining (Jackson, 1986).  Flanders (1968) further highlighted a few 
differences between collective bargaining and individual bargaining as follows: 
 
Table 2.1: Differences between collective bargaining and individual bargaining 
Individual Bargaining Collective Bargaining 
 Is about selling or buying a 
particular commodity. 
 Does not involve any buying or 
selling but is just an agreement on 
conditions under which buying or 
selling takes place. 
 Terms and conditions of trade are 
clearly stipulated. 
 Minimum terms and conditions are 
only stipulated. 
 It is a market activity.  It is a political activity. 
 It is restricted to economic matters.  It is undertaken by professional 
negotiators. 
  It is concerned with workers’ rights, 
the control of industry, etc. 
 10 
 
Flanders’ view of collective bargaining is criticised by Fox (1975) in Jackson, (1986), who 
states that Flanders erred in making a comparison between individual and collective 
bargaining.  According to Fox (1975), an alternative explanation to individual bargaining is 
that, it should be viewed as a process whereby parties deploy arguments, present evidence 
and issue threats; it may not end in an agreement and may not result in a contract into which 
both parties decide to enter.  Fox (1975) in Jackson (1986) further argues that Flanders 
(1968) erred in suggesting that individual and collective bargaining are different because one 
ends in a contract, whereas the other ends in a rule making. Fox does not deny that collective 
bargaining involves diplomatic power, but he also states that individual bargaining also does 
involve diplomatic power (Jackson, 1986).   
 
Fox (1975) as cited in Jackson (1986) also challenges Flanders’ view that the individual and 
collective bargaining differ because a refusal to conclude a contract is taken at face value in 
individual bargaining, whereas, in the latter, it is seen as a bargaining trick.  Lastly, Fox (1975) 
further contends that the differences between the collective and the individual refusal are 
seen as ones of contingency rather than principle (Jackson, 1986).  According to Jackson’s 
analysis (Jackson, 1986) of these theories, Flanders’ reasoning is that the main function of 
collective bargaining and trade unionism is political rather than economic, and that workers 
are concerned with issues of management. 
 
Dunlop (1958) as cited by Maree, (2011) brings another view where collective bargaining is 
seen as one that constitutes a sub-system of an industrial relations system.  According to this 
system, there are groups of actors, which are the employers or employer organisations and 
the employees and their unions; the set of rules, which are agreements that are negotiated by 
the actors; and the environment, which consists of industry, budgetary constraints and power 
relations of the actors (Maree, 2011).  A comprehensive definition of collective bargaining is 
then given as  
 
a process, necessitated by a conflict of needs, interests, goals, values, perceptions 
and ideologies, but resting on a basic interdependency and commonality of interest, 
whereby employees/employee collectives and employer/employer collectives, by the 
conduct of continued negotiation and the application of pressure and counter 
pressure, attempt to achieve some balance between the fulfilment of the needs, goals 
and interests of management on the one hand and employees on the other – the 
extent to which either party achieves its objectives depending on the nature of the 
relationship itself, each party’s source and use of power, the power balance between 
them, the organisational and strategic effectiveness of each party, as well as the type 
of bargaining structure and the prevalent economic, socio-political and other 
conditions. (Bendix, 2010, p. 252) 
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The right to bargain collectively contains many rights and freedoms associated with collective 
bargaining.  These rights include a right to bargain collectively; to use collective economic 
power in pursuit of a demand; and a positive right with the concomitant duty to bargain, which 
is a state-enforced duty to bargain (Cheadle, 2005). According to Bendix (2010), collective 
bargaining might not occur because it is workers who form themselves into collectives and 
demand that employers bargain with them. 
 
It has been found in some research by Foster, Murrie and Larid ( 2009) that the withdrawal of 
an employer’s support for collective bargaining is due to the absence of awareness on the 
part of employers to the benefits of entering into talks with the unions (Meyer & Davids, 2012). 
According to Barker (2007), an individual employer and individual employee do not have 
equal bargaining power; hence, it is essential that according to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), mechanisms should be in place to protect the individual employee against 
exploitation.  Factors such as unemployment position, demand conditions, profitability and 
production, elasticity of demand, monopolistic conditions, export orientation, capacity to deal 
with a strike and the standard of living of workers determine the relative power of the 
collective bargaining parties and the outcome of collective bargaining (Barker, 2007). 
 
2.2. BARGAINING STYLES 
There are two types of collective bargaining according to Bendix (2010), and these are: 
 
a) Distributive Bargaining: it occurs in the labour relations situation and is the most 
common type.  It occurs when employers and employees are in opposing positions 
and when a win for one represents a loss for the other.  Distributive bargaining 
centres on economic issues, and power tactics are used by both sides. 
b) Integrative Bargaining: it is when both parties have the same preference for a 
successful outcome, and they strive for a win-win situation.   
 
2.3. IMPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 Collective bargaining can assist to regulate and institutionalise industrial conflict 
(Jackson, 1986).  Even though collective bargaining does not prevent industrial 
conflict, it provides a platform for discussion.   
 Collective bargaining allows conflicting parties to view the situation more impassively 
and gives them a chance to review the consequences of a possible course of action. 
 It absorbs energy that might be directed in the wrong direction whereby both parties 
(workers and employers) devote their time to winning concessions in the bargaining 
table. 
 Collective bargaining can assist in the facilitation of improved relations and gradual 
change. 
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According to Jackson (1986), the foregoing implications are based on the view that one 
should not make any assumptions and that both parties will sometimes compromise on 
issues.  Employees do not need to achieve all of their demands to make them believe that the 
collective bargaining was worthwhile, but it is of utmost importance that they should be given 
some reward if they are not to discount collective bargaining as a worthless activity (Jackson, 
1986).  According to Barker (2007), the overall benefit of collective bargaining is that workers 
have more influence over their working environment and helps in avoiding exploitative actions 
by the employer, thus reducing government intervention. 
 
2.4. BRIEF HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In South African history, collective bargaining has been developed as a means where 
employer and employer organisations together with the employees and their unions can meet 
and bargain.  As far back as the 1900s, there are records of strike actions in South Africa 
(which were a result of minimal collective bargaining processes); these records show how the 
strike actions started, how they were resolved and how they were regulated (Finnemore, 
2002).  According to Swanepoel (1999), a strike is a social phenomenon of vast complexity, 
which in its totality is not susceptible to complete description, let alone a complete 
explanation.  
 
According to Beittel (1995), the 1913 miners strike was also a challenge to the authority of 
capital. This was because workers had potential allies among discontented rural Whites and 
the three-year old Union government was inexperienced at repressing popular dissent.   
 
The Rand Rebellion that took place in January 1922, where about 22 000 White miners went 
on strike was the highlight.  This strike was a critical turning point in the industrial relations of 
South Africa because it led to the drafting and passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 
1924 (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006).This Act was, according to Finnemore (2002), the first 
labour legislation in South Africa which structured relations between the employees and the 
employers, but it excluded “Black” workers from the definition of an “employee”.  Maree 
(2011) clearly put forward that the centrepiece of collective bargaining legislation in South 
Africa was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which was the result of the Rand Rebellion. 
 
Van der Velden and Visser (2006) state that the government had until this period adopted a 
laissez-faire approach to labour relations and had intervened in industrial unrest through the 
use of martial law when security was threatened.  Nel, Swanepoel, Kirsten, Erasmus, and 
Tsabadi (2005) also agree that the Rand Rebellion was the turning point in South Africa’s 
pattern of employment relations, as it marked the final parting of the ways of Black and White 
workers, and it produced a conciliation system via the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. 
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Because of a minimal and managed bargaining system, Beittel (1995) states that the 1930s 
were characterised by isolated but intermittent outbreaks of labour unrest. Comparatively, the 
early 1940s were marked by a wave of successful strikes by Black workers in the transport, 
manufacturing and commercial sectors.  In 1946, the labour protest spread to the gold mines 
with a week-long strike by more than 70 000 African miners but was ruthlessly suppressed by 
the police.  There were also protests by White workers during the 1946-1947 period, and 
these strikes had a political element to them in that they helped create the conditions for the 
narrow electoral victory of the National Party in 1948 (Beittel, 1995).   
 
The apartheid policies that were passed by the national government after it came into power 
were opposed by the township residents through ‘stay-aways’ from work and boycotts of 
municipal services (Beittel, 1995).  According to Beittel, these demonstrations advanced 
political demands against discriminatory legislation, and mobilisation was based on township 
residence, and people called for political concessions in addition to increased wages.  Nel, 
Swanepoel, Kirsten, Erasmus & Tsabadi (2005) state that, it was after the Second World War 
that Black trade unions increased, and a Bill was passed in 1947 in order to provide mediation 
and arbitration relief to Black workers; nonetheless, when the National Party came into power, 
it was never promulgated into law.  In the period between 1924 and 1973, there were strikes 
recorded, but of importance is that the legislation that came into effect during that period 
provided for tools to settle disputes through Industrial Councils and registration of White trade 
unions and employer organisations, and Blacks were not entitled to take part in collective 
bargaining (Nel et al., 2005).   
 
In 1960, the African National Congress (ANC) was banned, and many political leaders were 
jailed, and others went into exile.  Van der Velden and Visser (2006) state that there was no 
official strike organised by the labour movement in 1961, but there was a call by the ANC for 
stay-aways and boycotts. The 1960s were generally free of industrial conflict (Van der Velden 
& Visser, 2006). 
 
In 1973, there were massive strikes in Durban, and according to Finnemore (2002), the real 
power of Black workers was demonstrated without the backing of any formal organisation, as 
there were no trade unions involved. Van der Velden and Visser (2006) state that the Durban 
strikes made no fixed demands, but the actions were indicative of general dissatisfaction 
among Black employees.  From this, it was evident that the dual system of employment was 
not working but rather created conflict among workers, hence the Durban strikes emerged 
(Nel et al., 2005). 
 
Anstey (1999) believes that the Durban strikes of 1973 are widely credited as representing 
the birth of successful mobilisation of Black workers in the economy as they lead to the 
establishment of the Weihahn Commission.  Jones (1985) states that the Weihahn 
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Commission report marked a defining moment in the evolution of South African industrial 
relations.  The Commission was set up to inquire, report and make recommendations in 
connection with the existing labour legislation, and its point of departure was the start of the 
then government’s new labour policy, which made ground for the current labour legislation 
(Nel et al., 2005).  Of note as well is that, in the early 1970s, the strikes and boycotts were 
more political rather than labour-related, and there is a noted increase of strike action in the 
1980s (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006).  
 
Beittel (1995) states that Black workers undertook a wide range of protests that were 
disruptive, and the strikes were over wages and working conditions, but strikes in parastatals 
and other strategic industries advanced political demands, and most other forms of labour 
protests were viewed as disruptive by management and the state.  Van der Velden and Visser 
(2006) state that the unions that emerged in the 1980s displayed militancy, which was to be 
expected of a new movement, particularly one attempting to establish itself in an entrenched 
system.   
 
The Great Miners Strike of 1987 was a substantive strike, as it marked a pivotal shift in the 
historical relationship between labour, capital and the state (Beittel, 1995).  Van der Velden 
and Visser (2006) state that the economic recession of the middle eighties and the ANC’s 
intention to make the country ungovernable were among the issues responsible for the 
political and economic discontent.  According to Godfrey and Bamu (2012), a very important 
lesson in South Africa’s history of collective bargaining is that the country does not have a 
long and strong tradition of enterprise-level bargaining.  Before the 1970s and 1980s, 
collective bargaining took place in Industrial Councils, and it was during the mid-1970s to 
about 1990 where enterprise-level bargaining became common and challenged the 
dominance of centralised bargaining (Godfrey & Bamu, 2012). 
  
Godfrey and Bamu (2012) believe that the history of collective bargaining in South Africa 
brings about two views. One view is that it makes trade unions to increasingly depend on the 
centralised bargaining structure by either making concessions in order to accommodate the 
requirements of the employers and also to maintain strong shop floor structures. Another view 
is that focusing on centralised bargaining leads to a weakening of a shop floor organisation 
and less control by union members over the collective bargaining process.   
 
Because of various strikes and the fact that Black workers were not part of the bargaining 
system of the time, workers in the public sector mobilised themselves to form the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU).Nonetheless, they were strongly resisted by the 
government, which favoured its own in-house unions whose leaders were co-opted by 
management (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006).  After the strikes in the 1980s, South Africa 
held its first national democratic election in 1994,and the labour relations of the country took a 
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turn.  Maree (2011) supports this statement by saying that, further transformation of collective 
bargaining took place after the political transformation of South Africa in 1994.   
 
The political transformation brought back majority rule under the ANC-led government, with 
Nelson Mandela as the first Black president of the Republic of South Africa (Maree, 
2011).Various pieces of legislation were passed in order to regulate and improve 
employer/employee relations.  Some of these pieces of legislation were the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995, which extended full collective bargaining rights to almost the entire public 
service as well as domestic and farm workers and changed the name ‘Industrial Councils’ to 
‘Bargaining Councils’. Other pieces of legislation included the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, Employment Equity Act and Skills Development Act.  There was, however, 
wage disputes in the public and private sectors such as health, police and municipal services, 
which led to a renewed spate of strikes from 1996 to 1999 (Van der Velden & Visser, 2006). 
 
The following are examples of strikes that took place in local government sector (Annual 
Industrial Action Report, 2010): 
 
i) On 24 February 2010, EMM received a memorandum from striking members of 
SAMWU.  SAMWU believed that the Mayor had led the Municipality poorly and, as a 
result, the Mayor had to resign and municipality jobs were outsourced without 
consulting the union. 
ii) On 25 February 2010, SAMWU members at Madibeng Local Municipality in the North 
West went on strike due to the dismissal of the acting Chief Financial Officer. 
iii) On 3 March 2010, traffic officers of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
embarked on an illegal strike. 
iv) On 12 April 2010, SAMWU members embarked on a nationwide strike.  The main 
reason for the strike was that SAMWU demanded a 60th percentile, while SALGA 
offered a 50th percentile; it was claimed that this would put municipal salaries on par 
with wages in other sectors of the economy.  SAMWU also demanded that a job 
evaluation must grade all posts including top management; there should be no 
lawyers on disciplinary processes, and lastly, SAMWU demanded the extension of 
the Job Evaluation Collective Agreement and a wage cap on the salaries of 
councillors, municipal managers and section 57 employees.   
v) On 22 November 2010, SAMWU reported that about 300 of its members at the 
Hibiscus Coast Municipality, who were angry about the grading of some employees, 
went on strike. 
 
About 1593 working days were lost to work stoppages per 1000 working South Africans in 
2010 compared to 119 in 2009 (Annual Industrial Action Report, 2010).  This means that 2010 
can be regarded as the year where most industries were affected by  strike actions.  In an 
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article by Sibanyoni (2010), Professor Buhlungu of the University of Johannesburg is of the 
view that labour is not holding employers to ransom by striking, and when workers start 
striking, they are wrongly described as immoral and unpatriotic, but when the employers 
come up with excuses to give lower increases when the economy is down, not many people 
criticise them.  The year 2010 saw a rise in the strike action, and Levy (cited in 
Sibanyoni,2010) notes that the strikes that occurred could turn public opinion against labour, 
but some unions have used the World Cup card as a tool to negotiate for higher increases. 
 
According to Hofman (2009), those who support centralised bargaining state that having the 
same wages and conditions of service throughout an industry promotes industrial peace. On 
the other hand, those who oppose it state that centralised bargaining lacks flexibility and 
prevents employers from offering employees lower wages or less favourable conditions.   
 
The opponents of centralised bargaining state that it becomes difficult for small businesses or 
businesses that are not well established to compete with established businesses and, 
therefore, it slows economic growth and hinders job creation (Hofman, 2009). Jackson (1986) 
states that collective bargaining is centralised in Sweden more than it is in most European 
countries.  This has, however, changed as the Swedish metal workers and Volvo withdrew 
from centralised negotiations, and bargaining swayed thereafter towards the company and 
sector level (Freeman & Gibbons, 1995). 
 
Meyer and Davids (2012) state that collective bargaining in South Africa is based on the 
principle of voluntarism, but a system of complete voluntarism does not exist.  According to 
Maree (2011), collective bargaining in South Africa is not only conducted by bargaining 
councils, but at plant and company level, bargaining also takes place.  Because employees 
participate in a collective bargaining process, their interests can be enforced by themselves or 
their trade union representatives (Botha & Morajane, 2011).  According to Botha and 
Morajane (2011), the collective bargaining process ensures economic exchange between the 
collective workforce and the employer. 
 
The economic and social legacy of apartheid, especially the high levels of structural 
unemployment and the radically changed economic environment have put enormous 
pressure on the current centralised bargaining system (Godfrey & Bamu, 2012).  Godfrey and 
Bamu (2012) further note that, although the current industrial relations system promotes 
centralised collective bargaining system, there is more ambivalence to it in the wider political 
system because many businesses see it as a main cause of rigidity in the labour market.  
According to Godfrey and Bamu (2012), the state of the bargaining council system in the 
private sector differs with the strength of centralised bargaining in the public sector, with the 
latter becoming the centre of gravity of the collective bargaining system.   
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An important point highlighted by Godfrey and Bamu (2012) is the fact that the new 
amendments to the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (LRA) focus mostly on issues concerning 
casualisation and externalisation at the expense of a collective bargaining framework.  From 
their research, Godfrey and Bamu (2012) have found that bargaining councils are facing 
severe challenges, and the future of centralised bargaining depends on bargaining playing a 
greater role in the effective regulation of the casualisation and externalisation of employment. 
 
2.5. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK GUIDING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
2.5.1. Constitution 
Strike or strike action in South Africa is a right, and this right is contained in section 23 (2) (c) 
of the Constitution of South Africa Act 106 of 1996, which states that ‘every worker has the 
right to strike’. Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke, and Strydom (2011) state 
that the whole of section 23 protects a number of fundamental labour rights such as 
everyone’s right to fair labour practices, the right to freedom of association and the right to 
organise and bargain collectively.   
 
According to Cheadle (2005), section 23 of the Constitution guarantees a balanced package 
of rights, freedoms and duties related to labour relations, and this includes the right to strike, 
which is a powerful tool for workers to persuade the employer to bargain collectively.  It has 
been found in some research that the withdrawal of employer’s support for collective 
bargaining is due to the absence of awareness on the part of employers to the benefits of 
entering into talks with the unions (Meyer & Davids, 2012). According to Hofman (2009), the 
Constitution does not guarantee central bargaining, but central bargaining is part of the 
Labour Relations Act.No 66 of 1995.  
 
2.5.2. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
The ILO was formed in 1919, and its foundations are based on humanitarian, political and 
economic motives. The ILO is a valuable source of labour standards across countries, and 
South Africa is a member state (Basson et al., 2011).  Through Conventions and 
Recommendations, the ILO has built up a set of principles which regulate various labour 
matters, and the ILO Conventions have played a formative role in the development of South 
African labour law (Basson et al., 2011).   
 
There are two Conventions that are relevant to collective bargaining that are set out by the 
ILO, and according to Basson et al. (2011), South Africa must comply with the following 
provisions: 
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a) Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 87 of 1948 – 
this convention establishes the right of all workers and employers to form and join 
organisations of their own without prior authorisation or interference by public authorities. 
b) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention 98 of 1949 – it provides for 
protection of anti-union discrimination, for protection of workers and employers’ organisations 
against interference by each other, and for measures to promote collective bargaining. 
 
According to Brand, Lotter, Steadman,and Ngcukaitobi (2008), collective bargaining is defined 
in the Collective Bargaining Convention of 1981 as that which includes all negotiations which 
take place between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employer 
organisations.  It also includes negotiations between one or more workers’ organisations for 
the purposes of determining working conditions and terms of employment, regulating relations 
between employers and employees and regulating relations between employers or their 
organisations and workers’ organisation/s.   
 
Furthermore, article 5 of the Collective Bargaining Convention provides the following 
guidelines: 
 
a) Collective bargaining should be made possible for all employers and groups of 
workers in the branches of activity covered by the Convention. 
b) Collective bargaining should be progressively extended to the matters covered in 
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2 of the Convention. 
c) The establishment of rules of procedure agreed between employers’ and workers’ 
organisations should be encouraged. 
d) Collective bargaining should not be hampered by the absence of rules governing the 
procedure to be used or by the inadequacy or inappropriateness of such rules. 
e) Bodies and procedures for the settlement of labour disputes should be conceived so 
as to contribute to the promotion of collective bargaining.  
 
2.5.3. The Labour Relations Act (LRA) 
Cheadle (2005) states that the LRA gives effect to three elements which contain a range of 
rights and freedoms associated with collective bargaining.  These elements include a right to 
bargain collectively, to use collective economic power in pursuit of a demand, and a positive 
right with the concomitant duty to bargain.  The LRA also gives effect to the right to use 
collective economic power in the provisions relating to strikes, lockouts, and replacement 
labour and picketing (Cheadle, 2005).  
 
These three elements of the right to bargain provide the institutional infrastructure for 
voluntary collective bargaining at sector level and for the binding nature of collective 
agreements (Cheadle, 2005).  According to Godfrey and Bamu (2012), the main reason to 
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introduce the LRA was to provide a framework for centralised bargaining, and it was also the 
focus of the negotiations at the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC). 
 
Section 30 of the LRA highlights guidelines to be followed by bargaining councils when they 
are forming their constitutions, and the main functions of the bargaining councils are set out in 
section 27.  According to Bendix (2010), a bargaining council plays two main functions, that of 
collective bargaining and that of dispute resolution. Hofman (2009) also points out that a 
feature of central bargaining in South Africa is that the Minister of Labour has the power to 
extend collective agreements to all employers and employees in an industry even if they did 
not take part in the central bargaining that led to a collective agreement. 
 
2.5.4 Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector 
According to Maree (2011), representivity in the public service bargaining councils is very 
high. This can be attributed to the fact that after public services were granted – the same 
collective bargaining rights as the private sector in 1995 – and bargaining councils in the 
public service were established by statute, public service trade unions grew rapidly.    
 
Collective bargaining in the public sector is regulated by the Public Service Co-ordinating 
Bargaining Council (PSCBC).This council represents the government departments, excluding 
members of the National Defence Force, members of the National Intelligence Agency, 
members of South African Secret Service and members of the South African National 
Academy of Intelligence.  The following bargaining councils form part of the PSCBC together 
with the state as the employer, and for the purpose of this treatise, the first (GPSSBC) will be 
discussed: 
 
a) The General Public Service Sector Bargaining Council (GPSSBC) 
b) The Public Health and Social Development Sector Bargaining Council (PHSDSBC) 
c) The Safety and Security Sector Bargaining Council (SSSBC) 
d) The Education Labour Relations Council 
  
The General Public Service Sector Bargaining Council (GPSSBC) was designed in terms of 
the PSCBC resolution 10 of 1999 as a bargaining council of the general public sector  
 
The GPSSBC operates nationally with provincial and national chambers, and like any other 
bargaining council, it was established to facilitate collective bargaining and dispute resolution.  
The main objectives of the council are to: 
a) Promote labour peace in the General Public Service Sector. 
b) Promote and maintain sound relationships between employer and employees. 
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c) Negotiate and bargain collectively to reach an agreement on matters of mutual 
interest. 
d) Provide mechanisms for the prevention and effective and expeditious resolution of 
disputes. 
e) Conclude, supervise and enforce collective agreements. 
f) Comply with its powers and duties in terms of the LRA and the Council’s Constitution. 
 
The parties that form the Council are the State as the employer and the unions, which include 
National Education, Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU), Police and Prisons Civil 
Rights Union (POPCRU) and Public Servants Association (PSA), and this comprises nine 
Provincial Governments, 93 Provincial Departments, 34 National Departments and 305 000 
Employees.  The main function of collective bargaining is a national competency which is 
influenced by the provincial and national chambers, and the function of dispute resolution is 
centralised and insourced within the organisation, with an outsourced panel of Conciliators 
and Arbitrators. 
 
2.5.5 Collective Bargaining in Local Government Sector 
In South Africa, collective bargaining in local government is centralised, meaning that 
whatever agreements reached within the South African Local Government Bargaining Council 
(SALGBC) apply to all municipal employees and employers (Van der Walt et al., 2012).   
 
Collective bargaining in the local government sector is regulated by SALGBC, with SALGA 
representing the employer and two major unions, IMATU and SAMWU, representing the 
employees.  IMATU represents 73 000 municipal and allied employees whereas SAMWU is 
the majority union, with 122 000 members.  SAMWU is affiliated to COSATU, whereas IMATU 
is not affiliated nor does it support any political party.  There are 278 municipalities that are 
represented at SALGA (Van der Walt et al., 2012).   
 
The main functions of SALGBC are to conclude collective agreements and enforce those 
agreements and to also provide a dispute resolution function for the local government sector 
(Van der Walt et al., 2012).  According to Meyer and Davids (2012), the engagement between 
SAMWU, IMATU and SALGA has led to many deadlocks and protest actions, and strikes 
have become the instruments of negotiation and are used as a tool to resolve disputes.  
Meyer and Davids (2012) further state that the underlying cause of strike action at local 
government level is often alleged to be more than just about wages and terms and conditions. 
 
2.6. STRIKES AND THE STRIKE PROCESS 
Industrial action is a form of conflict manifestation in the context of employment relations, 
which is collective and organised, and strikes are one example (Nel et al., 2005).  Jones 
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(1985) noted that industrial relations and trade union development in South Africa were 
undergoing a fundamental transformation.  According to Barker (2007), strike action is a 
fundamental part of collective bargaining, and the power relationships between the employer 
and employee would be deformed without the right to strike.  According to Botha and 
Morajane (2011), although the right to strike is recognised by the Constitution, it is not an 
absolute right, as it can be limited. 
 
Workers engage in a strike action for various reasons, but wages or salaries are the most 
common factors that lead to a strike action (Nel et al., 2005).  Nel et al. (2005) note that, in 
1998, wages were the single most important factor causing strikes.  Therefore, generally, 
workers strike because they want higher salaries, but in the process of their strike action, 
some issues might also come up, such as poor working conditions, and working hours. Nel et 
al. (2005) also state that economic factors (such as the inflation rate and cost of living), 
political factors (labour legislation) and employment relations factors may be factors that 
trigger employees to strike.  Barker (2007) sees strikes as a healthy sign of a free economy 
and may help to build long-term working relationships. According to Chaulk and Brown 
(2008), the results of a strike action do not only relate to loss of income, but they negatively 
impact on worker’s experience and psychological experience as well.  With that said, 
employees might not only lose wages or salaries during a strike action but their work 
experience and sometimes employment service. 
 
When the workers decide to embark on a strike action, it might be peaceful, or it might not, 
depending on what has triggered the strike and how long it takes for management to resolve 
the issues. The strike action is sometimes a long process, and there are simple logistics that 
might delay the process, such as setting up meetings between the employee representatives 
and management, but the longest is the process of negotiation, as both parties need to find a 
common ground and sometimes get a mandate from those they represent.  In a research 
study conducted by Kaufman (1982 cited in Bhana, 1996), strikes are not rational and their 
occurrence must be attributed to mistakes and faulty negotiations. Most of the preparations of 
parties in negotiations centre on planning for potential strike action (SALGA, 2010).  The 
unions strategise on how to win mass support, both from the workforce and from the 
community, while the employers, on the other hand, spend much time on preparing for strike 
contingency plans. 
 
With all the processes of a strike action, some people view strikes as disrupting the 
production process and the economy.  Whether strikes are political or work-related, their 
outcomes affect the economy of the country.  In the South African context, strikes and 
protests have become cultural, as they have come to be associated with a particular way of 
doing strikes (Petrus & Isaacs-Martin, 2011).  Bhana (1996), on the other hand, holds a 
different view by stating that strikes are seen as an investment of giving up current resources 
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in the hope of gaining larger returns in the future.  In research conducted by Eaton (cited in 
Bhana, 1996), it was found that strikes tend to be a good investment for unions and a poor 
investment for the employer.  Bhana (1996) also states that, South Africa has witnessed a 
sharp rise in industrial strikes, where, in particular, work stoppages raise vital public policy 
issues and both the trade unions and the employers advance emotional arguments in support 
of their arguments.  
 
A definition of the term “strike” is contained in section 213 of the LRA, and parties to the 
collective bargaining system should comply with the requirements as set out in the LRA.  The 
definition of a strike limits the right to strike, in that if the action taken by the employees does 
not comply with the definition of a strike, it cannot constitute a strike and cannot qualify for 
protection in terms of the LRA.  Kgosimore (2007) states that a right to strike is not an 
absolute right as per the fundamental principles held by the International Labour Organisation 
and that its exercise should be in line with other fundamental rights of citizens and employers.   
 
Sub-sections (ss) 64 and 65, however, give a guide where certain requirements must be met 
before a strike can be seen as “protected” whereby employees cannot be dismissed for 
participating in a strike.  If the provisions of ss64 and 65 have not been met, then the strike is 
seen as “unprotected”, i.e. where an employer could interdict the employees from engaging in 
a strike, claim damages, and possibly dismiss the unprotected strikers fairly (Le Roux, 2004).  
This then serves as a guide to the employee representatives that they cannot just leave work 
and engage in a strike action; there are collective agreements that are in place and those 
should be noted. 
 
There are, however, instances where employees just engage in a strike action which is 
referred to as a wildcat strike.  Swanepoel (1999) defines a wildcat strike as a sudden 
unauthorised stoppage of work with little or no perceived warning to management, which can 
be extremely traumatic and disruptive.  Botha (1986) states that strikes and other forms of 
labour unrest have become part of South African industrial and business life.  Petrus and 
Isaacs-Martin (2011) are in support of Botha by stating that violent protests and strikes on 
various levels of South African society continue post-apartheid era.  Anstey (1999) also raises 
a point that, strikes are a concern because the country has entered a new period of labour 
militancy, which could have serious negative implications for investment in the country.    
 
2.7. CONFLICT, ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION 
2.7.1. Conflict defined 
In any employment relationship, there is bound to be conflict, and according to Anstey (2006), 
conflict is about change.  Bendix (2010) defines conflict as the meeting of opposing forces or 
persons and is prevalent in all relationships.  A specific definition of ‘industrial’ conflict is given 
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by Korpi and Shaler (1979) as a dramatic expression of the relationships between capital and 
labour.  Industrial conflict is understood in three different ways: as related to long-term 
contradictions of interests between the workers and employers; as a clash of demands 
connected with specific issues and generating some sort of bitterness, including warfare; and 
as a direct confrontation of the parties involved (Hirszowicz, 1981). 
 
Lan (1997) states that the actors in the conflict can be individuals, social groups, formal 
organisations, political and social institutions.  Bendix (2010) states that the sources of conflict 
between groups which are not aligned by choice are already evident from different values, 
interests, goals, ideologies, cultures and norms between them.  If this is the case, then the 
goals and interests of one group will come into conflict with ones of the other group, and the 
way that conflict will be handled will depend on the relationships which were formed.  Venter 
and Levy (2009) state that, when conflict is managed properly, it can be constructive because 
it constantly highlights areas for improvement in the organisation while simultaneously 
eliminating complacency. 
 
Korpi and Shaler (1979) state that conflict is institutionalised through the development of new 
institutions, primarily political democracy and collective bargaining, which provides an 
adequate means for resolving and regulating conflict.  Lan (1997) differentiates between 
micro-level and macro-level conflicts and state that, macro-level conflicts are less dispute-
specific and are typically at the institutional level while micro-level conflicts are interpersonal 
and inter-organisational and are often dispute-specific.  Anstey (2006) brings to note two 
concepts relating to conflict – latent and manifest conflict.  He defines conflict as one that 
exists when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously, or 
perceives a divergence in their values, needs or interests, and refers to this as latent conflict.  
Conflict also occurs when parties purposefully employ their power in an effort to eliminate, 
defeat, neutralise or change each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction 
(manifest conflict) (Anstey, 2006). 
 
From these explanations of conflict and specifically industrial conflict, it is understood that 
industrial conflict occurs between the employer and employee groups that have conflicting 
views on a certain issue or are in disagreement with a certain issue which binds them in the 
employment relationship.  Venter and Levy (2009) believe that conflict is a necessary and 
inherent part of all relationships, and no other human relationship is as closely aligned to the 
economic, socio-political and legal environment as the labour relationship.  Lan (1997) states 
that conflict occurs between labour and management, families, religious groups, political 
parties, and formal organisations. 
 
When workers engage in a strike action which results from non-agreement by parties in 
bargaining sectors, they are usually in a group form, with a common objective, and they are 
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usually union members.  Haas and Stack (1983) found that unions promote worker solidarity 
and provide resources such as strike funds that encourage workers to press their demands 
more forcefully and steadfastly.  According to Bendix (2010), there would be no bargaining if 
there was no conflict of interest, and the agreement to bargain does not cancel out the 
presence of conflict as conflict is not necessarily dysfunctional. 
 
2.7.2. Sources of Conflict 
 
a) The employer-employee relations – the employer makes decisions, directs 
employees in the fulfilment of their duties, plans and controls the general operation of 
the organisation, and the employees in return carry out the employer’s orders.  Venter 
and Levy (2009) note that the employer’s position of dominance over the employee is 
a major source of contention.  It is argued that the employee performs the productive 
function of the organisation, so they should have more say in the decision-making 
processes that affect them; nonetheless, this has been addressed through structures 
such as Workplace Forums and Collective Agreements (Venter & Levy, 2009).  
 
b) Wage disputes – the employment relationship is an economic one where the 
employees offer their labour in exchange for payment in the form of a wage;  
employees generally feel that their services are undervalued, and they then want 
better salaries for their efforts (Venter & Levy, 2009).  On the other hand, managers 
want to pay less so that they can offer their shareholders a larger portion of the 
profits.  Venter and Levy (2009) further note that the difference in salaries and wages 
is a source of wage disputes, where pay differentials exist between the highest and 
lowest paid workers in an organisation. 
 
c) Scarcity of resources – lack of resources cause job dissatisfaction and frustration and 
ultimately leads to conflict (Venter & Levy, 2009).  Anstey (2006) states that scarcity 
of resources puts pressure in any social system, and one global resource that has 
become scarce is work.  According to Anstey (2006), jobs have become scarce 
internationally, and this has the potential for political instability.  Bendix (2010) puts it 
clear that the main source of conflict in the employment relationship is money, as 
companies want to increase shareholder value, investing in the company and so 
forth, while the unions, on the other hand, are of the view that money should be used 
to increase wages. 
 
d) Differing goals – Venter and Levy (2009) state that members of the organisation must 
share a common goal; however, this is not the case as the goals are often based on 
self-interests and that employees are more interested in seeing an increase in their 
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compensation than in organisational development and growth issues; on the other 
hand, managers are more interested in self-advancement than in increasing 
shareholder value.  According to Anstey (2006), the scarce resource factor ensures 
competition in relations, as conflict is reflected in relations in which parties are in 
search of differing goals – a tension aggravated when they are interdependent and 
where there is a scarce resource in which they are competing for. 
 
e) Diversity – South Africa is a diverse nation with diverse cultures, and workers bring to 
the organisation their own set of values, beliefs and ideologies, and if this is not 
properly managed and tolerated, the integration of these different cultural groups can 
create conflict (Venter & Levy, 2009).  In Anstey (2006), two types of conflicts relating 
to groups are identified as conflicts of class and conflicts of communal nature.  In 
conflicts of communal nature, parties define their conflict in cultural rather than in 
economic terms, where some groups may see themselves as exploited by others 
(relative deprivation), and where a dominant group attempts to enforce its own 
symbols, culture and language over others in a heterogeneous society. 
 
f) Ambiguity– Anstey (2006) states that during periods of social change, uncertainty 
about boundaries of acceptable behaviour emerge and cause conflict.  According to 
Anstey, restructuring for purposes of competitiveness generates uncertainty. 
 
2.7.3. Conflict Escalation 
In the South African context, history provides us with examples (such as Rand Rebellion of 
1922 and SATS strike of 1987), where conflict was allowed to develop and grow out of 
proportion (Venter & Levy, 2009).  Anstey (2006) gives key elements of the conflict escalation 
process, and these are: 
 
a) Issues and demands – as the conflict grows, the number of issues in contention 
between the parties also grow. 
b) Communications – during conflict situations, communication becomes unreliable and 
impoverished because the available communication channels are either ignored or 
are used to abuse the other party.  Poor communication also increases the 
possibilities of misjudgement and misperception in the relationship. 
c) Mutual perceptions – negative attitudes and perceptions are both causes and effects 
of the use of contentious tactics, and conflicting parties tend to perceive each other 
as lacking in moral virtue, dishonest, untrustworthy and hostile. 
d) Shifts in tactics – there is a shift away from problem-solving, persuasion and 
conciliation when conflict escalates.  The people in conflict then believe that the 
solution to the conflict is only attainable through force and trickery.  The parties also 
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focus their efforts on maximising their own power while trying to minimise that of the 
other due to the win or lose belief that develops through the conflict escalation 
process.  It is also noted in Anstey (2006) that parties are likely to punish each other 
and escalate conflict when they see the other party’s behaviour as arbitrary. 
e) Group changes –conflict escalates when a group changes and when the parties in 
the group do not hold the same goals as they did before.  In Anstey (2006), it is 
stated that relations between groups in conflict are characterised by the emergence 
of enemy perceptions, increased hostility and distrust, communication breakdowns 
and selective information induction. 
f) Gratification –parties in conflict may achieve a sense of gratification and a sense of 
group solidarity from the use of coercive tactics; this promotes conflict escalation. 
g) Entrapment –it is a form of escalation where parties expend more of their time, 
energy, money and other resources in conflict than seems appropriate.  Anstey 
(2006) notes that the more violent the action of one side, the more likely it is that the 
escalation will occur as grievances and calls for retribution increase. 
h) Provocation –shared understandings about ways of pursuing conflicting goals may be 
the basis for conflict escalation and one side may provoke the other into escalation in 
order to make it behave in a reprehensible manner.  Anstey (2006) state that where 
conflict is regulated and institutionalised, it lessens the likelihood of conflict escalation 
as mutual behaviour becomes more predictable and less likely to be misunderstood. 
i) Leadership and control structures –conflict escalates as leaders and parties calling 
unsuccessfully for an end to violence attribute their failure to each other’s seditious 
intentions and acts of aggression.  Groups that are also not in direct control of the 
highest decision-makers are more likely to escalate a conflict. 
 
2.7.4. Conflict de-escalation 
De-escalation of conflict is the reduction of conflict.  In Anstey (2006), the following reasons 
are given as the main reasons for the development of conflict de-escalation: 
 
a) Competition for group leadership: Anstey (2006) states that, when leaders offer 
alternatives for achieving goals in a conflict escalation, they may achieve dominance 
with their peers and the leadership competition may see the emergence of moderate 
constituencies as the conflict escalation produces no signs of achieving desired 
goals. 
b) Organisational conservatism: Groups that are engaged in a conflict situation may not 
be willing to escalate conflict in ways which will threaten their existence. 
c) New relations between adversaries: Anstey (2006) notes that as the group members 
develop respect and understanding for each other, they establish new methods of 
relating through procedural and institutional arrangements.   
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d) Coercion: Coercion may physically prevent the other group from continuing with 
conflict behaviour and obliging de-escalation. Because of loss of capacity, a group in 
conflict may lose its will to persist and may question the desire to pursue competitive 
tactics. 
e) Third part intervention: Third parties may de-escalate conflict through intervention or 
non-involvement. 
 
2.8. CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
Change management is an approach that is used to move people from the current state to the 
desired future state.  The labour relations function in most organisations is integrated with the 
human resources (HR) function, so when the labour relations department wants to introduce 
change, they liaise with the HR department.  According to Armstrong (2001), the change 
process begins with an awareness of the need for change, and managing change is a critical 
phase in the process.  There are two types of change as highlighted by Armstrong (2001), 
and these are strategic change – which is about organisational transformation, as it deals 
with broad long-term organisational issues, and it leads to specifications of competitive 
positioning and strategic goals for achieving and maintaining a competitive advantage.  On 
the other hand, there is operational change – which relates to new systems, procedures, 
structures or technology and has an immediate effect on working arrangements. 
 
Job evaluation is a systematic process for establishing the relative worth of jobs within the 
organisation (Armstrong, 2001).  Prior to 2011, jobs at EMM were never evaluated; as a 
result, once the wage curve agreement was signed, the process of evaluating jobs started.  
The type of job evaluation used was TASK.  The TASK job evaluation system is based on 
four stages, which are assessment of overall skill level of a job; the assessment of the 
complexity of job content and relationships; assessment of job influence; and the 
establishment of job grade by converting the sum of the scores to TASK grade (Bussin, 
2011).  It is the result of this job evaluation and the process in managing the change that has 
triggered this research. 
 
It has also been noted that collective agreements that were signed between SALGA, IMATU 
and SAMWU introduced evaluation of jobs, which is a human resource intervention and has 
the consequence for remuneration and progress in the organisation has consequences for 
employees and can affect the way that they feel about the organisation.  This research will 
determine if implementation of these agreements affected organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction, union commitment and management satisfaction. 
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2.9. AFFECTIVE OUTCOMES OF A STRIKE 
The study conducted by Chaulk and Brown (2008) has found that the negative effects of 
strikes carry over into the workplace after a strike action in terms of worker affect towards 
their union and employer.  According to Chaulk and Brown (2008), their findings are 
consistent with the concept of the feedback loop, which is found in the Industrial Relations 
system concept.  They further suggest that issues relating to worker reaction should be 
examined in future strike research and theories should be expanded to examine issues 
relating to worker reaction.  Chaulk and Brown (2008) state that job satisfaction, management 
satisfaction, organisational commitment, work climate satisfaction and union commitment are 
key variables to the industrial relations field, and there has been limited examination of how 
these constructs, preceding organisational psychology, can be impacted by a strike. 
 
As stated earlier, Chaulk and Brown (2008) examined five constructs in their research, which 
are job satisfaction, management satisfaction, organisational commitment, work climate 
satisfaction and union commitment, and these are discussed below. 
 
I. Job and Management Satisfaction 
Chaulk and Brown (2008) define job satisfaction as a positive emotional reaction to 
one’s assessment of one’s job experience.  Saari and Judge (2004 cited in Chaulk 
&Brown, 2008) found that the nature of work, supervision, job responsibilities and 
relationships with fellow employees contribute to the level of job satisfaction. Chaulk 
and Brown state that there is no study conducted that focuses on how direct 
involvement in a strike can impact overall job satisfaction or a specific feature of 
management satisfaction. 
 
II. Organisational Commitment 
In Koh and Boo (2004),organisational commitment is defined as the relative strength 
of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organisation and is 
characterised by a strong belief in and acceptance of the organisation’s goals and 
values (affective), a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organisation (continuance) and a strong desire to maintain membership in the 
organisation (normative).  Visagie and Steyn (2011)state that organisational 
commitment relates to organisational change because when one implements change 
in the organisation, one needs the employer’s and the employee’s commitment to the 
organisation for the change to be sustainable.  According to Visagie and Steyn 
(2011), an employee’s commitment to the organisation decreases when change is 
introduced.  Chaulk and Brown (2008) highlight the fact that organisational 
commitment is crucial in the workplace because of the positive relationship between 
organisational commitment and both job satisfaction and performance, and a 
negative relationship between organisational commitment and turnover. 
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The results of research by Chaulk and Brown (2008) suggest that organisations 
where employees have high levels of organisational commitment will see positive 
employee reactions and performance.  Koh and Boo (2004) also found that greater 
job satisfaction is expected to lead to stronger organisational commitment.  The 
results of Chaulk and Brown’s research show that organisations with employees who 
have high levels of organisational commitment will see positive employee reactions 
and performance. 
 
III. Work Climate Satisfaction 
In prior research regarding work climate satisfaction, it was shown that if the work 
environment was seen as  a motivating factor and the organisation was thought to be 
involved, performance ratings were mainly positive (Chaulk & Brown, 2008).  Another 
study found that favourable perceptions of work climate were associated with high 
levels of customer service, individual performance and employee retention (Chaulk & 
Brown, 2008).  Chaulk and Brown (2008) state that a strike can result in strained 
workplace relationships; one would expect that satisfaction with work climate could 
decrease after a strike action. 
 
IV. Union Commitment 
When employees view the industrial relations climate to be positive, commitment to 
the union and the employer are positive as commitment to the employing organisation 
facilitates union commitment (Chaulk & Brown, 2008).   
 
2.10. SUMMARY 
Collective bargaining is integral to the South African labour relations system, and centralised 
collective bargaining is entrenched in the public sector.  Strikes are part of collective 
bargaining, as it is failure on the part of parties in the bargaining process to reach a satisfying 
outcome that leads employees to embark on strike action.  The resolution of a strike results in 
the signing of collective agreements that reflect the compromise position reached by the 
parties.  
 
The local government strike action of 2010 resulted in the signing of a collective wage 
agreement and also a job evaluation and wage curve agreement.  Unfortunately, the job 
evaluation and wage curve agreement was not clearly understood by all the union members, 
and the implementation of the agreement has resulted in unanticipated consequences for 
many employees.  Employees have blamed the unions for the negative consequences of the 
agreement, and in fact, the employees have in many instances been reluctant to embark on 
any strike action, as they do not trust their union. 
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The implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve agreement is a human resource 
intervention and has had consequences for remuneration and progress within local 
government.  As such, the implementation of the collective agreement could affect the 
attitudes that employees hold towards the organisation and management, which could have 
an impact on job performance.  Building on the work of Chaulk and Brown (2008),this 
research study investigated the organisational behaviour outcomes of organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment following the 
implementation of the collective agreement.  
 
The following model, developed by the researcher, captures the process investigated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negotiation and strike  
Job evaluation and wage 
curve agreement 
concluded  
Job & Management satisfaction 
Organisation and union commitment 
Pre-test Q 
Implementation and 
ongoing adjudication of 
dispute regarding the 
terms of the collective 
agreement on job 
evaluation and wage 
curves  
Post-test Q Job & Management satisfaction 
Organisation and union commitment 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter was a review of literature relevant to the research topic.  This chapter 
deals with the research design that was developed for the study.  As an introduction, the 
research problem, objectives and research questions are restated.  Thereafter, the research 
design in terms of the general approach, population, sample, sample selection, measuring 
instruments, data collection and analysis, ethical considerations and the source of possible 
error in the study are discussed below. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The process and the implications of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
were not clearly explained to the employees, especially regarding how the changes would 
affect the categorisation of their jobs and the impact this would have on their salaries.  
 
3.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
First objective: To describe the collective agreements that were signed in 2010 as a result of 
a need to categorise municipalities and evaluate jobs and the consequences of the collective 
agreements on employees through the study of documents supplemented by interviews. 
 
Second objective: To investigate if there has been a change in attitudes of the employees in 
the Roads and Stormwater Department of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality after the 
implementation of the wage curve agreement.  The key attitudes to be measured were union 
commitment, organisational commitment, job satisfaction and management satisfaction. 
 
3.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The first objective led to the following research questions: 
 
1) What was the nature of the wage curve and job evaluation collective agreement? 
2) What were the consequences of the implementation of the wage curve and job 
evaluation collective agreement to the employees of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality? 
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The second objective led to the following research questions related to the attitudes of the 
employees and the change in these attitudes after the implementation of the collective 
agreement: 
 
1) What was the change in employee attitudes post the introduction of the wage 
curve, in particular, the attitudes towards organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment? 
2) What was the relationship between the sub-groups and employee attitudes pre 
the wage curve agreement implementation? 
3) What was the relationship between sub-groups and employee attitudes post the 
wage curve agreement implementation? 
4) What was the relationship between the sub-groups and the change in employee 
attitudes pre and post the wage curve agreement implementation? 
 
3.5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.5.1. General approach 
The study was a descriptive one. Descriptive research is a type of research which aims to 
describe social systems, relations and social events (Sarantakos, 2005).  Descriptive 
research presents a picture of the specific details of the situation, social setting or relationship 
and focuses on the how and why questions (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche, & Delport, 2002).  In 
the study, a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods has been applied to 
gather both qualitative and quantitative data.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted with a 
shopsteward from IMATU; one shopsteward from SAMWU; one member of the management 
team who was involved in the negotiations; and three managers from the Roads Department. 
Quantitative data was collected through a self-administered questionnaire that was distributed 
to employees within the Roads and Stormwater Department. 
 
3.5.2. Population 
The population was the employees of the Roads and Stormwater Department Eastern Region 
of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality who work at various road depots.  This population 
included all levels of employees except section 571 employees.  The literacy levels of all 
employees vary from Standard 6 (Grade 8) up to those who have a post-matric qualification, 
but there are still those who have primary education.  The table that follows gives a split of the 
employees per depot and per occupational level. 
 
                                                     
1Senior Management on contract  
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Table 3.1: Roads Employees per Depot 
Occupational level Benoni Brakpan Nigel Springs Total 
Legislators (Section 57) Excluded from the sampling  
Directors & Managers 1 1 0 1 3 
Professionals      
Technicians & Trade Workers 12 6 3 7 28 
Community & Personal 
Service workers 
     
Clerical & Admin Workers 2 2 1 2 7 
Machine Operators & Drivers 15 8 9 13 45 
Labourers 56 19 29 45 149 
Total employees per depot 86 36 42 68 232 
 
The occupational levels used are the ones that are used when the Municipality compiles its 
Workplace Skills Plan.  The occupational levels are explained in the table that follow. 
 
Table 3.2: Occupational Levels 
Occupational Level Explanation 
Legislators This includes the Mayor and City Manager 
Directors &Managers Managers (including Depot Managers) and 
Senior managers  
Professionals Engineers, Doctors, etc. Anyone who is 
employed by the Municipality for their profession 
Technicians and Trade Workers Artisans, Engineering Technicians, etc. 
Community & Personal Service 
workers 
Community Liaison Officers 
Clerical & Admin Workers Clerks, administrators and their assistants 
Machine Operators & Drivers Messengers, Grader Operators and other 
machines 
Labourers General workers 
 
3.5.3. Sample and sample selection 
Participants for the self-administered questionnaire (Appendix 3) were all employees who are 
employed in the Eastern Region as per table 3.1 above.  Two hundred and thirty-two 
questionnaires were distributed to all the employees in the four depots of the R & SW.  The 
employees were not selected, but the questionnaires were given to all the employees at the 
various depots because the sample is not a large number. 
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The researcher interviewed one shopsteward from SAMWU and one shopsteward from 
IMATU.  From the management side, three managers participated in the interviews and one 
member of management, who is a member of the Local Labour Forum and who also has an 
insight on wage negotiations was part of the sample. 
 
3.5.4. Measuring instruments 
Two methods of data collection were used in this study, a face-to-face interview guide and a 
survey questionnaire. 
 
3.5.4.1. Face-face interview guide 
A face-to-face interview guide was prepared in order to interview six employees (see 
Appendix 7and 8). 
 
3.5.4.2. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire that was used is a questionnaire that was originally used by Chaulk and 
Brown (2008) and later adapted and used by Kigozi (2012) (see Appendix 3).  From the 
questionnaire used by Kigozi, four constructs were chosen for the questionnaire 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment.  
The Kigozi questionnaire used 25 items to measure these four constructs.  This was felt to be 
too long for the target population, and thus the questionnaire was shortened to 20 items. 
Organisational commitment was measured using five items; job satisfaction was measured 
using five items; management satisfaction, three items; and union commitment, seven items. 
 
The questionnaire was divided into three sections: 
 
Section A–This part of the questionnaire had the questions relating to the four constructs.  It 
had 20 questions, and the respondents were required to indicate how they felt BEFORE the 
new T-scales, which were a result of the wage curve agreement, which introduced job 
evaluation.  The respondents were required to answer the questions using a 5-point Likert 
scale, with 1 for “strongly disagree”, 2 for “disagree”, 3 for “neutral”, 4 for “agree” and 5 for 
“strongly agree”. 
 
Section B – This also had the questions relating to the four constructs and had 20 questions 
which required the respondents to indicate how they felt AFTER the job evaluation wage 
collective agreement was introduced. 
 
Section C – This section asked a few questions about the respondent.  The respondents 
were requested to indicate their age, their years of service, their occupational salary level and 
whether they belonged to a union or not.  The employees were given the questionnaire to fill 
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in and to drop off the completed questionnaire in the box which was placed outside the Chief 
Clerk’s office.  This, they were requested to complete during their lunch time or when they 
were not busy.  The questionnaires were to be collected after two days by the researcher, and 
the employees were encouraged to complete their questionnaires until all the questionnaires 
were given back. 
 
3.5.5 Data collection 
3.5.5.1. The interviews 
The researcher interviewed six people (one shopsteward from SAMWU; one shopsteward 
from IMATU; one member of management who is a member of the Local Labour Forum; and 
three managers from the Roads and Stormwater Department).  The researcher developed 
two interview guides; the first one (see Appendix 7) was used specifically to get the views of 
the managers who were on the X-scale but applied for managerial positions and got promoted 
to such and were then transferred to T-scales.  The second interview guide (See Appendix 8) 
was designed for the members representing the unions and those representing management 
in order to find the strike causation, the strike process and the outputs. 
 
Interview with SAMWU shopsteward 
The researcher phoned the SAMWU shopsteward and arranged for an appointment in order 
to conduct the interview.  The interview was held on 1 October 2012 in the boardroom of the 
Department, as the shopsteward did not have an office available at the time, and he was 
comfortable with the meeting taking place in the boardroom. 
 
Interview with Manager from Local Labour Forum 
A meeting was scheduled with the Manager from Labour Relations who is also a member of 
the Local Labour Forum who advised that I get permission from the HOD: Human Resources 
but after several emails were sent to the HOD, and telephone calls were made, no positive 
feedback was ever received. 
 
Interview with Manager (1) 
A meeting with the Manager: Project Management was set up for 12 April 2013 in his office.  
The purpose of the interview was explained to the Manager when the researcher requested 
an appointment and the issue of confidentiality was emphasised. 
 
Interview with Manager (2) 
The researcher met with the Manager: Roads and Stormwater on 12 April 2013 in his office, 
and the purpose of the interview was explained to the Manager when the researcher 
requested an appointment and the issue of confidentiality was emphasised. 
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Interview with Manager (3) 
The researcher could not meet face to face with the Manager due to work commitments.  An 
appointment was telephonically made with the Manager for 12 April 2013, but on the day of 
the appointment, he had to attend to work-related matters.  Another appointment was made 
for 02 May 2013, and again, the Manager was not available; he, however, suggested that the 
researcher send him the questions, and he would answer them in his spare time at home and 
send back.   
 
The questions were sent to him, and he answered and sent them back on 16 June 2013.  
 
3.5.5.2. The questionnaires 
The researcher requested permission to conduct the research from the Department of Roads 
and Stormwater, and permission was granted. She further requested permission from the HR 
Department of EMM, and permission was granted in 2012 (See Appendix 2). 
 
Questionnaires were distributed to all employees at the various depots, and they had to drop 
off the completed questionnaire in the box that was provided.  Before the questionnaires were 
distributed, the researcher met with the employees during their lunch breaks to explain what 
the survey was about and the importance of completing the questionnaire. 
 
The researcher emphasised the aspect of confidentiality to the respondents who participated 
in both the face-to-face interviews and the self-administered questionnaires; this was to 
ensure that the respondents felt at ease in responding to the questions.  The employees 
refused to sign consent letters, as they said the letters will be used against them.  Even when 
the researcher explained the issue, some threatened not to participate in the survey if the 
researcher forces them to complete consent letters.  The researcher also emphasised the 
confidentiality issue in a general meeting attended by the depot employees, their 
shopstewards and their depot manager before the questionnaires were distributed.  The 
researcher also informed the employees that they must be honest with their answers and that 
the completion of the questionnaire will not lead to loss of jobs. 
 
Participation in the survey was also voluntary even though the researcher distributed the 
exact number of questionnaires totalling the total number of employees. The employees were 
informed that participation was voluntary and that participants would not be paid for taking 
part in the survey. 
 
Personal information of the participants was also protected as they were not requested to 
submit their names and surnames, identity numbers or employee numbers in the 
questionnaire. 
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Two hundred and thirty-two questionnaires were distributed on different dates as follows: 
 
 Eighty-six questionnaires were distributed at Benoni depot on 1 October 2013. 
 Thirty-six at Brakpan and 68 at Springs depots on 2 October 2013. 
 Forty-two were distributed at Nigel depot on 7 October 2013. 
The questionnaires were collected in boxes on 18 October 2013 by the researcher from all 
the depots. 
 
Out of the 232 distributed questionnaires, only 88 were returned.  Some of the employees 
who were given the questionnaires said they did not have time to complete the questionnaire 
or that they have left it at home. 
 
3.5.6. Data capturing and data analysis 
The survey questionnaire data was captured in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  Descriptive 
statistics included frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations.  Group 
characteristics used were appropriate for sub-group analysis. For inferential statistics, t-tests 
were done; and Cohen’s rule was applied to the results.  Further, where appropriate ANOVA 
and Scheffé tests were used to measure the statistical difference for the impact of each sub-
group on the organisational commitment, union commitment, job satisfaction and 
management satisfaction.  The level of statistical significance was set at alpha=0.05, and the 
level of practical significance was determined using Cohen’s d, where intervals of 0.0<d<0.5, 
0.5<d<0.8 and d<0.8 are small, medium and large respectively.  The reliability of the attitude 
measurement scales was determined using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha.  A coefficient alpha 
of 0.7 was considered reliable.  
 
3.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
3.6.1. Voluntary participation 
Participation in the study was absolutely voluntary.  Before the questionnaires were 
distributed, the researcher emphasised to the employees that participation was voluntary and 
that no one will be paid for taking part in the study. 
 
3.6.2. Confidentiality 
Confidentiality of responses was emphasised to the respondents.  Respondents were also 
assured that the questionnaires would only be handled by the researcher.  To also ensure 
confidentiality of responses, the boxes where the employees had to drop off their completed 
questionnaires was sealed and only the researcher could open it. 
 
 38 
 
3.6.3. Anonymity of responses 
The questionnaire did not require the respondents to supply any information that would link 
them to the response, such as their identity numbers, employee numbers or names and 
surnames, and this guaranteed the anonymity of the responses received. 
 
3.6.4. Protection of the participants 
The issue of psychological injury was also considered because the outcomes of the strike 
was not what they expected, so asking them about issues relating to their salaries might have 
a psychological impact in that the T-scales have been implemented; as a result, they affected 
their salaries.  For that reason, in this case, the researcher could not have avoided the 
psychological injury; hence, the reason for the study was explained to the respondents. 
 
3.7. SOURCES OF ERROR AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Errors might have occurred when questionnaires were given to the employees, where they 
were supposed to complete the questionnaires alone and not in groups because when they 
complete them in groups, they might not give true answers.  Another error that could occur is 
the one regarding the interviewing of a SAMWU representative and an IMATU representative 
because they might give answers beneficial to them and not a true reflection of what 
happened.  Another source of error that might have occurred is the non-availability of the 
representative from the employer, who would have given insight on what happened during the 
implementation of the wage curve collective agreement.  
 
Because the Roads depots are far from where the researcher is, errors could have occurred 
where the researcher did not have control of making sure that the questionnaires are 
completed at one time and are all returned; as a result, some questionnaires were never 
returned. Two hundred and thirty-two questionnaires were distributed, but only 88 came back; 
that being the case, the researcher cannot ignore the fact that the other employees could 
have had di f ferent  views.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The foregoing chapter discussed the research design and methods employed in this study. 
This chapter lays out research results from the self-administered questionnaires and face-to-
face interviews that were conducted.  The chapter is divided into two sections: section A is the 
results from the survey and lays out the tables and discussion on the tables, and section B is 
the results and discussion of the face-to-face interviews.  
 
4.2. RESULTS FROM THE SURVEY 
4.2.1. Sample Demographics 
Table 4.1: Sample profile of employees at the Roads & Stormwater Department (n=88) 
  Frequencies
(f) 
Percentages 
(%) 
Gender Male 55 63 
Female 33 38 
Racial group  African 49 56 
Coloured 25 28 
Indian 5 6 
White 9 10 
Occupational Job 
Scales:  
X-scale 23 26 
T-scale 65 74 
Which union do you 
belong to?  
SAMWU 39 44 
IMATU 26 30 
No union 23 26 
How many years have 
you been a member of 
the union that you 
currently belong to?       
1-4 24 37 
5-9 19 29 
10-30 22 34 
How old are you?  20-29 30 34 
30-39 26 30 
40-49 31 36 
How long have you 
worked at the 
Department of Roads 
and Stormwater in the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality? 
0-4 34 39 
5-9 29 33 
10-43 25 28 
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Table 4.1 shows the sample demographics of employees of the Roads and Stormwater 
Department of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality.  A total number of 88 employees took 
part in the study, of which 63% were males and 38% were females.  The employees were 
also categorised into racial groups, where African employees make up 56% of the sample 
population, followed by Coloureds at a percentage of 28%, and Indians and Whites at 6% and 
10% respectively. 
 
The employees were also categorised according to their occupational job scales, where they 
had to indicate whether they were on a T-scale or an X-scale.  The majority of the 
respondents were on a T-scale at 74%, and those on an X-scale were on 26%. 
 
Respondents were requested to indicate which union they belonged to.  Forty-four % of the 
respondents indicated that they were affiliated to SAMWU, and those who belonged to IMATU 
were 30%,while those who were not unionised were at 26%. 
 
The respondents were also requested to state the years they have been with the union they 
belong to.  The years were categorised into three areas; those who had between 1-4 years 
with the union constituted 37%; those who had between 5-9 years made up 29%; and lastly, 
the ones who had 10-30 years were at 34%. 
 
Table 4.1 also shows an age category of employees that took part in the survey.  The ages 
were split into three categories.  Thirty-four per cent constituted participants who were aged 
20-29, respondents aged 30-39 constituted 30%, while those who were 40-49 made up 36% 
of the sample population. 
 
Lastly, the respondents were asked to indicate the number of years they have been with the 
Department of Roads and Stormwater.  Those who had 0-4 years were comprised 39%, 
followed by those who had 5-9 years at 33%, while 28% was made up of those who has 10-
43 years of service. 
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4.2.2. The reliability of the affective factors pre and post the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
 
Table 4.2: Cronbach’s alpha for the affective factors (n=88) 
No.   Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
1 Organisational 
commitment  
Pre-implementation  0.87 3.51 0.83 
Post-implementation  0.85 2.76 0.88 
2 Job satisfaction Pre-implementation  0.87 3.50 0.85 
Post-implementation  0.85 2.69 0.92 
3 Management  
satisfaction 
Pre-implementation  0.87 3.50 0.85 
Post-implementation  0.85 2.69 0.92 
4 Union commitment Pre-implementation  0.96 3.22 1.10 
Post-implementation  0.96 2.54 1.11 
 
The table above shows that the Cronbach’s alpha for organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment were acceptable for pre and 
post implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement, as they were 
above 0.7.  These four factors can then be considered reliable. 
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4.2.3. Results for the affective factors pre-implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement 
 
4.2.3.1. Organisational commitment 
 
Table 4.3: Organisational commitment for sample pre the implementation of the wage 
curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No. Description Low 
(1,2) 
Average 
(3) 
High 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % f % f %   
A2 Working for the Department of 
Roads and Stormwater was a 
good decision on my part 
14 16 14 16 60 68 3.69 0.98 
A5 I told others that the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater was a great 
department to work for 
13 15 23 26 52 59 3.57 0.98 
A12 I agreed with Ekurhuleni 
policies on matters relating to 
its employees 
22 25 25 28 41 46 3.27 1.05 
A17 I felt very loyal to the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater in Ekurhuleni 
Municipality 
19 22 24 27 45 51 3.42 1.10 
A18  I was proud to tell others that I 
was an employee at the Roads 
and Stormwater Department in 
the Ekurhuleni Municipality 
15 17 21 24 52 59 3.59 1.00 
AOC Organisational commitment  12 14 29 33 47 53 3.51 0.83 
 
The above table indicates organisational commitment of employees before the 
implementation of the job evaluation and the wage curve collective agreement.  The 
respondents were positive about the five items that tested their organisational commitment 
before the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  A high 
rate of positivity is shown (M=3.69; SD=0.98), where they felt that working for the Department 
of Roads and Stormwater was a good decision on their part.  The respondents were also 
positive about being proud to tell others that they were employees of Roads and Stormwater 
Department (M=3.59; SD=1.00).  The respondents’ positivity towards agreeing with 
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Ekurhuleni policies on matters relating to its employees was a little bit low compared to the 
others (M=3.27; SD=1.05). 
 
The respondents’ overall perception towards organisational commitment before the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement was positive 
(M=3.51; SD=0.83). 
 
 
Table 4.4: Organisational commitment for the sample post the implementation of the 
wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No. Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % F % f %   
B2 Working for the Department of 
Roads and Stormwater in the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality is a good 
decision on my part 
33 37 25 28 30 34 2.92 1.13
B5 I tell others that the Department of 
Roads and Stormwater in the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality is a great 
department to work for 
43 50 21 24 22 26 2.74 1.08
B12 I agree with Ekurhuleni 
Municipality policies on matters 
relating to its employees 
41 46 29 33 18 21 2.61 1.12
B17 I feel very loyal to the Department 
of Roads and Stormwater in the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality 
36 41 28 32 24 27 2.76 1.16
B18  I am proud to tell others that I am 
an employee at the Roads and 
Stormwater Department in the 
Ekurhuleni Municipality 
33 40 29 35 20 24 2.80 1.08
BOC Organisational commitment 38 43 35 40 15 17 2.76 0.88
 
Table 4.4 above shows that the respondents were less positive towards organisational 
commitment after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement, especially on issues of agreeing with municipal policies in relation to its 
employees (M=2.61; SD=1.12).  The employees were least negative about working for Roads 
and Stormwater Department (M=2.92; SD=1.13) and the overall commitment to the 
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organisation after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement was negative (M=2.76; SD=0.88). 
 
4.2.3.2. Job satisfaction 
Table 4.5: Job satisfaction for sample pre the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No. Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % F % f %   
A06 My job was satisfying 14 16 20 23 53 61 3.59 0.99
A13 My job gave me a sense of 
accomplishment 
13 15 18 21 56 65 3.60 0.95
A15 I was satisfied with my pay at the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater 
22 25 21 24 45 51 3.27 1.16
A19 I was a valued employee at the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater 
18 21 20 23 50 57 3.45 1.06
A20 There were opportunities for 
promotion at the Department of 
Roads and Stormwater 
16 18 17 19 55 62 3.59 1.06
AJS Job satisfaction 13 15 26 30 49 56 3.50 0.85
 
Table 4.5 shows employees’ perceptions regarding items that relate to job satisfaction before 
the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  Employees 
were positive on most of the items, more specifically about their satisfaction with the job 
(M=3.59; SD=0.99) and about the opportunities for promotion at the Roads and Stormwater 
Department (M=3.59; SD=1.06).  The respondents were somehow less positive when it came 
to their satisfaction with their pay (M=3.27; SD=1.16), but the overall response was positive 
when it came to job satisfaction (M=3.50; SD=0.85). 
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Table 4.6: Job satisfaction for sample pre the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No. Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % f % f %   
B06 My job is satisfying 46 53 19 22 22 26 2.57 1.19
B13 My job gives me a sense of 
accomplishment 
38 43 24 27 26 29 2.75 1.11
B15 I am satisfied with my pay at the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater 
50 56 23 26 15 17 2.27 1.19
B19 I am a valued employee at the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater 
31 36 31 35 26 30 2.90 1.12
B20 There are opportunities for 
promotion at the Department of 
Roads and Stormwater 
31 35 25 28 32 36 2.95 1.20
BJS Job satisfaction 37 42 35 40 16 18 2.69 0.92
 
From table 4.6, it can be seen that the respondents were less positive about job satisfaction 
(M=2.69; SD=0.92) after the implementation.  Respondents were least positive when asked if 
they were satisfied with their pay after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage 
curve collective agreement (M=2.27; SD=1.19). 
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4.2.3.3. Management satisfaction 
Table 4.7: Management satisfaction pre the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No.  Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % f % f %   
A07 Management in the 
Department of Roads and 
Stormwater was fair 
13 15 30 34 45 51 3.43 0.91
A08 I had respect for management 
in the Department of Roads 
and Stormwater 
13 15 21 24 53 61 3.56 0.95
A16 Management listened to any 
questions or concerns I shared 
with them 
31 35 36 30 31 35 2.98 1.09
AMS Management satisfaction 15 18 35 40 38 43 3.32 0.83
 
Table 4.7 highlights management satisfaction of employees before the implementation of the 
job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  Employees were positive towards the 
items relating to whether management was fair (M=3.43; SD=0.91) and whether they had 
respect for management (M=3.56; SD=0.95).  The least positive response related to whether 
management listens to employee questions or concerns (M=2.98; SD=1.09).  The overall 
satisfaction with management was positive (M=3.32; SD=0.83). 
 
Table 4.8: Management satisfaction post the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No. Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % f % f %   
B07 Management in Department of 
Roads and Stormwater is fair 
38 44 28 32 21 24 1.72 1.13
B08 I have respect for Management 
in Department of Roads and 
Stormwater 
39 45 23 26 26 30 2.80 1.17
B16 Management listens to any 
questions or concerns I share 
with them 
45 51 21 24 22 25 2.52 1.21
BMS Management satisfaction 39 44 29 33 20 23 2.68 1.05
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Table 4.8 reveals an overall negative response towards satisfaction with management after 
the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement (M=2.68; 
SD=1.05).  Employees’ response for the item of whether management of Roads and 
Stormwater Department was fair shows the most negative response (M=1.72; SD=1.13). 
 
4.2.3.4. Union commitment 
Table 4.9: Union commitment pre the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No.  Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % f % f %   
A01 I was willing to put a great deal 
of effort into making the union 
successful 
25 28 15 17 48 54 3.35 1.27
A03 I felt a sense of pride belonging 
to the union 
22 25 26 30 39 45 3.23 1.18
A04 I was glad I became a member 
of the union 
23 26 23 26 42 48 3.28 1.22
A09 I was proud to tell others I was 
a member of the union 
22 25 26 30 39 45 3.23 1.21
A10 I gained a lot by being a 
member of the union 
34 38 23 26 31 36 2.99 1.20
A11 I trusted the members in the 
union 
26 29 24 27 38 44 3.16 1.18
A14 I felt very loyal towards the 
union 
22 25 20 23 46 53 3.31 1.19
AUC Union commitment  22 25 24 27 42 48 3.22 1.10
 
Table 4.9 above illustrates commitment to the union before the implementation of the job 
evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  The most positive response was towards 
the employee’s willingness to put in a great deal of effort into making the union successful 
(M=3.35; SD=1.27).  The employees were also positive about being loyal to their union 
(M=3.31; SD=1.19).  A slightly negative response related to a question about whether they 
gained a lot about being a member of the union (M=2.99; SD=1.20); otherwise, there was a 
positive response regarding union commitment (M=3.22; SD=1.10).  
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Table 4.10: Union commitment post the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
  n=88 
No. Description LOW 
(1,2) 
AVERAGE
(3) 
HIGH 
(4,5) 
Mean SD 
  f % f % f %   
B01 I am willing to put a great deal 
of effort into making the union 
successful 
50 57 18 20 20 23 2.48 1.28
B03 I feel a sense of pride 
belonging to the union 
49 56 23 26 16 18 2.47 1.25
B04 I am glad I became a member 
of the union 
50 57 19 22 19 21 2.51 1.26
B09 I am proud to tell others I was a 
member of the union 
46 53 20 23 22 25 2.59 1.23
B10 I gain a lot by being a member 
of the union 
39 48 22 27 21 26 2.61 1.27
B11 I trust the members in the union 39 45 28 33 19 22 2.59 1.21
B14 I feel very loyal towards the 
union 
43 50 24 28 19 22 2.56 1.23
BUC Union commitment 48 54 23 26 17 19 2.54 1.11
 
The above table indicates union commitment after the implementation of the job evaluation 
and wage curve collective agreement.  The least positive response related to feeling a sense 
of pride belonging to a union (M=2.47; SD=1.25) and whether they are glad they became 
members of the union (M=2.51;SD=1.26).  The employees were also negative when asked 
whether they were willing to put in a great deal of effort into making the union successful 
(M=2.48; SD=1.28).  Generally, the employees’ responses were negative towards union 
commitment (M=2.54; SD=1.11). 
 
4.2.4. Differences between the affective measures pre and post the implementation of 
the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
 
T-tests were used to determine if there was a statistically significant change in the 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment 
after the wage curve was implemented in the Municipality.  The results are shown in table 
4.11.  Cohen’s d was calculated to determine whether the statistical significance was small, 
medium or large. 
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Table 4.11: Differences between the affective measures pre and post implementation of 
the Job Evaluation and Wage Curve Collective Agreement for the sample (n=88) 
 PRE POST t-Test (df=87) 
 Mean SD Mean SD T p Cohen’s d 
Organisational 
commitment 
3.51 0.83 2.76 0.88 6.89 <.0005 0.73 (medium) 
Job satisfaction 3.50 0.85 2.69 0.92 7.35 <.0005 0.69 (medium) 
Management 
satisfaction 
3.32 0.83 2.68 1.05 6.52 <.0005 0.69 (medium) 
Union commitment 3.22 1.10 2.54 1.11 5.84 <.0005 0.62 (medium) 
 
Table 4.11 above demonstrates a practically significant decrease in employees’ commitment 
to the organisation, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment after the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve agreement.  All the employee attitudes 
measured were more positive prior to the implementation of the wage curve agreement than 
after the implementation.  
 
The difference in organisational commitment pre- and post-implementation of job evaluation 
and wage curve collective agreement was found to be practically significant (t=6.89, p <.0005, 
d=0.73).  There was also a practically significant difference in the level of job satisfaction 
(t=7.35, p<.0005, d=0.69) and management satisfaction (t=6.52, p<.0005, d=0.69) as well as 
union commitment (t=5.84, p<.0005, d=0.62) before and after the implementation of the wage 
curve.  
 
The above table also shows that the employees’ most positive attitudes were commitment to 
the organisation both pre-implementation of the wage curve collective agreement and post–
implementation.  Employees were most negative towards commitment to the union both pre 
and post the implementation. 
 
4.2.5. Impact of sub-groups and demographic variables on change in the affective 
factors pre- and post-implementation 
In this section, comment will be made only on practically significant results (Cohen’s d 
medium or large). 
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4.2.5.1.Results for Gender 
Table 4.12: The impact of gender on the affective factors pre the implementation of the 
wage curve (n=88) 
 Pre-Wage Curve  t-tests 
df=86  FEMALES 
n=33 
MALES 
n=55 
 Mean SD Mean SD T p Cohen’s 
d 
Organisational commitment 3.63 0.68 3.44 0.90 -1.07 .290 n/a 
Job satisfaction 3.75 0.65 3.36 0.92 -2.12 .037 0.47 
(small) 
Management satisfaction 3.60 0.48 3.16 0.95 -2.46 .016 0.54 
(medium)
Union commitment  3.02 1.00 3.34 1.14 1.31 .192 n/a 
 
The table above indicates that both males and females were positive regarding the affective 
factors pre-implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve agreement.  Table 4.12 also 
shows that there is a practically significant difference (p=.016, d=0.54) between the levels of 
satisfaction with management for males and females pre-implementation of the job evaluation 
and wage curve agreement.  Females (M=3.60; SD=0.48) were significantly more positive 
than males (M=3.16; SD=0.95) on management satisfaction. There were no other practically 
significant differences between males and females before the implementation of the job 
evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. 
 
Table 4.13: The impact of gender on the affective factors post the implementation of 
the wage curve (n=88) 
 Post-Wage Curve  t-tests 
df=86  FEMALES 
n=33 
MALES 
n=55 
 Mean SD Mean SD t p Cohen’s 
d 
Organisational 
commitment 
2.85 0.84 2.70 0.91 -0.79 .434 n/a 
Job satisfaction 2.76 0.83 2.65 0.98 -0.53 .596 n/a 
Management satisfaction 2.88 0.92 2.56 1.11 -1.37 .174 n/a 
Union commitment  2.42 1.10 2.61 1.13 0.75 .452 n/a 
 
Table 4.13 reveals that both males and females were negative regarding the affective factors 
post-implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. This table, 
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however, shows that there was no significant difference between males and females on their 
perception on organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and 
union commitment post-implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement. 
 
Table 4.14: The impact of gender on the change in the affective factors pre and post 
the implementation of the wage curve (n=88) 
 FEMALES 
n=33 
MALES 
n=55 
 
t-tests (df=86) 
 
 Mean SD Mean SD t p Cohen’s 
d 
Organisational 
commitment 
0.78 1.06 0.74 1.01 -0.18 .859 n/a 
Job satisfaction 0.99 1.03 0.71 1.04 -1.24 .220 n/a 
Management satisfaction 0.72 0.88 0.60 0.95 -0.59 .558 n/a 
Union commitment  0.60 1.02 0.73 1.13 0.54 .590 n/a 
 
Table 4.14 highlights that there was no significant difference between males and females in 
the change in the affective factors pre- and post-implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement. 
 
4.2.5.2. Results for race 
In testing the relationship between race and the affective factors, only the coloured and 
African sub-groups were analysed since the other sub-groups were too small.  
Table 4.15: The impact of race on the affective factors pre wage curve implementation 
(n=74) 
 PRE-Wage curve  t-tests 
(df=72)  African  
n=49 
Coloured  
n=25 
 Mean SD Mean SD t p Cohen’s d
Organisational 
commitment 
3.53 0.93 3.46 0.64 0.34 .734 n/a 
Job satisfaction 3.47 0.93 3.55 0.75 -0.40 .689 n/a 
Management 
satisfaction 
3.36 0.98 3.24 0.52 0.59 .558 n/a 
Union commitment  3.42 1.12 2.87 1.07 2.02 .047 0.50 
(medium) 
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Table 4.15 illustrates that both African and Coloured employees were positive towards 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction and management satisfaction before the 
implementation of the wage curve agreement.  The results for union commitment show that 
Coloureds were negative in their responses (M=2.87; SD=1.07) while Africans were positive 
(M=3.42; SD=1.12).  There was also no practically significant difference between Africans and 
Coloureds for organisational commitment and job satisfaction.  However, there was a 
practically significant difference between the two racial groups regarding commitment to the 
union (p=.047, d=0.50).  Africans (M=3.42; SD=1.12) were more positive than Coloureds 
(M=2.87; SD=1.07). 
 
Table 4.16: The impact of race on the affective factors post the implementation of the 
wage curve (n=74) 
 Post Wage curve  t-tests 
(df=72)  African  
n=49 
Coloured  
n=25 
 Mean SD Mean SD t P Cohen’s d 
Organisational 
commitment 
2.88 0.99 2.50 0.68 1.74 .087 n/a 
Job satisfaction 2.83 1.03 2.35 0.64 2.10 .039 0.52 
(medium) 
Management 
satisfaction 
2.80 1.20 2.47 0.84 1.25 .215 n/a 
Union commitment  2.73 1.18 2.20 1.11 1.85 .069 n/a 
 
The above table shows that, after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve 
collective agreement, both racial groups’ perspective of the affective factors was negative.  
There was, however, a practically significant difference (p=.039, d=0.52) between Africans 
(M=2.83; SD=1.03) and Coloureds (M=2.35; SD=0.64) on job satisfaction, with Africans being 
more positive. 
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Table 4.17: The impact of race on the change in the affective factors pre and post the 
implementation of the wage curve (n=74) 
 African  Coloured   
t-tests (df=72) 
 
 Mean SD Mean SD T p Cohen’s d 
Organisational 
commitment 
0.64 1.06 0.96 1.01 -1.22 .226 n/a 
Job satisfaction 0.64 1.12 1.20 0.88 -2.19 .032 0.54 (medium) 
Management 
satisfaction 
0.56 0.96 0.77 0.87 -0.93 .356 n/a 
Union Commitment 0.69 1.17 0.67 0.98 0.08 .933 n/a 
 
Table 4.17 indicates that there was a practically significant difference (t=-2.19,df=72, p=.032, 
Cohen’s d=0.54) regarding the change in job satisfaction pre and post job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement between the two racial categories.  The gap in job 
satisfaction between Africans and Coloureds widened after the implementation (pre- 
implementation M diff=3.47 – 3.55=0.08; post-implementation M diff=2.83 – 2.35=0.48) with 
Coloured employees experiencing a greater drop in job satisfaction post-implementation. 
 
4.2.5.3. Results for Union membership 
 
Table 4.18: The impact of union membership on the affective factors pre-wage curve 
implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 Pre-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
(df=87)  SAMWU  
n=39 
IMATU  
n=26 
None  
n=23  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
3.50 0.91 3.45 0.66 3.59 0.87 0.172 .842 
Job satisfaction 
 
3.35 0.93 3.60 0.66 3.65 0.89 1.156 .320 
Management 
satisfaction 
3.37 0.97 3.24 0.71 3.33 0.71 0.185 .831 
Union 
commitment  
3.59 1.02 3.36 0.85 2.42 1.09 10.530 <.0005 
 
Table 4.18 illustrates that there was a practically significant difference for commitment to the 
union among the employees affiliated to the two unions and those who were not union 
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members (F=10.530; p=<.0005).  To check if the difference is among the three or only 
between two of the unions, a Scheffé test was conducted as per table 4.19 below. 
 
Table 4.19: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – A-UC by Union (n=88) 
Union  1 Union  2 Diff. M1-M2 Scheffé p Cohen’s d 
SAMWU IMATU 0.23 .653 0.24 Small 
SAMWU No union  1.18 <.0005 1.12 Large 
IMATU No union  0.94 .006 0.97 Large 
 
The results from table 4.19 show that the difference in union commitment was a result of the 
difference between those unionised and those who were not unionised, which was a trivial 
result. 
 
Table 4.20: The impact of union membership on the affective factors post-wage curve 
implementation (n=88) 
 Post-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
(df=87)  SAMWU  
n=39 
IMATU  
n=26 
None  
n=23  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
2.86 0.93 2.77 0.93 2.56 0.76 0.849 .431 
Job satisfaction 2.78 
 
0.97 2.79 1.00 2.43 0.69 1.306 .276 
Management 
satisfaction 
2.80 1.16 2.59 1.03 2.58 0.88 0.465 .630 
Union commitment  2.86 1.21 2.59 0.96 1.94 0.85 5.540 .005 
 
Table 4.20 shows that there was a practically significant difference among union members 
towards their commitment to the union after the implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement (f=5.540, p=.005). 
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Table 4.21: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – B-UC by Union (n=88) 
 
Union  1 Union  2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
SAMWU IMATU 0.28 .592 0.25 Small 
SAMWU No union  0.92 .006 0.84 Large 
IMATU No union  0.65 .108 0.71 Medium 
 
As per table 4.21 above, the difference in union commitment again lies between those who 
were unionised and those who were not. Again a trivial result.  
 
 
Table 4.22: The impact of union membership on the change in the affective factors pre- 
and post-wage curve implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 
 SAMWU  
n=39 
IMATU  
n=26 
None  
n=23  
(df=87) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
0.63 0.93 0.69 1.00 1.03 1.19 1.162 .318 
Job satisfaction 0.57 0.99 0.81 0.98 1.23 1.07 3.087 .051 
Management 
satisfaction 
0.57 0.82 0.65 0.88 0.75 1.14 0.289 .750 
Union commitment  0.73 0.99 0.77 1.25 0.48 1.08 0.522 .595 
 
It can be seen form table 4.22 above that there was no significant difference in the change in 
the affective factors among the members of SAMWU, IMATU and the non-unionised 
employees pre and post the implementation. 
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4.2.5.4. Results for years with Union 
Table 4.23: The impact of years with the union on the affective factors pre-wage curve 
implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 
 Pre-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
df=64  1-4 years 
n=24 
5-9 years 
n=19 
10-30 years 
n=22 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
3.37 0.81 3.57 0.48 3.53 1.05 0.265 .768 
Job satisfaction 
 
3.48 0.79 3.39 0.63 3.46 1.04 0.050 .952 
Management 
satisfaction 
3.29 0.84 3.38 0.60 3.30 1.11 0.046 .955 
Union 
commitment  
3.33 1.01 3.54 0.70 3.65 1.08 0.362 .698 
 
Table 4.23 highlights that there was no significant difference amongst the categories of years 
with union on all the affective factors before the implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement. 
 
 
Table 4.24: The impact of years with the union on the affective factors post-wage curve 
implementation (n=88) 
 Post-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
df=64  1-4 years 
n=24 
5-9 years 
n=19 
10-30 years 
n=22 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
2.66 0.77 2.75 0.64 3.07 1.22 0.962 .388 
Job satisfaction 2.61 0.81 2.73 0.77 3.03 1.22 0.911 .407 
Management 
satisfaction 
2.47 0.98 2.74 0.86 2.97 1.38 0.951 .392 
Union commitment  2.49 1.01 2.67 1.06 3.11 1.24 1.402 .254 
 
It is shown in table 4.24 that there was no significant difference amongst the categories of 
years with union on all the affective factors after the implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement. 
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Table 4.25: The impact of years with the union on the change in the affective factors 
pre- and post-wage curve implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 
 1-4 years 
n=24 
5-9 years 
n=19 
10-30 years 
n=22 
(df=64) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
0.70 0.99 0.82 0.92 0.46 0.94 0.490 .615 
Job satisfaction 0.88 1.05 0.66 0.84 0.44 1.03 0.752 .476 
Management 
satisfaction 
0.82 0.87 0.64 0.78 0.33 0.82 1.192 .311 
Union commitment  0.84 1.18 0.87 1.01 0.54 1.08 0.454 .637 
 
Table 4.25 shows that there is no significant difference in the change in organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment amongst the 
groups reflecting different years in union membership. 
 
4.2.5.5. Results for age 
Table 4.26: The impact of age on the affective factors pre-wage curve implementation 
in the organisation (n=88) 
 
 Pre-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
df=86  20-29 years 
n=30 
30-39 
n=26 
40-64 years 
n=31 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
3.41 0.83 3.38 0.74 3.72 0.89 1.596 .209 
Job satisfaction 
 
3.57 0.80 3.26 0.82 3.67 0.89 1.748 .180 
Management 
satisfaction 
3.19 0.80 3.22 0.76 3.54 0.90 1.623 .203 
Union commitment 2.75 1.06 3.09 1.03 3.72 0.97 6.837 .002 
 
Table 4.26 reveals that there is no significant difference among the different age groups and 
the affective factors of organisational commitment, job satisfaction and management 
satisfaction.  There was, however, a significant difference in the age groups of the employees 
and their commitment to the union (f= 6.837; p=.002) before the implementation of the job 
evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  Further analysis follows in table 4.27 below. 
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Table 4.27: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – A-UC by age category 
(n=88) 
Age Cat. 1 Age Cat. 2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
20-29 30-39 -0.34 .479 0.32 Small 
20-29 40-64 -0.96 .002 0.95 Large 
30-39 40-64 -0.63 .080 0.63 Medium 
 
Table 4.27 further shows that there was a practically significant difference between the 20-29 
and 40-64 age groups and the 30-39 and 40-64 age groups.  The 40-64 age group was the 
most loyal (M=3.72), followed by the 30-39 age group (M=3.09), with the least loyal being the 
younger group of 20-29 years (M=2.75). 
 
Table 4.28: The impact of age on the affective factors post-wage curve implementation 
(n=88) 
 Post-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
df=86  20-29 years 
n=30 
30-39 
n=26 
40-64 years 
n=31 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
2.68 0.66 2.58 0.76 2.95 1.13 1.411 .250 
Job satisfaction 2.50 0.70 2.64 0.82 2.95 1.13 1.975 .145 
Management 
satisfaction 
2.54 0.89 2.58 0.90 2.90 1.30 1.067 .349 
Union 
commitment  
2.27 0.85 2.36 1.02 2.88 1.27 2.712 .072 
 
Table 4.28 indicates that there is no significant difference among the different age groups for 
the affective factors post the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement.  
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Table 4.29: The impact of age on the change in the affective factors pre- and post-wage 
curve implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 20-29 years
n=30 
30-39
n=26 
40-64 years
n=31 
(df=86) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
0.72 1.01 0.80 0.94 0.77 1.15 0.038 .962 
Job satisfaction 1.07 0.99 0.62 0.85 0.72 1.20 1.481 .233 
Management 
satisfaction 
0.64 0.98 0.65 0.71 0.63 1.06 0.002 .998 
Union commitment  0.49 0.99 0.74 1.15 0.84 1.14 0.834 .438 
 
The above table shows that there was no significant difference in the change in the affective 
factors among the age groups pre- and post-implementation of the job evaluation and wage 
curve collective agreement. 
4.2.5.6. Results of length of service 
 
Table 4.30: The impact of length of service on the affective factors pre-wage curve 
implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 Pre-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
df=87  0-4 years 
n=39 
5-9 years 
n=26 
10-43 years 
n=23  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
3.39 0.87 3.39 0.62 3.81 0.93 2.348 .102 
Job satisfaction 
 
3.51 0.87 3.34 0.68 3.68 0.98 1.096 .339 
Management 
satisfaction 
3.33 0.79 3.15 0.71 3.52 0.98 1.356 .263 
Union commitment  2.80 1.17 3.50 0.76 3.46 1.18 4.285 0.017 
 
The above table demonstrates that there was a significant difference in the employees’ length 
of service and their perception of union commitment.  There was no significance difference on 
job satisfaction, organisational commitment and management satisfaction.  Further analysis in 
table 4.31 below shows that, there was a practically significant difference between employees 
with a length of service of 0-4 years and those who had 5-9 years and for those who had 0-4 
years and 10-43 years.  Employees with 0-4 years of service (M=2.80) were less committed 
to the union than employees with longer service. 
 60 
 
 
Table 4.31: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – A-UC by Length of 
Service (n=88) 
 
LoS Cat. 1 LoS Cat. 2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
0-4 years 5-9 years -0.70 .038 0.69 Medium 
0-4 years 
10-43 
years -0.65 .069 0.56 Medium 
5-9 years 
10-43 
years 0.04 .990 0.04 Not sig. 
 
 
Table 4.32: The impact of length of service on the affective factors post-wage curve 
implementation (n=88) 
 
 Post-wage curve  ANOVA tests 
df=87  0-4 years 
n=39 
5-9 years 
n=26 
10-43 years 
n=23  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
2.86 0.70 2.35 0.66 3.09 1.16 5.527 .006 
Job satisfaction 2.75 0.73 2.24 0.70 3.14 1.14 7.373 .001 
Management 
satisfaction 
2.76 0.90 2.29 0.86 3.03 1.30 3.726 .028 
Union commitment  2.42 1.01 2.32 0.95 2.95 1.34 2.535 .085 
 
Table 4.32 shows that there was a practically significant difference among the groups 
categorised by the length of service and their perceptions of organisational commitment 
(f=5.527; p=.006) and job satisfaction (f=7.373;p=.006)and management satisfaction 
(f=3.726;p=0.28) after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement. Further analysis is given in tables 4.33, 4.34 and 4.35. 
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Table 4.33: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – B-Organisational 
Commitment by Length of Service (n=88) 
 
LoS Cat. 1 LoS Cat. 2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
0-4 years 5-9 years 0.50 .066 0.74 Medium 
0-4 years 
10-43 
years -0.23 .580 0.25 Small 
5-9 years 
10-43 
years -0.74 .008 0.80 Large 
 
In table 4.33, it can be observed that there was a practically significant difference between the 
employees who had worked in the organisation for 5-9 years and the employees who had 
worked in the organisation for between 10-43 years and those who had worked for 5-9 years 
and those who had worked for 0-4 years.  The longer-serving employees (10-43 years with 
M=3.09) and the newer employees (0-4 years with M=2.86) were more committed than those 
who had worked for between 5-9 years (M=2.35). 
 
Table 4.34: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – B-Job Satisfaction by 
Length of Service (n=88) 
LoS Cat. 1 LoS Cat. 2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
0-4 years 5-9 years 0.50 .073 0.70 Medium 
0-4 years 
10-43 
years -0.39 .234 0.42 Small 
5-9 years 
10-43 
years -0.89 .001 0.96 Large 
Table 4.35: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – B-Management 
Satisfaction by Length of Service (n=88) 
LoS Cat. 1 LoS Cat. 2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
0-4 years 5-9 years 0.48 .185 0.54 Medium 
0-4 years 
10-43 
years -0.26 .622 0.24 Small 
5-9 years 
10-43 
years -0.74 .033 0.68 Medium 
The same pattern as found for organisational commitment was repeated for both job 
satisfaction (Table 4.34) and management satisfaction (Table 4.35), where the longer-serving 
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employees (10-43 years) and the newer employees (0-4 years) were more practically 
significant and more positive than those who had been with the organisation for 5-9 years. 
 
Table 4.36: The impact of length of service on the change in the affective factors pre- 
and post-wage curve implementation in the organisation (n=88) 
 
 0-4 years 
n=39 
5-9 years 
n=26 
10-43 years 
n=23  
(df=87) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD f P 
Organisational 
commitment 
0.53 0.93 1.04 0.96 0.72 1.18 1.989 .143 
Job satisfaction 0.76 1.03 1.09 0.85 0.54 1.19 2.000 .142 
Management 
satisfaction 
0.56 0.90 0.86 0.75 0.49 1.11 1.276 .285 
Union commitment  0.38 0.93 1.18 1.04 0.51 1.18 5.067 .008 
 
 
Table 4.36 shows that there was a practically significant difference in the change in 
commitment to the union among the groups categorised by length of service 
(f=5.067;p=.008).  Further analysis in table 4.37, further highlights that there was a practically 
significant difference between employees with a length of service of less than four years and 
those between 5-9 years, and between those with 10-43 years and those with 5-9 years.  This 
indicated that employees with 5-9 years service experience had a greater change in 
commitment towards the union than the other two age groups (M – pre=3.50;M – post=2.32) 
 
Table 4.37: Descriptive and Inferential statistics for ANOVA – C-UC by Length of 
service (n=88) 
LoS Cat. 1 LoS Cat. 2 
Diff. 
M1-M2 
Scheffé 
p Cohen’s d 
0-4 years 5-9 years -0.80 .013 0.81 Large 
0-4 years 
10-43 
years -0.13 .896 0.12 Not sig. 
5-9 years 
10-43 
years 0.67 .068 0.61 Medium 
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4.3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
4.3.1. The changes in the attitudes of the employees after the implementation of the job 
evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
The first research question that was asked was: What is the change in employee attitudes 
post the introduction of the wage curve, especially the attitudes of employees towards 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment 
after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement?  Table 
4.11 showed the changes. 
 
Respondents have shown a less positive attitude towards organisational commitment after 
the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  Table 4.11 
shows that the difference in organisational commitment pre- and post-implementation was 
found to be practically significant (t=6.89, p=<.0005, d=0.73).  The employees’ attitudes post 
the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement were negative 
for organisational commitment.  There was a practically significant decrease in the level of 
organisational commitment of the employees after the implementation of the job evaluation 
and wage curve collective agreement (pre-implementation with M=3.51, SD=0.83 and post-
implementation with M=2.76, SD=088). 
Table 4.4, which deals with the specific items measured for organisational commitment, 
shows that employees were more negative regarding the policies on matters relating to 
employees. 
 
For job satisfaction, table 4.6 indicates that the employees were least positive, especially on 
the question that was asked them, i.e. if they were satisfied with their pay after the 
implementation of the wage curve agreement (M=2.27; SD=1.19).  Table 4.11 shows that 
there was a practically significant decrease in employees’ job satisfaction after the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  The difference in 
job satisfaction was found to be practically significant. 
 
The results for attitudes of employees regarding management satisfaction after the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement in table 4.8 shows 
that the employees were negative, especially when they were asked whether management of 
Roads Department was fair.  Table 4.11 shows a change in attitudes of employees regarding 
management satisfaction because before the implementation of the job evaluation and wage 
curve collective agreement the level of satisfaction was high (M=3.32; SD=0.83) and post-
implementation was low (M=2.68; SD=1.05). The change was also found to be practically 
significant (t=6.52, p=<.0005, d=0.69). 
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There was a decrease in the level of union commitment (pre-implementation with M=3.22, 
SD=1.10, post-implementation with M=2.54, SD=1.11).  The respondents showed a negative 
attitude towards their commitment to the union after the implementation of the job evaluation 
and wage curve collective agreement.  A very negative response was shown in table 4.10 
when the respondents were asked if they were proud to belong to a union (M=2.47; SD=1.25) 
and whether they were willing to put in a great deal of effort to make their union successful.   
 
4.3.2. Relationship between sub-groups and employee attitudes pre-implementation of 
the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
The second research question asked was: What is the relationship between the sub-groups 
and employee attitudes pre the wage curve agreement implementation?  The sub-groups that 
were identified were gender, age, length of service, years with the union, union membership 
and race. 
 
In table 4.12,the results show that both males and females were positive regarding 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment 
before the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  Table 
4.12 further shows that there was a practically significant difference (p=.016; d=0.54) between 
the levels of management satisfaction for males and females before the implementation of the 
job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.   
 
In table 4.15,the results reveal that African and Coloured employees were positive towards 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction and management satisfaction before the 
implementation.  There was, however, a practically significant difference between the two 
racial groups regarding commitment to the union. 
 
There was no significant difference among the different age groups and the affective factors 
before the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. 
 
In table 4.30, the results for length of service on the affective factors pre-implementation show 
a significant difference on union commitment and no significance on the other three affective 
factors.  The results also show that employees with less service of 0-4 years were less 
committed to the union than the employees with longer service pre-implementation.  This can 
be explained because ‘new’ employees would not be committed to the union than those who 
have been with the organisation for longer years and who are members of the union. 
 
Table 4.23 indicates that there was no significant difference amongst the categories of years 
with union on all the affective factors before the implementation of the job evaluation and 
wage curve collective agreement. 
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In table 4.18,the impact of union membership on the affective factors demonstrates that there 
was a practically significant difference for commitment to the union among the employees 
affiliated to SAMWU and IMATU and those who were not union members pre-implementation.  
The results also show that the difference in union commitment was a result of the difference 
between those who were unionised and those who were not. 
 
In table 4.26, the results highlighted that there was no significant difference among the 
different age groups and the affective factors.  There was, however, a practically significant 
difference between the age groups and their commitment to the union before the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement (f=6.837; p=.002).  
The older group (40-64 years) was more loyal than the younger group (20-29 years). 
 
4.3.3. Relationship between the sub-groups and affective factors post-implementation 
of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
The third research question was: What is the relationship between the sub-groups and 
employee attitudes post the wage curve agreement implementation?  The sub-groups that 
were identified were gender, age, length of service, years with the union, union membership 
and race. 
Table 4.13 shows that both males and females were negative regarding the affective factors 
post-implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. 
 
Table 4.28 illustrates that there was no significant difference among the different age groups 
for the affective factors after the implementation of the collective agreement. 
 
In table 4.32, results reveal that there was a practically significant difference among the 
groups categorised by the length of service and their perceptions of organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction and management satisfaction.  The employees who had been 
with the organisation for a longer period (10-43 years) and the newer employees (0-4 years) 
were more committed than those who had been with the organisation for 5-9 years. 
 
Table 4.24 indicates that there was no significant difference amongst the categories of years 
with union on all the affective factors after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage 
curve collective agreement. 
 
As was observed in table 4.20,there was a practically significant difference among the union 
members towards their commitment to the union after the implementation of the agreement 
(f=5.540; p=.005).  SAMWU members were more committed to the union. 
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Table 4.16 highlights that there was a practically significant difference (d=0.52) between 
Africans and Coloureds on job satisfaction, with Africans being more positive than the 
Coloured employees on job satisfaction. 
 
4.3.4. The impact of the sub-groups on the affective factors pre- and post-
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
 
The last research question was: What is the relationship between the sub-groups and the 
change in employee attitudes pre and post the wage curve agreement implementation?  The 
sub-groups that were identified were gender, age, length of service, years with the union, 
union membership and race. 
 
In table 4.14, the results of the impact of gender in the affective factors show no significant 
difference in the change in the affective factors between males and females before and after 
the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. 
 
Table 4.29 reveals that there was no significant difference in the change in the affective 
factors among the age groups pre and post the implementation. 
 
In table 4.36, the results for the impact of length of service on the change in the affective 
factors pre- and post-implementation show a practically significant difference in the change in 
one of the affective factors, which is union commitment (f=5.067; p=.008).  The results further 
show a practically significant difference between employees with a length of service of 0-4 
years and those who had 5-9 years, and those with 10-43 years and those with 5-9 years.  
Employees with 5-9 years service showed a greater change in union commitment than the 
other employees. 
 
In table 4.25, the results of the impact of years with union on the affective factors indicate that 
there was no significant difference in the change in all affective factors pre- and post-
implementation. 
 
Table 4.22 shows that there was no significant difference in the change in the affective factors 
among the members of the union and non-unionised employees pre- and post-
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement. 
 
In Table 4.17, the results for the impact of race on the change in the affective factors pre- and 
post-implementation revealed a practically significant difference regarding change in job 
satisfaction.  The Coloured employees experienced a greater drop in job satisfaction post-
implementation as compared to the African employees. 
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4.4. RESULTS FROM FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEWS 
Managers 
The managers who were interviewed were both union members, and before they were 
appointed as managers, they were engineers on an X-scale.  One of the managers has had 
his previous job (Engineer: Roads and Stormwater Design) evaluated; this means that when 
he became a manager, the Engineer post was advertised on a T-scale.  The other manager’s 
previous position (Engineer: Projects) was not evaluated when all the jobs were evaluated; as 
a result, when that Engineer post became vacant, it was not advertised immediately; HR had 
to evaluate it first, and this was only done in 2013,whilethe process of job evaluations was 
conducted in the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 financial years.  The process of having other 
positions evaluated and others not had an impact on the turnaround time of filling vacancies. 
 
Both managers indicated that they had their current jobs evaluated; this means that they 
moved from the X-scale and are now getting paid according to the T-scales.  From the 
interviews, it can be concluded that the managers were not satisfied with the T-scales 
because the salaries were low and it takes more than five years for one to reach the last 
notch. 
 
With regard to the impact that the implementation of the agreement had on promotional 
opportunities, the response from both managers was negative.  One manager cited that junior 
employees on the old X-scale earn more than their immediate supervisors who are on the T-
scale; as a result, some employees do not apply for promotional posts.  In terms of benefits, it 
is understood that there were fixed benefits before the implementation of the job evaluation 
and wage curve collective agreement. 
 
Shop stewards 
The shopstewards who were interviewed were SAMWU and IMATU shopstewards.  In one 
way or the other, both shopstewards were involved in the strike action that has led to the 
signing of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.   
 
With regard to the cause of the strike, the SAMWU shopsteward indicated two things: the 
finalisation of the grading system and the reopening of negotiations due to the increase in 
CPI.  The IMATU shopsteward, on the other hand, stated that the cause of the strike was the 
dissatisfaction with the resolutions that were not in the members’ favour.  Both shop stewards 
indicated that the strike was in April 2010.  The SAMWU shop steward, when asked what 
happened between the union and management, stated that whilst the workers were on strike, 
some of the workers would submit sick notes and the managers would accept them; as a 
result, the strike divided the workers.  From IMATU’s side, the shopsteward indicated that the 
union members were informed what the strike was about, and from the management’s side, 
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they applied the “no work, no pay” rule; as a result, some of their members returned to work 
but were intimidated by SAMWU members. 
 
From both unions, the members were kept updated about the developments through 
meetings.  Finally, both unions agreed that the strike ended on 21 April when an agreement 
was signed.  It is understood that employees’ salaries were increased with the annual 
increase as at 1 July 2010; however, the wage curve attached to the agreement was not 
increased with the same annual increase as at 1 July 2010 as a result of the clause that was 
changed by SALGA before it was signed.  Thus, when the employees were converted to the 
wage curve, they were not placed on the correct grades/notch, and this may affect a possible 
back pay for eligible employees; this resulted in the unions going to the Labour Court (see 
Appendix 6 for the Labour Court’s judgement on this issue).  In their research, Meyer and 
Davids (2012) recommend that any agreements reached or promises made must be put into 
action as soon as possible in order to keep the momentum and avoid creating unnecessary 
disagreements and conflict.  This is the opposite of what happened with the signing of the 
2010 agreements because the unions thought they signed a document which they agreed 
upon with the employer the previous night, only to find out at a later stage that the document 
was amended without their knowledge. 
 
4.5. SUMMARY 
Relating to the first objective, the employer saw a need to categorise municipalities and start 
the process of job evaluation, but the change that was implemented at Ekurhuleni Municipality 
had a negative impact on the employees.  From the interviews, the researcher can conclude 
that the employees were not engaged in the process; they did not understand what the 
outcomes of the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement 
would have on their salaries, benefits and their promotional chances. 
 
From the results of the interviews with the union representatives, it seems that the employees 
do not want to engage in a strike action anymore because they feel that their unions sold 
them by allowing the employer to implement an agreement that would affect their salaries.  As 
has been discussed in the literature review, the results show that the outcomes of a strike 
action have a negative impact on both the employer and the employee, as the employers lose 
production, the employees lose salaries or income as the principle of “no work, no pay” is 
usually applied by the employers.   
 
The results from the survey questionnaire show that the changes in the attitudes of 
employees after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement were negative.  There was a significant decrease in the level of organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction, union commitment and management satisfaction; this was in 
relation to the first research question that asked: what is the change in employee attitudes 
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post the introduction of the wage curve, especially the attitudes of employees towards 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment 
after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement? 
 
Relating to the second research question, the sub-group of males and females show that they 
were positive for all the affective measures before the implementation. There was no 
significant difference among the age groups and the categories of years with the union on the 
affective measures beforethe implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement. 
 
The results also show that employees with a service of 0-4 years were less committed to the 
union before the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  
 
There was also a practically significant difference for commitment to the union among the 
employees affiliated to SAMWU and IMATU and those who were not union members; the 
results show that the difference in union commitment was a result of the difference between 
those who were unionised and those who were not. 
 
Finally, the results showed that there was no significant difference among the different age 
groups and the affective factors.  However, a practically significant difference between the 20-
29 and 40-64 age groups and the 30-39 and the 40-64 age groups was shown, with the age 
group of 40-64 years being more loyal than the age group of 20-29 years. 
 
The response to the third research question can be summarised as follows: males and 
females were negative post the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve 
collective agreement, and there was no significant difference in age groups and categories of 
years with union.  There was a practically significant difference for groups categorised by the 
length of service and how they view organisational commitment, job satisfaction and 
management satisfaction.  Employees with 10-43 years of service seemed to be more 
committed than those who have 0-4 years service.  A practically significant difference was 
also shown between African and Coloured employees on job satisfaction, with African 
employees being more positive than Coloured employees. 
 
The last research question asked: what is the relationship between the sub-groups and the 
change in employee attitudes pre and post the wage curve agreement implementation?  The 
sub-groups that were identified were gender, age, length of service, years with the union, 
union membership and race.  The overall response of the sub-groups was that the gender, 
age, years with union and membership with union showed no significant difference in the 
affective factors pre- and post-implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective 
agreement.  Race and length of service, however, showed a practical significance. 
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This negative attitude towards union commitment should be noted but also raises the 
question to the current debate, i.e. if unions are still relevant in this day and age. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The penultimate chapter discussed and analysed the results of the study.  The treatise was 
divided into five chapters: Chapter 1 was the introduction to the research; Chapter 2 was the 
literature review; Chapter 3 discussed the method used; Chapter 4 was the analysis and 
discussion of results; and Chapter 5 deals with the conclusion and summary of the study. 
 
The aim of the research was to study employee’s perceptions of organisational commitment, 
job satisfaction, management satisfaction and union commitment before and after the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement, which was a result 
of the 2010 local government strike. 
 
5.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
5.2.1. Objective 1 
The first objective of the study was to describe the collective agreements that were signed in 
2010 as a result of the need to categorise municipalities and to evaluate jobs and the 
consequences of the collective agreements for employees through the study of documents 
supplemented by interviews.  
 
5.2.2. Objective 2 
The second objective of the research was to investigate if there has been a change in 
attitudes of employees in the Roads and Stormwater Department of Ekurhuleni after the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  The key attitudes 
that were measured were organisational commitment, job satisfaction, management 
satisfaction and union commitment. 
 
5.3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The first part of the discussion will deal with the results from the face-to-face interview and the 
second part with the results from the questionnaires. 
 
5.3.1. Face-to-face interviews 
The results from the face-to-face interviews show a link of collective bargaining and how far 
the employees understand the collective agreements and whether the union members 
understand the implications of the agreements they have signed.  With regard to collective 
bargaining, it is noted that conflict results from lack of bargaining or implementing bargaining 
decisions.  In the literature review, it is stated that conflict is institutionalised through the 
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development of new institutions, primarily political democracy and collective bargaining, which 
provide adequate means for resolving and regulating conflict (Korpi & Shaler, 1979).  
Collective bargaining in the public sector and in local government was discussed to give a 
picture of how collective bargaining works in these sectors.  A broad history of strikes in South 
Africa is highlighted to show that strikes are part of collective bargaining.  In South Africa, 
during the mining era, strikes were recorded as a result of no bargaining system in place and 
later on, when bargaining systems were in place, they only accommodated Whites until there 
was a system that accommodated Blacks as well.  Legislation that regulates the bargaining 
system was also discussed, which all employers and employees of local government now 
enjoy.  
 
According to the SAMWU shop steward who was interviewed on 1 October 2012, the strike 
divided workers as they felt that there will be no change in what they were striking for 
because in the 2010 strike, they felt that there was no good feedback on what they were 
striking for; as a result, they returned to work as they thought about their families and 
personal responsibilities; however, some workers joined IMATU.  Therefore, as a result of this 
strike, SAMWU’s membership declined. 
 
There was also a general feeling from the managers who were interviewed that the 
introduction of the T-scales had an impact on the employee salaries and also that they were 
not motivated to apply for promotional posts as there was no significant difference in salaries. 
 
5.3.2. Results from the Survey Questionnaires 
5.3.2.1. Organisational Commitment 
Organisational commitment relates to organisational change because when one implements 
change in the organisation, one needs the employer’s and the employee’s commitment to the 
organisation in order for the change to be sustainable (Visagie &Steyn, 2011).  According to 
Visagie and Steyn (2011), employees’ commitment to the organisation decreases when 
change is introduced. 
 
The results for organisational commitment have shown that there was a significant decrease 
in the change in the attitudes of employees of organisational commitment after the 
implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve collective agreement.  There was a 
practically significant difference for groups categorised by the length of service and how they 
view organisational commitment, as employees with 10-43 years service appeared to be 
more committed to the organisation than those who only have 0-4 years service.  In the 
literature review, it is stated that organisational commitment is the relative strength of an 
individual’s identification with the organisation and is characterised by a strong belief in the 
organisation’s values and goals.  With that said, the employees’ attitudes for organisational 
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commitment were negative after the implementation of the job evaluation and wage curve 
collective agreement. 
 
5.3.2.2. Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is a positive emotional reaction to one’s assessment of one’s job experience 
(Chaulk & Brown, 2008).  The research results show that there was a decrease in job 
satisfaction post-implementation, and the employees were least positive, especially when 
asked if they were satisfied with their pay after the implementation.  The Coloured employees 
were less satisfied with their jobs than their African counterparts.  This outcome should be of 
concern because if employees are not satisfied with their pay, they might leave the 
organisation, or they might not be as productive.    
 
5.3.2.3. Management Satisfaction 
The results for management satisfaction show that employees were negative towards 
satisfaction with management.  
 
5.3.2.4. Union Commitment 
From the results, an answer to Chaulk and Brown’s (2008) question of how union 
commitment is affected by the strike is provided.  Chaulk and Brown further ask whether 
members become more committed to their union after a strike action or whether their level of 
commitment decreases or remains the same.  Employees with service of 5-9 years showed 
greater union commitment than other employees.  The employees were also negative when 
asked if they were proud to belong to a union and whether they were willing to put in a great 
deal of effort in order to make the union a success.  With regard to union commitment, 
employees with a service of less than four years were less committed to the union before the 
implementation of the agreement.    
 
5.4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a recommendation for future research, it would be ideal to conduct the research before a 
strike action takes place in order to test the constructs before the action, and once the strike 
action is over, then the attitudes of employees can be tested to get a clearer feeling from the 
respondents while their memories and feelings are still fresh and genuine.  Research can also 
be done to compare how the employees in other metropolitan municipalities have had the 
implementation of the agreement affect them because the implementation of the job 
evaluation and wage curve collective agreement was a national decision affecting all 
municipalities in South Africa. 
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At municipal level, it is recommended that managers need to do a thorough consultation with 
the employees at all levels to make sure that they understand whatever change that needs to 
be implemented.  Because the wage curve collective agreement has been implemented at 
Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality, the municipality needs to look at ways to incentivise 
employees as they are currently demotivated, like encouraging employees to apply for senior 
positions and possibly look at paying benefits like scarce skills allowance, ,  
 
The unions need to go back to their members and reassure them of their commitment to the 
protection and advancement of working conditions of its members and also acknowledge 
where they have gone wrong specifically regarding the implementation of the job evaluation 
and wage curve collective agreement.  
 
Lastly, these findings can also be used for introducing and managing change in an 
organisation and for other related future research projects. 
 
5.5. CONCLUSION 
The research was done on Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (Department of Roads and 
Stormwater) to assess the employees’ attitudes after the implementation of the Job 
Evaluation and Wage Curve Collective Agreement.  The data was collected through face to 
face interviews and distribution of a questionnaire.   
 
Four constructs that were used to assess the change were also discussed and these 
involved, organizational commitment, union commitment, job satisfaction and management 
satisfaction.  
 
In conclusion, the literature review shows that collective bargaining is part of the South 
African labour relations system which is regulated by various legislation.  Change on its own 
may also have negative or positive outcomes depending on how it is introduced to the other 
party.   
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Summary :  Rectification of a Wage Curve Collective Agreement 
signed on 21 April 2010 to give effect to the agreement reached between 
the parties on 20 April 2010 and the agreement reached in respect of the 
amendment of one clause immediately prior to the signing of the Wage 
Curve Collective Agreement.  
JUDGMENT 
AC BASSON, J 
The parties 
[1] The applicant in this matter is the Independent Municipal and Allied Trade 
Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘IMATU’). The second to eleventh 
applicants are Mr. Dale Forbes (the Collective Bargaining Officer of 
SAMWU), Mr. Ndhlovu (SAMWU), Mr. Kennedy Nkosi (SAMWU), Mr. 
Andre Adams (SAMWU), Mr. Phasoane Molope (President of SAMWU), 
Mr. Ntokoza Nzuza (SAMWU), Mr. Barend Koen (General Secretary of 
IMATU), Mr. Danie Carstens (IMATU), Mr. Stanley Khoza (IMATU) and 
Ms Helen Duminy (IMATU) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘individual 
applicants’). The application to join the individual applicants was not 
opposed and was granted at the commencement of the proceedings. 
[2] The first respondent is the South African Local Government Association 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘SALGA’). The second respondent is the South 
African Municipal Workers Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘SAMWU’). 
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The second respondent, although it did not file any papers, made common 
cause with the applicants in these proceedings. For purposes of this 
application Mr. Van der Riet SC appeared on behalf of both IMATU (the 
first applicant) and SAMWU (the second respondent). (Where reference is 
made to ‘the Unions’ reference is made to both SAMWU and IMATU. I will 
refer to the unions and the second to eleventh applicants collectively as 
‘the applicants’). 
[3] The third respondent is the South African Local Government Bargaining 
Council (‘the SALGBC’). Although cited as a respondent, the SALGBC 
took no steps to oppose the application or to intervene in the proceedings. 
Mr. Brassey SC and his junior appeared on behalf of the first respondent. 
The fourth and further respondents are members of the caucus of the first 
respondent’s Bargaining Committee representatives. 
[4] At the close of the applicants’ case, SALGA moved for absolution from the 
instance. The application was dismissed.  
The urgent application 
[5] The dispute about the validity of the Categorisation and Job Evaluation 
Wage Curves Collective Agreement first came before this Court by way of 
an urgent application for a temporary interdict against the SALGBC for a 
declaratory order that the 21 April 2010 agreement is void ab initio. The 
order sought to prevent the SALGBC from implementing the Wage Curve 
Collective Agreement signed on 21 April 2010, until the dispute between 
the parties regarding the validity of the said Collective Agreement could be 
resolved. On the day of the hearing, the Court indicated to the parties that 
the factual disputes could not be resolved without hearing oral evidence. 
By agreement it was ruled that the application be referred to oral evidence 
so that the dispute regarding the validity of the Categorisation and Job 
Evalution Wage Curve Collective Agreement signed on 21 April 2010 
could be resolved. IMATU did not file any affidavits in the urgent 
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application but aligned itself with the urgent application brought by 
SAMWU. 
The dispute 
[6] The dispute between the parties relates to the validity of ‘the 
Categorisation and Job Evaluation Wage Curves Collective Agreement’ 
signed on 21 April 2010 at a signing ceremony by IMATU, SAMWU (the 
unions) and SALGA under the auspices of the SALGBC. (I will refer to this 
collective agreement generally as the ‘Wage Curve Agreement’.) The 
Wage Curve Agreement was the result of negotiations on 19 and 20 April 
2010 and led to the signing of a Wage Curve Agreement on 21 April 2010. 
It is fundamentally in dispute whether the applicants had intended to sign 
the version of the Wage Curve Agreement that was actually signed on 21 
April 2010 or whether they had intended to sign the Wage Curve 
Agreement that emerged from the deliberations of the Drafting Committee 
(representing the respective bargaining counterparts) that concluded their 
deliberations on 20 April 2010. What is, however, common cause is the 
fact that a Wage Curve Agreement was signed on 21 April 2010.  
[7] The applicants allege that the Wage Curve Agreement that was concluded 
on 20 April 2010 is the collective agreement that is binding on IMATU, 
SAMWU and SALGA (the collective bargaining parties). (I will refer to the 
Wage Curve Agreement which the applicants say came into existence on 
20 April 2010 and therefore binding on the parties (although unsigned), as 
the ‘20 April Agreement’.) SALGA allege that the Wage Curve Agreement 
that is binding on the collective bargaining parties is the one that was 
signed on the following day namely 21 April 2010. (I will refer to the Wage 
Curve Agreement which SALGA says came into existence as the ‘21 April 
Agreement’).  
[8] The contents of the 20 April Agreement and the 21 April Agreement are 
exactly the same but differ fundamentally in respect of the implementation 
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date of the salary scales referred to in the Annexures to the Wage Curve 
Agreement. Both of these agreements (the one of 20 April and the one of 
21 April) therefore intend to deal with the same issues one of which is the 
wage curves for the different categories of municipalities. Apart from the 
date of implementation of the wage curve agreement (and one or two 
minor issues not material to this dispute) the 20 April agreement is 
therefore identical to the 21 April agreement. (I will return in more detail to 
the crucial difference between the two agreements hereinbelow). 
[9] It is common cause that the 21 April agreement was signed at a signing 
ceremony under the auspices of the SALGBC. It is further common 
cause that the parties under the auspices of SALGA were involved in 
negotiations in the Bargaining Committee established in terms of 
SALGA’s constitution.  (I will return to the said constitution and the 
effect thereof hereinbelow). 
[10] It is further also common cause that the Wage Curve Agreement was 
signed on 21 April 2010 in the context of a strike in support of, inter alia, 
the conclusion of the Wage Curve Agreement. The strike was also in 
support of the Disciplinary Code Collective Agreement. (I will refer to 
this collective agreement as ‘the Disciplinary Agreement’). This 
agreement was also signed on 21 April 2010. The Disciplinary 
Agreement is however not in dispute in these proceedings although 
reference will be made to this collective agreement. 
[11] The negotiations to settle the strike took place over two days namely on 
19 and 20 April 2010 and ultimately culminated in the signing of the 21 
April Wage Curve Agreement. The parties also took part in other 
bilaterals on other dates between the different role players. 
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SAMWU’s Statement of Claim 
[12] In essence what SAMWU and IMATU are seeking is an order from this 
Court confirming that the Wage Curve Collective Agreement signed on 21 
April 2010 does not reflect the agreement reached during their prior 
negotiations with SALGA on 20 April 2010. Consequently, the applicants 
seek the following relief: 
12.1 An order declaring that the 20 April Wage Curve Agreement1 
constitutes a binding collective agreement between IMATU, 
SAMWU and SALGA. 
12.2 Alternatively to (i) above, rectification of the Wage Curve 
Agreement signed on 21 April 20102 by deleting clause 8.2 thereof 
and inserting clauses 8.2 and 8.3 of the 20 April Wage Curve 
Collective Agreement.3  
12.3 If the order in 12.1 is granted, then an order is also sought declaring 
that the Wage Curve Agreement signed on 21 April 2010 does not 
constitute a valid agreement. 
[13] In order to decide the dispute this Court has to decide the following:  
13.1 Firstly, whether the parties did in fact reach an agreement on the 
contents of the document referred to as the 20 April Wage Curve 
Agreement. 
13.2 Secondly, did the trade union parties sign the document referred to 
as the 21 April Wage Curve Agreement on the understanding that 
this document in fact reflected the agreement reached on 20 April 
                                                 
1 Appearing on pages 42 to 53 of Bundle C. 
2 Annexure ‘BJK3’ to the Founding Affidavit in the Urgent Application. At pages 61 -89 of Bundle 
B.  
3 Referred to in footnote 1 supra. 
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2010, subject to the amendment to clause 7.2.3 agreed to just 
before signature?  
13.3 Thirdly, did the Unions form the understanding that what they 
signed on 21 April 2010 was the 20 April 2010 Agreement on the 
basis of the representation made by Mr. Yawa (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘Yawa’) that only clause 7.2.3 had been amended?  
13.4 Fourthly, did SALGA also sign the 21 April Wage Curve Agreement 
on the understanding that they signed the agreement reached on 
20 April 2010 subject to the amendment of clause 7.2.3 agreed to 
just before signing? 
Background facts 
[14] Some of the background facts are common cause. The parties, however, 
materially differ in respect of the events that culminated in the signing of 
the 21 April agreement. 
Events prior to 20 April 2010 
[15] In 2003 IMATU, SALGA and SAMWU concluded a Wage Curve Collective 
Agreement to give effect to the Job Evaluation Collective Agreement.4 
This agreement was concluded in an attempt to regulate and consolidate 
jobs in municipalities by classifying jobs and providing for job descriptions. 
In brief, it was the purpose of this agreement to provide for a mechanism 
for this process. Although this process had started already in 2003, it was 
only on 27 January 2009 that SAMWU referred a dispute concerning its 
proposals for the development of a wage curve to the SALGBC for 
conciliation. SAMWU demanded that a collective agreement be concluded 
                                                 
4 After 1994 municipalities were dramatically restructured in line with the new political 
dispensation. The SALCBC came into existence in the late 1990’s as a merger of all the 
Industrial Councils under the previous LRA.  
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to create a formalised wage curve for all the different jobs in 
municipalities.  
[16] On 26 March 2010, SAMWU issued a strike notice and its members 
embarked on a nation-wide protected strike in support of the Wage Curve 
Agreement and the conclusion of a new Disciplinary Code Collective 
Agreement.  
[17] Negotiations took place between the different parties during the strike.5 
SAMWU and SALGA also held bilateral meetings at which it was agreed 
that the wage curve scale in the local government sector would be based 
on the 50th percentile market position as determined by Deloitte and 
Touche in its salary survey of September 2009. IMATU was in agreement 
with this determination.  
[18] Prior to the commencement of the Bargaining Committee6 negotiations, 
the parties have therefore already settled the basis for the wage curve 
scale agreement. The negotiations of the Bargaining Committee focused 
on the draft collective agreements on the wage curve and the disciplinary 
procedure. SALGA had 10 representatives, SAMWU had six 
representatives (in light of the fact that it enjoys more representation than 
IMATU) and IMATU had four representatives on the Bargaining 
Committee. Counselor Mashilo of SALGA was the chairperson of the 
Bargaining Committee and also acted as the facilitator.  
Negotiations of the Bargaining Committee on 19 and 20 April 2010  
[19] When the Bargaining Committee convened drafts of the two collective 
agreements were projected on a big screen directly from Forbes’ laptop. 
                                                 
5 The strike was called off on 21 April 2010 after the signing of the two collective agreements. 
6 Clause 7.2 of the constitution provides for the establishment of a Bargaining Committee that will 
have the power to conclude Collective Agreements relating to terms and conditions of service and 
any other matter referred to it 
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The Bargaining Committee then proceeded to consider the draft collective 
agreements clause by clause.  
[20] The Bargaining Committee continued its deliberations until the early hours 
of 20 April 2010. The two major issues at that stage were the issue of 
back pay and pay progression. The back pay issue was about whether the 
employees ought to get the benefits of the wage curve agreement 
retrospectively. SAMWU’s position was that the employees should get 24 
months’ back pay whereas SALGA’s position was that they should get no 
back pay at all. The pay progression issue was whether employees’ 
movement up the wage curve notches ought to be automatic or whether it 
should be merit based. 
[21] During the negotiations (on 19 April 2010) Mashilo advised the Unions that 
SALGA had a special meeting scheduled for the following morning (20 
April 2010) and that SALGA would seek a further mandate from its 
National Executive Committee to resolve the issue. That meeting was held 
and the negotiations continued thereafter on 20 April 2010. The parties 
concluded their negotiations on two important issues:  
21.1 In respect of the back pay issue, the parties agreed that employees 
who are entitled to benefits in the wage curve collective agreement 
would receive nine months’ back pay. As it will become clear later in 
this judgment, the parties had not reached an agreement on the 
period over which the back pay would be paid. It appears from the 
evidence that this issue was first raised during the deliberations of 
the Drafting Committee.  
21.2 In respect of pay progression, the parties agreed that this issue 
would not be dealt with in the present collective agreement, but that 
it would stand over for deliberation at another time.  
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Deliberations of the Drafting/Refining Committee 
[22] It is common cause that when the deliberations of the Bargaining 
Committee were finalised, a Drafting/Refining Committee was appointed 
by the members of the Bargaining Committee to refine the two draft 
collective agreements. It appears from the evidence that the parties at the 
Bargaining Committee had finally reached agreement on a set of 
principles that they considered sufficient to form the basis for the signing 
of the two collective agreements. The Drafting Committee was then tasked 
to draft the collective agreements. The Drafting Committee commenced its 
deliberations in a smaller room at approximately 16H00 on 20 April 2010. 
Forbes had the draft substantive agreements concluded in the Bargaining 
Committee on his laptop. He then acted as the typist and proceeded to 
type whilst the Drafting Committee refined the clauses one by one. Koen’s 
undisputed evidence was that none of the Drafting Committee members 
had a hardcopy of the two collective agreements and that they relied on 
the copies on Forbes’ laptop. Yawa (who is employed by SALGA as the 
Executive Director Municipality Institutional Development) gave evidence 
that he had a hard copy and that he was looking at the hard copy and not 
at the computer screen of Forbes. (I will return to his evidence in more 
detail hereinbelow.) 
[23] The Drafting Committee consisted of Mr. Koen (obo IMATU – General 
Secretary); Mr. Forbes (obo SAMWU – the Collective Bargaining Officer) 
and Messrs Yawa (SALGA’s chief negotiator), Lebelo (member of 
SALGA’s negotiating team and Director of Labour Relations of the City of 
Johannsburg) and Van Zyl (a member of SALGA’s negotiating team). The 
parties disagree as to the precise function this team was supposed to 
perform. This dispute is formulated as follows in the pre-trail minutes: 
23.1 SALGA alleges that the team was appointed to refine the 
agreement on all other issues initially agreed upon and formulate 
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the agreement in terms of back pay as agreed by the principals in 
the properly constituted Bargaining Committee and then to place it 
before the Bargaining Committee for ultimate acceptance.  
23.2 The Unions contend that the team was appointed to formulate a 
draft collective agreement on, inter alia, the wage curve issue for 
approval by their principals. The evidence on behalf of the 
applicants was that all the principals were there when the Drafting 
Committee was refining the two collective agreements and that they 
had approved the final drafts of the two collective agreements which 
emanated from the deliberations. (I will return to the dealings of the 
drafting committee in more detail hereinbelow).   
[24] At the outset, it must be pointed out that it is common cause that the 
Bargaining Committee never reconvened or held another meeting before 
the signing ceremony on 21 April 2010. It is further common cause that all 
the principal role players were present whilst the Drafting Committee was 
deliberating. Forbes testified that Mr. George (the CEO of SALGA) was 
there throughout the deliberations and so were Yawa, Van Zyl and Lebelo 
for SALGA. Koen was also there on behalf of IMATU.  
[25] Forbes testified that a dispute arose during the deliberations of the 
Drafting Committee about the timing or period of the back pay that was to 
be paid. It is common cause that Mashilo was called into IMATU’s caucus 
delegation to assist in settling the issue. Mashilo informed them that 
SALGA had proposed that the nine month back pay would be paid over a 
period of nine months. The parties then settled the issue of back pay on 
this basis during the refinement process. Molope testified that although he 
was not involved in the Drafting Committee, he and the other 
representatives waited around in the event their members on the Drafting 
Committee needed a mandate to settle an issue. He also could recall the 
issue of the timing of the back pay and that that issue was settled during 
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the deliberations of the Drafting Committee. This issue was therefore 
settled whilst the Drafting Committee was deliberating on the final draft 
and without referring the matter back to the Bargaining Committee for a 
voting process as required in terms of the Constitution of the SALGBC. 
Forbes’ evidence that the practice was to conclude collective agreements 
without referring the final collective agreements again to the Bargaining 
Committee was confirmed by Koen. (I will return to the evidence of Koen 
hereinbelow where I consider the submissions made on behalf of SALGA 
in respect of the validity of the 20 April 2010 agreement.) 
[26] Forbes testified that it was therefore the task of the Drafting Committee 
to take the substantive agreement reached in the Bargaining 
Committee and to translate that into wording. Forbes (and Koen) was 
adamant that the negotiating parties would then consider the 
agreements and settle any disputes that may arise during the 
deliberations. As already pointed out, one of the disputes that was in 
fact settled (the extent of the (nine months) back pay) was settled after 
the members of the Drafting Committee had obtained mandates from 
their respective principals who were all waiting in the event they were 
required to give a  to their representatives on the Drafting Committee. 
[27] As regards the seating arrangements in the room where the Drafting 
Committee deliberated, Forbes’ evidence was that he set up his 
computer and acted as the typist. Yawa and Koen were seated next to 
him. Koen confirmed in his evidence that Yawa sat to the right of 
Forbes and that he (Koen) was seated on Forbes’ left. Van Zyl sat on 
the other side of the table and could not see the laptop screen. Lebelo 
stood behind them and was therefore also able to look at the laptop 
screen.  
[28] Forbes then went through the agreements that the Bargaining 
Committee had ended with clause by clause until it was finalised. The 
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other members of the team looked at the wording on his laptop screen. 
He specifically disputed that everyone could not see what was going on 
on his computer. He further testified that everyone was involved in the 
wording and that everyone made suggestions. Koen also confirmed 
that they went through the draft agreement clause by clause agreeing 
on the wording as they went along. Van Zyl was, according to Koen, the 
only one who did not say much during the deliberations. 
[29] SALGA’s version is that Lebelo and Yawa never saw what Forbes was 
typing in on his laptop. The laptop was not linked to a screen (similar to 
the one that was used during deliberations of the Bargaining 
Committee). Yawa testified that he and Forbes were seated on the one 
end of the table. Koen was seated on the other side of the table straight 
opposite him and Lebelo was seated next to him almost opposite of 
Forbes. According to Yawa, he was not able to see what Forbes was 
typing on his laptop and that no one in fact looked at what Forbes was 
doing. He testified that he had a hard copy of the agreements that had 
emerged from the Bargaining Committee plenary and that he was 
looking at the hard copies. Yawa however conceded that Forbes read 
each clause out loud.  
[30] During the deliberations, a crucial issue arose regarding the date on which 
the wage curve scales would be increased. The representatives discussed 
the issue. The Union’s stance was that the wage curve scales ought to be 
increased on 1 July 2010 by the same percentage as the salary increase 
that was due on the same date. The Unions initially proposed that the 
wage curve scales set out in Annexures B1 – B2 to the Wage Curve 
Collective Agreement be adjusted by the percentage of the inflationary 
linked salary increase that was due on 1 July 2010. SALGA pointed out to 
the Committee that the percentage figures had not yet been determined. 
The union parties then proposed the formulation of clauses 8.2 and 8.3 
(as contained in the 20 April 2010 agreement) with the implementation 
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date of the wage curve as 1 July 2010. Forbes was adamant that they had 
agreed to the implementation date being 1 July 2010 and that SAMWU 
would never have agreed to the implementation date being 1 July 2011. 
Koen also confirmed that the date of the increase was discussed and that 
it was discussed that it would happen on 1 July 2010. Koen further 
testified that he had explained to the meeting why it had to happen on that 
day. According to him, the date of 2011 was not tabled. 
[31] Yawa could not remember whether clause 8 had been read out. Yawa, 
however, accepted that the Unions took the position during the 
deliberations of the Drafting Committee that the wage curve scales ought 
to be adjusted from 1 July 2010. Yawa further accepted that when the 
trade unions realised that the wage curve scales could not be physically 
adjusted because the percentage of the inflationary salary increase had 
not yet been determined, that they proposed the formulation of clause 8.2 
and 8.3 (as reflected in the 20 April agreement). Yawa, however, 
maintained that the agreement was then reached in the Drafting 
Committee that the wage curve scales would be increased on 1 July 2011. 
According to him, if they (SALGBC) had agreed on 1 July 2010 as the 
implementation date, this would have amounted to an impermissible 
tampering with the agreement reached in the Bargaining Committee. 
SALGA’s version, therefore, is that they had agreed that the 
implementation date of the wage curve agreement would be 1 July 2011. 
Yawa further testified that he was not that concerned about what was in 
the agreement as it was clear that the signing was not going to happen.7 
                                                 
7 Yawa testified as follows: ‘I did not have a concern as in my ordinary understanding of 
concern, but I had a desire that what would be contained in the ultimate final document 
should be reflective of what we had discussed and refined the agreement by. To that end and 
when it was clear that signing was not to happen as I initially said M'Lady, that earlier on Mr 
Koen did indicate that his president was not around and nobody else can sign in terms of their 
own protocols and whatever they were going through. I then, because I was concerned and I 
was desirous that what would be in that document, should be free of defect. I then together 
with Mr Lebelo asked Mr Forbes where this computer and the 3G, to then email that 
document to us so that then in the carrying of this desire of mine and ours, that it was must be 
reflective of what we know ourselves as what was agreed to, I can then have an opportunity 
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As will be pointed out below, this version can clearly not be accepted in 
light of the fact that Yawa, at that time, could not have known that the 
agreements would not be signed that evening. Mr. George was adamant 
during an interview on E-TV that the collective agreements would be 
signed that evening. (I will return to this interview in detail hereinbelow). 
[32] The Drafting Committee concluded their deliberations after 18H00 on the 
evening of 20 April 2010. Koen asked Mr. Craig Adams (the Deputy 
General Secretary for legal matters of IMTATU) to print the hard copies. 
Adams copied four documents from the laptop of Forbes. One document 
was the Wage Curve Collective Agreement and the other was the 
Disciplinary Code Collective Agreement (both these two documents were 
in Microsoft Word format). Two further documents in Microsoft Excel 
format were printed out namely Annexure A and Annexure B to the Wage 
Curve Collective Agreement. Adams then stapled the Disciplinary Code 
Agreement together and the Wage Curve Collective Agreement together 
with the two annexures (Annexure A and B).  
[33] Adams testified that he handed Yawa a hard copy of the two agreements 
and handed another to Forbes (who was in another room). At that stage, 
Koen had already left. Adams was clear that the copy of the agreement 
that he handed to Yawa and Forbes on the evening of 20 April 2010 was 
the one referred to in this judgment as the 20 April 2010 agreement. Later, 
in the evening, Adams met Yawa in the foyer of the Hotel and he again 
gave Yawa a copy of the two Annexures that he had ‘cleaned up’. 
[34] Despite Adams’ evidence, Yawa denied that he had received hard copies 
of the collective agreements on the evening of 20 April 2010. According to 
him the wage curve collective agreement was not even ready on 20 April 
                                                                                                                                                 
to know that whatever he typed in as our resolution so to speak, were in fact as we know 
them. Before then you know, would ask our principals to endorse and then sign when the time 
is appropriate.’ 
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2010. Koen also confirmed that Adams had told him that he had given a 
copy to Yawa. 
[35] Forbes testified that he took the two agreements to his principals and 
indicated to them the contents of the documents and indicated the areas 
where there had been changes. The SAMWU mandating structure was 
complicated. They had 15 people there - one from every province and six 
senior national office bearers. He, however, testified that his principals 
were happy with the changes and that they were prepared to sign. Molope 
confirmed that he had received a copy of the agreements and that Forbes 
briefed SAMWU delegates. He confirmed that the agreements that were 
given to him were the ones that would have been signed that evening (20 
April 2010). Molope also confirmed that those were the agreements he 
was told to take to the signing ceremony.   
[36] Forbes testified that he took the agreements to IMATU and Mashilo (on 
behalf of SALGA). Both indicated to him that they were satisfied with the 
agreements and that they were prepared to sign.  
[37] According to Forbes, all the parties were therefore willing to sign the two 
agreements. However, as already pointed out the signing did not go 
ahead because George was not there for SALGA. Mr. Carstens (the 
President of IMATU) was also not available to sign the agreements on the 
evening of 20 April 2010. Koen made agreements for Mr. Stanley Khoza 
(the Deputy President of IMATU) to sign the agreements on behalf of 
IMATU. Koen testified that the Drafting Committee could not reach a final 
agreement because they had to run the final agreement past their 
principals before it was an agreement. He, however, confirmed that at the 
end of the deliberations on the evening of 20 April 2010 the final collective 
agreements were taken to their principals for ratification and that the 
principals did ratify the agreements. According to him, the only issue that 
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was outstanding was the signatures. He also confirmed that the SAMWU 
principals had ratified the agreement. 
[38] A further reason why the agreement could not be signed on 20 April 2010 
was the fact that some people from SAMWU’s Johannesburg branch were 
unhappy with the agreement. However, despite all of these obstacles, the 
Unions are adamant that there was a conclusive agreement on the 
evening of 20 April 2010 in respect of the Wage Curves Agreement (and 
the Disciplinary Code). 
News interview on E-TV on 20 April 2010 
[39] It is common cause that Mr George (the CEO of SALGA) appeared on 
E-TV’s 7 o’clock news (19H13 to 19H19) on the evening of 20 April 
2010. During an interview8 with Mr. Jeremy Maggs (the presenter of 
that programme) George stated that the parties have reached an 
agreement. Maggs asked the following question:  
‘So where do we stand tonight, Xolile George is with us who speaks for 
the South African Local Government Association, welcome, is this any 
closer to being resolved?’   
George replied as follows:  
‘We have resolved the matter now.  We have a deal on the table that 
we have worked on this afternoon as a culmination of what was 
worked off overnight, last…., I mean yesterday at the South African 
Bargaining Council, so now we have a deal that as, I leave the studio, I 
will be going back to the bargaining council to formalise the signing of 
the deal.’ 
George repeats in the next paragraph:  
                                                 
8 The interview was shown to the Court in full. 
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‘there is a deal Jeremy, that has been accepted by SAMWU, it has 
been accepted by IMATU, remember there is three parties in the 
Bargaining Council, SAMWU, SALGA, IMATU, all parties have now 
accepted the deal on the table.’9 
Maggs then brings the interview to a conclusion by saying the following: 
‘alright, one more time, I want to get this 100 percent on the record.  I 
do not want to report this inaccurately, deal on the table, the two 
unions involved have agreed, you are off to go and make sure that pen 
hits paper, that the deal is inked, strike is over.’ 
George replied as follows:  
‘Yes, that is a correct position Jeremy, there is a deal on the table, 
parties have agreed, I am going back now to the negotiating table to 
formalise those arrangements.’ 
[40] Forbes testified that on the evening of 20 April 2010 he met George who 
had just returned from the interview with E-TV. According to Forbes he 
informed George that the signing ceremony would be the following day. 
He also indicated to George that the agreements were binding 
notwithstanding the fact that the parties have not yet signed the 
agreements. According to Forbes, George tried to persuade him to sign 
the agreement that evening.  
[41] Yawa, however, testified that he had phoned George during the 
deliberations of the Drafting Committee and told him not to hurry back to 
the hotel as the parties were not going to sign the agreements that 
evening. His evidence therefore directly contradicts that of Forbes.  
[42] Adams testified that he in the meantime tidied up the formatting of the 
Annexures and that he had printed out the copies of the Annexures. As 
already pointed out, he testified that he had met Yawa in the foyer of the 
                                                 
9 Court’s emphasis. 
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hotel and handed him the new copies of the Annexures. He was surprised 
that most of the other had had already left. Yawa advised him that the 
signing ceremony would be the next day.  
Reasons why the agreements were not signed on 20 April 2010 
[43] As already pointed out, it common cause that the agreements were not 
signed that evening as most of the people who had to sign on behalf of 
their respective constituents had already left. It was then agreed that 
evening that the two collective agreements would be signed on 21 April 
2010 at 14H00 at a signing ceremony. It is also common cause that the 
Bargaining Committee and Drafting Committee were never reconvened 
nor was an arrangement to this effect made after the deliberations were 
concluded on 20 April 2010 and before the agreements were signed at the 
signing ceremony the next day. 
[44] Forbes, who had to leave for Cape Town, could not attend the signing 
ceremony the following day and handed the two collective agreements to 
Molope to sign. Forbes confirmed that the Wage Curve Agreement that he 
gave to Molope was the one identified in this judgment as the 20 April 
2010 agreement.  
[45] In my view, it is clear from the evidence that, at the end of the afternoon 
(early evening) of 20 April 2010, the parties were ready to sign the two 
collective agreements. George said so unequivocally on national 
television. In fact, George stated unequivocally that all three parties were 
in agreement and willing to sign. It was only due to the unavailability of 
some parties that it was decided that the signing ceremony would be held 
on 21 April 2010 (the next day).  
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Events after the closing of the deliberations by the Drafting Committee. 
E-mail of Forbes to Yawa at 19H09 on 20 April 2010 
[46] Yawa asked Forbes to e-mail the Wage Curve Agreement and the 
Disciplinary Code Collective Agreement that were finalised by the Drafting 
Committee to him. According to Forbes, this request was made after the 
negotiating parties (the principals) had already looked at the agreements 
and expressed their satisfaction with the contents thereof. Forbes then e-
mailed the two documents to Yawa and Lebello at 19H09 on 20 April 
2010. The subject of the e-mail is: ‘Final10 collective agreements’. 
[47] The Wage Curve Agreement that was e-mailed to Yawa and Lebello was 
the 20 April 2010 Agreement. Forbes was adamant that the agreement 
that he had sent to Yawa contained the 1 July 2010 implementation date 
(in paragraph 8.3 of the agreement) and not the 1 July 2011 
implementation date (and the other amendments to the numbering to 
clause 8).  
[48] Forbes referred to the attachments in his e-mail as the ‘Final’ collective 
agreements which, in my view, support the contention by SAMWU and 
IMATU that they had considered the agreements which emanated from 
the Drafting Committee as the final agreements which would be signed the 
following day. 
The e-mail of Yawa on 21 April 2010 at 8H37 
[49] On 21 April 2010 at 08H37 Yawa, on the face of it, forwarded the e-mail 
sent to him by Forbes (at 19H09 the previous evening) to his colleagues 
(amongst others George and Van Zyl). The subject of the e-mail is: ‘FW: 
Final11 collective agreements’. Yawa therefore also referred to the 
attached collective agreements as the ‘Final’ versions. It further appears 
                                                 
1010 Court’s emphasis. 
11 Ibid. 
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from the subject matter of the e-mail that he was forwarding the ‘Final’ 
collective agreements sent to him by Forbes to his colleagues. In the e-
mail Yawa wrote as follows: 
‘Morning Colleagues 
Herewith the final12 versions of the agreement meant for signature today. 
Kindly comb and advise if your sport (sic) something untoward.’ 
[50] Yawa testified that he read the Wage Curve Agreement for the first time 
after he had sent it to his colleagues at 08H37 at 21 April 2010. It was only 
then that he discovered that clause 8.3 of the 20 April Agreement 
contained according to him, an ‘obvious error’. Why he did not 
immediately and expressly communicate this to his counterparts is 
suspect. 
The e-mail of Yawa on 21 April 2010 at 10H25 
[51] At 10H25 on 21 April 2010 Yawa sent a further e-mail to some of his 
colleagues. Not included as recipients in this e-mail is Mashilo, Mr. Sonyo 
and George. In this e-mail Yawa wrote as follows: 
‘Quickly tell whether 8.313 (in red) here means when we increase salaries 
in July, we increase these scales or as I think it should be, we increase 
the salaries per the wage and salary agreement.’  
[52] From this e-mail it would appear that Yawa was in possession of the 20 
April 2010 Agreement sent to him by Forbes which contained clause 8.3 
which reflected the implementation date as 1 July 2010 hence his question 
about the implementation of the wage scales. 
E-mail from Roger Falken to Yawa and others at 12H47 
                                                 
12 Ibid 
13 Clause 8.3 of the 20 April 2010 agreement states that the salary scales will be adjusted with 
effect from 1 July 2010. 
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[53] At 12H47 Falken responded to the aforementioned e-mail from Yawa as 
follows: 
‘Hi there 
I must say that I have seriously mad principles because the agreement is 
outside the mandate. 
The agreement in its current form is problematic and the clause referred 
to by Mzie [Yawa] has its problems. I suggest the following amendments 
to 7.2.6 and 8.3 as both have to be amended to bring sanity to the 
application: 
“7.2.6 Eligible employees…nine(9) months retrospective increases based 
on the difference between the salary as at 30 September 2009 and 1 July 
2010(new salary notch) and prior to the application of the annual salary 
increase, taking into account any adjustment to the basic salary between 
the dates referred to herein. This retrospective…” 
And 
“8.3 The salary scales…with effect from 1 July 2010, [prior to] after the 
annual salary adjustment referred to in the Wage and Salary Collective 
Agreement, and then annually thereafter by the same percentage as 
agreed to in the [applicable Wage and Salary Agreement] said 
Agreement” (note [ ]=deleted words) 
Mzie good luck if you can get this right. 
Regards 
Roger’ 
Yawa’s e-mail on 21 April 2010 12H48 pm 
[54] At 12H48 Yawa sent an e-mail to Forbes, Lebelo and Van Zyl. In this 
email he wrote as follows:   
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‘Guys, 
1. See some improvement in the drafting we did not translate the 
agreement reached on the Wage Curve. In particular note our removal of 
the initial clause 8.1 on increase on the R 4000 minimum wage as that is 
taken care of by the current wage and salary agreement. 
2. See the improvement on 7.2.3 where we tried to remove vagueness in 
the wage curve applicable higher notch by using the applicable Task 
Grade.’ 
Shortly thereafter Yawa also sent the e-mail to Koen and Theledi. 
[55] The Unions argue that Yawa had made certain far reaching changes to 
the 20 April 2010 agreement during the course of the morning of 21 April 
2010: He amended clauses 7.2.3, 7.2.5 and 7.2.6 of the agreement. He 
deleted cause 8.2 of the 20 April Agreement and amended clause 8.3 
which became clause 8.2. Clause 8.2 was also amended to provide that 
the wage scales would now increase on 1 July 2011 and not as previously 
stated on1 July 2010.  
[56] Yawa attached to this e-mail the Wage Curve Agreement that he had 
amended as indicated above. What Yawa failed to mention in the e-mail 
(nor did he draw the attention of the parties thereto) is the fact that he was 
of the view (if it was so) that the parties have not agreed that the 
implementation date of the wage curve would be 2010 as opposed to 
2011. In other words, despite the fact that this amendment to the 
implementation date of the Wage Curve Agreement was crucial and was 
included in a document referred to as the ‘final’ collective agreement, 
Yawa simply decided to amend the date and not to inform the other 
bargaining partners accordingly. He therefore fundamentally amended 
paragraph 8 without drawing the other bargaining partners’ attention 
thereto. Yawa also did not indicate in the e-mail that he was of the view 
that there was a ‘mistake’ or some ‘error’ nor did he indicate that (if that 
24 
 
was so) he did not have a mandate to agree to the implementation date 
being 1 July 2010. Despite the importance of the amendments to clause 
8.3 Yawa deemed it fit to only highlight in red the changes to paragraph 
7.2.3 (which is to a large extent not nearly as contentious as clause 8.3) 
but not to do the same in respect of clause 8 of the 20 April 2010 
agreement.  
[57] It is therefore clear from the exchange of e-mails that Yawa did not draw 
his colleagues’ attention to the fact that he had affected crucial changes to 
clause 8.3. Moreover, Yawa also did not inform the decision makers of 
SALGA namely George, Mashilo and Somyo before the agreement was 
signed, that he had changed the agreement finalised by the Drafting 
Committee the previous night. 
[58] It is important to point out that Yawa sent this e-mail to Forbes, Koen, 
Lebelo and Van Zyl only shortly before 13H00. The signing ceremony was 
scheduled for 14H00. Koen’s evidence was that he had left for the signing 
ceremony at approximately 12H30 and that he did not see the e-mail from 
Yawa until after he had returned to his office. Forbes who was in Cape 
Town also only saw the e-mail at approximately 13H02 when he 
responded to the e-mail (see below). To a hypothetical question whether 
or not it could not have been possible that Yawa later realised that the 
date had to be 2011 and not 2010, Koen testified that if that was so, at the 
very least Yawa should have e-mail him and Forbes and said to them; 
‘Guys, I have overstepped my mandate’. It is common cause that this did 
not happen.  
Forbes’ e-mail dated 21 April 2010 at 01.02 pm 
[59] Forbes e-mailed back to Yawa and recorded the following: 
‘See my revised wording of 7.2.3 below:  
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4.1.1 Employees whose exiting basic salary is higher than the maximum 
notch of the Task grade to which he/she is entitled to, must be place in 
the wage curve applicable to his/her municipality and will retain his/her 
basic salary.’ 
We have to retain the old 8.1 to indicate what the starting minimum wage 
is.’ 
[60] It is common cause that Forbes meant to refer to the old 8.2 and not 8.1. It 
is also common cause that Forbes did not say anything about the other 
changes to clauses 8.2 and 8.3. Forbes did not attend the signing 
ceremony as he was already in Cape Town. His evidence was that he 
looked at the e-mail and that he had responded to what Yawa had 
suggested in the e-mail in respect of 7.2.3. He also indicated to Yawa that 
SAMWU was not prepared to accept a change to paragraph 8.2. In 
essence, it was his evidence that the negotiations were completed the 
previous evening and that he had no mandate to re-open any negotiations 
with Yawa. He also testified that he did not look at the rest of the 
agreement because his attention was not drawn to any other changes and 
when he did not hear anything from Yawa he accepted that Yawa did not 
persist with the amendments as suggested in the e-mail. Only later when it 
was brought to his attention did Forbes realise that Yawa had affected a 
material change to the agreement. 
The signing ceremony on 21 April 2010 
[61] Yawa arrived at the signing ceremony just before 14H00. He testified that 
he had assumed that the agreements Molope had with him were the 
agreements that he had e-mailed to Theledi at 12H49 that morning. He 
also assumed that Koen had received the email from him at 12H48 and 
that he (Koen) had the (amended) collective agreements that he had e-
mailed to him and Forbes. 
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[62] Molope arrived at the signing ceremony venue sometime before 14H00 
with the hard copies of the collective agreements that had been handed to 
him by Forbes the previous evening. When he arrived at the ceremony 
Yawa handed him two documents and informed him that those were the 
collective agreements for signature. Molope’s evidence was that he 
started to read through the two agreements. He first went through the 
Disciplinary Code Agreement and just as he was starting to read the 
Wage Curve Agreement, did Yawa interrupt him. According to him Yawa 
said: ‘Look, there is some changes that I have actually effected to the 
document, but I did not interfere with the content of that particular 
agreement’. Yawa then drew Molope’s attention to the fact that he had 
affected certain grammatical changes to clause 7.2.3. They then started to 
discuss the change. Koen testified that he did not even know that Yawa 
had effected changes to clause 7.2.3 – he only saw this later on the email 
when he had returned to his office after the ceremony. Koen also testified 
that Yawa must have realised by the manner in which he (Koen) 
approached the changes to clause 7.2.3 that he (Koen) had not seen the 
e-mail. Yawa, however, did not mention to him (Koen) that he had sent an 
e-mail to him. It is in fact common cause that Yawa did not inform Koen 
and Molope that he had sent an e-mail to Forbes nor that Forbes had 
responded to his e-mail. Koen stated in his evidence that he did not 
actually look at the Wage Curve Agreement because he took Yawa’s word 
when Yawa told him that he did not change anything apart from the 
amendment to clause 7.2.3. He further stated that, with hindsight, it was 
probably the biggest mistake he has ever made in the 14 years that he 
had worked for IMATU.  
[63] Koen and Ms Grey (the Deputy General Secretary of IMATU) joined Yawa 
and Molope and the four of them debated the change to clause 7.2.3. 
Grey wrote down the agreed formulation on a piece of paper and Adams 
was tasked to insert the agreed formulation into the electronic version of 
the wage curve agreement. 
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[64] After Koen, Yawa, Molope and Grey had agreed on an improved 
formulation of clause 7.2.3, Koen asked Yawa in the presence of the 
others whether he had affected any other changes to the agreement. 
Yawa answered that he did not. Molope also testified that Yawa confirmed 
that there were no other changes. He testified that he thereafter did not 
look at the rest of the agreement after Yawa had assured him that he did 
not affect any other changes. He testified that he had trusted Yawa’s 
assurance and that he had no reason not to believe Yawa.  
[65] Yawa’s evidence about what had happened differs. According to him, 
Molope had reviewed the entire document and it was only after he had 
finished reading the Wage Curve Agreement that he drew Molope’s 
attention to the fact that he had made a change to clause 7.2.3. Yawa 
admitted that Koen asked him whether he had made any other changes to 
the agreement and admitted that he had replied that he did not. According 
to Yawa, he referred to the document that they had and that ‘in the 
document we had, there were no other changes, everything else was 
agreed’. 
[66] The agreement was printed and taken to the signatories for signing. It is 
common cause that the document that was signed is the one contained at 
pages 61 – 73 of Bundle D. George signed on behalf of SALGA. Koen 
signed on behalf of IMATU and Molope on behalf of SAMWU. The signed 
agreement could, however, not be photocopied as the photocopying 
machine at the hotel was not working. The original signed copies were 
handed to a courier to courier to the SALGBC’s Head Office. As a result, 
none of the parties received copies of the signed agreements on 21 April 
2010. 
[67] The Unions’ case is that they were unaware that Yawa had made changes 
to paragraph 8 of the final draft concluded on 20 April 2010 and that they 
had signed the agreement on 21 April 2010 on the basis that the 
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agreement that they had signed was the Wage Curve Agreement that was 
finalised the night before save for the amendment to clause 7.2.3 on 21 
April 2010 when mere grammatical adjustments were made to the clause. 
According to the Unions, they were under a justified mistake caused by 
Yawa when they signed the collective agreement on 21 April 2010. Koen 
also confirmed in his evidence that he was of the view that IMATU was 
signing the agreement that they had reached the night before save for the 
grammatical change made to clause 7.2.3. He also confirmed that he had 
not read the entire document before he signed it because the agreements 
were ready to be signed the night before and that he had no reason to 
suspect that any other changes were going to be made to the agreements: 
The agreements were therefore settled the night before and those were 
the agreements that Koen was going to sign. Koen confirmed that he had 
asked Yawa whether he had changed anything else beside clause 7.2.3 
and when Yawa assured him that he did not, he signed the Wage Curve 
Agreement under the impression that he had signed the 20 April 
Agreement. He confirmed that it was only later when he saw the e-mail 
that he asked for the signed copy to be faxed to him. It was then that he 
had discovered that clause 8.3 was removed and the date amended. He 
confirmed that IMATU would never have signed the agreement if the 
implementation date was 1 July 2011. Molope likewise testified that, had 
he known about the changes, he too would not have signed the 
agreement. 
[68] SALGA’s case is that they had no reason to doubt that the union parties 
had perused and checked the agreement before they had signed it.  
Events after the signing ceremony 
[69] Adams phoned Forbes on 22 April 2010 and informed him that there was 
a problem with the signed Wage Curve Agreement. Forbes received a 
copy of the signed Wage Curve Collective Agreement by fax and he also 
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realised that clause 8.2 was deleted and that clause 8.3 became clause 
8.2 to provide that the wage curve scales would increase only on 1 July 
2011. 
[70] There was a telephonic conference meeting of the Bargaining Council 
Executive Committee on 22 April 2010. The meeting was convened after 
the Unions had written letters indicating that the wrong agreement was 
signed. During the telephone conference Yawa indicated that he had 
unilaterally changed the date from 1July 2010 to 1 July 2011 because 
Forbes had made an error when he typed in 1 July 2010 instead of 1 July 
2011. According to him, this was done to reflect the common intention of 
the parties during the negotiations. 
[71] On 23 April 2010, Adams from IMATU wrote as follows in a circular: 
‘Regrettably however, it has subsequently emerged that the signature and 
execution process have been tainted by scandalous and fraudulent 
behavior on the part of a SALGA official. By all accounts, the aforesaid 
SALGA official fraudulently altered the documents just prior to the 
signature thereof and sought to mislead the signatories as to the true 
nature of the contents of the documents that were presented for 
signature.’ 
[72] Forbes, on behalf of SAMWU, wrote a letter to George (the Chief 
Executive Officer of SALGA) on 23 April 2010 to indicate that the changes 
to the agreement were made without the consultation or agreement of the 
union parties. He wrote as follows: 
‘Furthermore, we wish to advise that during a special SALBC Executive 
meeting held on 22 instant 2010 via telephone conference, the relevant 
SALGA official confirmed that he unilaterally amended the agreement as 
drafted on Tuesday evening. Mr. Yawa tried to explain his despicable 
conduct by blaming it on a ‘drafting error’. 
… 
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In negotiations trust is of the utmost importance. Sometimes parties have 
to take unpopular positions back to their constituencies. This requires that 
the counter-party does the same. Failure to act honestly and ethically 
means that it become extremely difficult to negotiate in good faith. The 
actions by your official, Adv. Yawa, effectively destroys this trust 
relationship.’ 
[73] Forbes ended the letter by stating the following: 
‘This leaves us with no effective collective agreement and thus the 
dispute remains unresolved. Salga is called upon to speedily correct the 
breach of your official, Adv. Yawa. Should you fail to do so, this will 
require us to re-engage in industrial action in the forthcoming period. We 
would also be required to made the actions of Salga public.’ 
Koen’s letter dated 23 April 2010 
[74] Koen also wrote a letter stating that IMATU concurred with the views 
expressed by SAMWU. Koen stated in this letter that Yawa and Lebelo 
both made substantive input and comments on the precise wording of 
clauses 8.2 and 8.3. According to Koen, it was now ‘downright dishonest’ 
to claim that it was a ‘drafting error’ by the ‘technical team’. Koen ended 
his letter by stating that IMATU agreed with the legal conclusions as set 
out by Forbes in his letter (referred to in the previous paragraph). Koen 
also stated that IMATU would join SAMWU in further anticipated strikes. 
[75] A further Executive Meeting was held on 29 April 2010. Molope (on behalf 
of SAMWU) pointed out to the meeting that the changes were only later 
discovered and that SAMWU intended to sign the 20 April Agreement.14 
                                                 
14 ‘In other words, it has the effect of denying the workers a salary increase on 1 July this year. 
We consider those changes to be of suspension, a serious irregularity and we called upon the 
General-Secretary not to append his signature to the agreement. We believe that dishonesty and 
fraud had taken place on behalf of the employer organisation and prior to the agreement being 
signed by the General-Secretary and circulated, we’d like the changes to be reversed and the 
original agreement we had concluded on Tuesday be the agreement that was to be signed. So, I 
think that’s what brought the matter to this point, that we believe that- that’s the basis of why we 
believe that no proper agreement has been signed and that the changes effected by SALGA 
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Forbes was also adamant at the meeting that he did not accept the 
explanations from Yawa and that the agreement concluded between the 
parties was the one of the previous evening. 
[76] On 17 May, George wrote a letter to Mr Nhlapo (General Secretary of 
SAMWU), Molope, Koen, Carstens, Govender and the Minister stating the 
following: 
‘That clause 7.2.3 refinement having been a typical giving of effect to 
what was agreed to at negotiations led by principals, must be 
differentiated from the two new clauses in clause 8.2 and 8.3, which, per 
your letter, were inserted in the agreement at refinement. SALGA views 
same as issues of substance that cannot simply be inserted into the 
agreement in the name of cleaning or refining same. In fact, the 2010 
instead of 2011 in the then clause 8.3 was typed in by your Mr Forbes, in 
error as far as SALGA is concerned. Our SALGA team, on noticing same, 
corrected it. 
That is why our Adv Yawa referred to it as a typing /drafting error in the 
teleconference on 22 April 2010. For IMATU, in their letter, to refer to that 
as “downright dishonest” is unfortunate. SALGA however sincerely 
believes that neither Mr Forbes nor Mr Koen had an intention of materially 
changing the agreement reached in negotiations led by principals prior to 
this refinement process. 
It is SALGA’s considered view that what was agreed to in negotiations, in 
essence, remains embodied in the signed agreement. The agreement 
(wage curve and DC), in the form that was ultimately signed, were equally 
sent to SAMWU and IMATU’s Deputy General Secretaries sometime 
before signing thereof. We must state that such was at the verbal request 
of your Deputy General Secretary, Mr Theledi, to our Adv Yawa.’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
needs to be removed and the original wording needs to be replaced prior to us concluding that 
agreement.’ 
32 
 
[77] On 17 May 2010 SALGA respondent and indicated that the signed 
agreement (the 21 April Agreement) was in order and therefore valid: 
‘Having considered the views of SAMWU, IMATU and SALGA expressed 
at the Special Executive Committee Meetings held on 22 and 29 April 
2010 respectively, and the response of SALGA, dated 17 May 2010, 
detailing the sequence of events prior to the signing of the agreement, I 
hereby attach my signature to the Agreements, signed by IMATU, 
SAMWU and SALGA, at Irene in Pretoria on 21 April 2010.’  
Summary of the differences between the 20 April agreement and the differ 21 
April agreement 
[78] The changes between the 20 April agreement and the 21 April agreement 
relate to the following:  
78.1 A change was made to clause 7.2.3. This change is not at issue in 
these proceedings. Koen, Yawa and Molope agreed to the changes 
immediately before the signing of the agreements (on 21 April 
2010). These changes were, in any event, purely grammatical and 
did not change the substance or essence of the clause.  
78.2 Clause 7.2.5 was changed in the final draft. 
78.3 Clause 8.2 from the 20 April draft was deleted from the 21 April 
draft. 
78.4 An amended clause 8.3 was inserted. This clause became clause 
8.2. Apart from the numbering, a crucial change was made to the 
adjustment date of the salary scales of the wage curve agreement: 
The 20 April 2010 agreement referred to the adjustment date as 1 
July 2010 whereas the 21 April agreement referred to the 
adjustment date as 1 July 2011. 
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[79] The disputed clauses of the collective agreement that Forbes sent to 
Yawa on 20 April 2010 read as follows: 
‘8.1 There shall be salary scales from TASK Grade 1 to TASK Grade 
26 as follows: [This clause is not in contention.]  
8.2 The initial minimum salary on TASK Grade 1 of R 4, 000.00 (four 
thousand rand) per month shall increase by the same percentage as 
agreed to in the current Wage and Salary Collective Agreement. [This 
clause was deleted from the signed agreement.] 
8.3 The salary scales referred to in annexures B1 to B8 will be 
adjusted with effect from 1 July 2010 and ten annually thereafter by the 
same percentage as agreed to in the applicable Wage and Salary 
Collective Agreement.’  
[80] The disputed clauses of the collective agreement that was signed on 21 
April 2010 read as follows: 
‘7.2.5 Annual salary adjustments, in terms of 8.3 below, will be applied to 
the basic salaries of those employees referred to in clause 7.2.3 and 
7.2.4 above; and..’ 
‘8.1 There shall be salary scales from TASK Grade 1 to TASK Grade 26 
as follows: [This clause is not in contention.]  
8.2 The salary scales referred to in annexures B1 to B8 will be adjusted 
with effect from 1 July 2011 and then annually thereafter by the same 
percentage as agreed to in the applicable Wage and Salary Collective 
Agreement.’ [Clause 8.3 was deleted and replaced by Clause 8.2.] 
Crux of the dispute 
[81] It is the Unions’ case that the parties have reached an agreement that the 
wage curve scales would be increased on 1 July 2010. SALGA dispute 
this and contend that it was agreed that the wage curve scales would be 
adjusted with effect 1 July 2011.  
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Constitution of the SALGBC 
[82] As already pointed out, negotiations took place within the context of the 
SALGBC. It is common cause that SALGA’s activities are governed by its 
Constitution. Clause 7 of this Constitution provides for the establishment 
of various committees. Clause 7.2 thereof provides for the establishment 
of Bargaining Committees. Clause 7.2.6 of the Constitution provides that a 
Bargaining Committee shall have the power to conclude any collective 
agreement relating to terms and conditions of service or any other matter 
referred to it for bargaining by the Executive Committee. This clause reads 
as follows: 
‘7.2 Bargaining Committee 
7.2.1 The bargaining committee shall consist of 20 (twenty) seats divided 
equally between the Employer Parties and the Trade Union Parties. 
7.2.2 The allocation of Representatives amongst the Employer Parties shall be 
determined mutatis mutandis by the formula in sub-clause 5.4. 
7.2.3 The allocation of Representatives among the Trade Union Parties shall 
be determined by the formula in sub-clause 5.4. 
7.2.4  The delegates shall, at the first meeting of the year, appoint a chairperson 
from who the delegates to the Bargaining Committee. The Bargaining 
Committee may appoint a chairperson from outside the delegates of the 
parties’ representatives. 
7.2.5  The Bargaining Committee shall meet at such a place, date and time it or 
the Executive Committee may determine. 
7.2.6  The Bargaining Committee shall have the power to conclude any 
collective agreement relating to terms and conditions of service or any 
other matter referred to it for bargaining by the Executive Committee. 
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7.2.7 A dispute that arises in the Bargaining Committee shall be resolved in 
terms of clause 11.’ 
[83] Clause 16 provides for the manner in which decisions must be taken and 
the circumstances under which a decision of (inter alia) a committee in 
respect of a substantive matter will be binding on the parties. This clause 
reads as follows: 
‘16. Decisions 
All decisions of the Central Council, Division or any Committee 
concerning substantive matters shall require a two-thirds concurrent 
majority of the Employer Representatives on the one hand an a two-thirds 
concurrent majority of the Trade Union Representatives to the Council on 
the other hand. 
No decision of the Central Council, Division or any Committee concerning 
substantive matters shall be binding on the parties unless- 
the subject matter of the decision has been reduced to writing 
before the decision is take; or 
if not reduced to writing before the decision is taken, the subject 
matter of the decision is reduced to writing and adopted by 
subsequent decision of the council. 
Decisions of the Central Council, Division and or Committee concerning 
administrative matters shall require a simple majority of those 
Representatives present. 
The Central Council shall determine from time to time which matters are 
substantive and which are administrative in terms of the process as is set 
out in clause 16.1.’ 
[84] Clause 17 lastly provides for the procedures to be adopted for the 
negotiation of collective agreements. This clause reads as follows:  
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‘16. Procedure for the Negotiation of Collective Agreements 
A procedure, forum and level for negotiations shall be determined by the 
Parties to the Central Council. 
Any Party to the Council may introduce proposals for the conclusion of a 
Collective Agreement on appropriate subject matter and at the 
appropriate level. 
At least two-thirds of the Employer Representatives on the one hand and 
two-third of the Trade Union Representatives on the other hand must vote 
in favour of a Collective Agreement for it to be binding on the Parties.15 
In the event of a dispute arising from proposal for the conclusion of a 
Collective Agreement the parties shall have the rights prescribed in the 
Act.’ 
[85] SALGA, apart from the fact that they disput some of the facts, raised 
three main defences in their statement of response.  
85.1 The first defence is that, upon signing the agreement, the 21 
April Agreement became binding on the parties to the SALGBC 
by operation of its Constitution. As a result, the duly adopted 
resolution of a corporate entity cannot be treated as void on the 
grounds of an operative error. In other words, if a party wants to 
attack such a resolution, the ordinary contractual principles 
relating to mistake, or as it is referred to ‘an operative error’, 
does not apply. In the alternative, if the ordinary contractual 
principles do indeed apply, only members of the Bargaining 
Committee have the locus standi to attack that resolution and 
therefore they have to be joined as parties to the proceedings. It 
then follows that the union will have to show that at least two 
thirds of the trade union members laboured under the mistake 
                                                 
15 Court’s emphasis. 
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that we have pleaded. 
85.2 In terms of the second defence, it is argued that there exists no 
basis for the rectification of the agreement of 21 April 2010 in that 
a duly adopted resolution of a corporate entity (especially a 
resolution adopting a collective agreement by a Bargaining 
Council established under its constitution) cannot be rectified on 
the grounds of operative error.  
85.3 In terms of the third defence, it is submitted that by the end of the 
Bargaining Committee’s deliberations on 20 April 2010 
consensus had been attained but two outstanding issues still had 
to be dealt with. The first was the extent to which the increases 
consequent on the new wage scales would be made 
retrospective and secondly pay progression. It was therefore 
argued that the written draft of 20 April 2010 was therefore not an 
agreement. It is also argued that the draft of 20 April was in any 
event not adopted by virtue of the fact that it was not signed as 
was customary to do.  
The defences raised on behalf of SALGA were disputed by the 
applicants.  
[86] Detailed heads of arguments were filed on behalf of SALGA attacking 
the validity of the 20 April 2010 collective bargaining agreement on the 
basis that it did not comply with the Constitution of the SALBC. It was 
argued that the delegates had casually entrusted the finalisation of the 
agreement to their mandated representatives which they could not do. 
It was further argued that the agreement upon which the applicants rely 
emerged from the Drafting Committee that had no power to finalise 
issues of substance. The Drafting Committee could not change the 
position regarding the implementation date without the input of the 
Bargaining Committee. Without the input of the Bargaining Committee 
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the default position therefore remained in place. (See in this regard 
clause 17 of the Constitution).16 
[87] Forbes testified that, once parties have agreed on the contents of a 
collective agreement, the practice was that the agreement would not go 
back to the Bargaining Committee or the General Council for adoption. 
The parties will regard the agreement as final. Koen also gave detailed 
evidence in respect of the process that was followed in reaching an 
agreement over collective agreements. He testified that it often 
happened that the Bargaining Committee would complete their 
deliberations and that the collective agreement would then be referred 
to a Drafting Committee. Should issues arise during the deliberations of 
the Drafting Committee the issues will be discussed with the parties’ 
respective principals and the issues would be resolved. Where a 
mandate was required to settle an issue during the deliberations of the 
Drafting Committee, the parties would seek a mandate from their 
respective principals. Once that is completed, the parties would have 
an agreement irrespective of whether the collective agreement had 
been referred back to the Bargaining Committee. Koen confirmed this 
practice with reference to the wage negotiations that took place the 
previous year. A Drafting Committee was also appointed to refine the 
collective agreement. The principals accepted that agreement. Minutes 
before signing this agreement SALGA had approached IMATU and 
informed them that the agreement was too expensive and that the 
parties had to affect changes to the agreement. At that time the 
Bargaining Committee had likewise long completed their deliberations. 
A mandate was solicited from the principals and once the parties had 
reached an agreement, the (wage) collective agreement was thereafter 
signed. Koen therefore confirmed the practice that exists namely that 
not all the negotiations take place on a formal basis in a plenary 
                                                 
16 Supra. 
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session of the Bargaining Committee. This, he pointed out, was also 
what had happened during the deliberations of the Drafting Committee 
in respect of the Wage Curve Agreement. An issue arose about the 
period over which the nine month back pay would be paid. The 
respective parties obtained a mandate from their principals to settle the 
issue. Forbes deliberated with Malope (the president of SAMWU) and 
the secretary general of SAMWU. SALGA was consulted by Yawa. 
Once the parties have reached an agreement, the matter was settled. It 
is common cause that this issue was never referred back to the 
Bargaining Committee.  
[88] I am, on the evidence, persuaded that the parties are able (and were 
able) to reach agreements within the context of the Drafting Committee 
provided that the principals of the respective parties agree to any 
changes in respect of the collective agreements on the table or agree to 
the settlement of any disputes that arise during the deliberations of the 
Drafting Committee. I am therefore satisfied that by the end of 20 April 
2010, the parties had reached an agreement in respect of both 
collective agreements and in particular the contents of the Wage Curve 
Collective Agreement which reflected the implementation date as 1 July 
2010. 
Conclusion on the facts 
[89] It was common cause that Yawa changed the implementation date from 1 
July 2010 to 1 July 2011. The question that must be considered is whether 
that change was concealed from his bargaining colleagues. The version of 
SALGA was that Yawa made the change because it was a mistake - a 
typing error. It was put to Molope that Yawa did not draw anyone’s 
attention to this typing error because he took it for granted that that was 
not a matter to be drawn to the attention of anybody particularly. Molope 
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refused to accept that any mistake was made. According to Molope, Yawa 
intentionally made  the changes and then tried to hide it from them.  
[90] I am of the view that the evidence supports a conclusion that after Yawa 
had amended the agreement, he deliberately concealed that not only from 
his own principals but also from his bargaining counterparts. Yawa’s e-
mails confirm this conclusion. I am further of the view that it is 
inconceivable that Yawa could not have known that the date of the 
implementation of the wage curve is a crucial issue. I also cannot accept 
that Yawa could have accepted that his counterparts would have read the 
attachments to his e-mail particularly if regard is had to his e-mails in 
which he failed to draw the other parties’ attention to the amendments. 
Yawa’s deception deepened when he deliberately did not inform Koen that 
he had sent him an e-mail which referred to certain changes to the 
agreement. When Koen deliberated on clause 7.2.3 during the 
discussions prior to the signing ceremony, Yawa must have realised that 
Koen did not receive the e-mail. At the very least, Yawa should have 
asked Koen whether he had seen the e-mail and whether he was aware of 
the changes. Yawa’s final deception was when he was specifically asked 
whether he had changed anything else in the agreement and replied ‘no’. I 
do not accept that he could have assumed that the others had the 
amended collective agreements. At the very least, Yawa should have 
raised the issue with his bargaining parties prior to the signing of the 
agreements. After all, the relationship between bargaining parties should 
be based on good faith.  I also do not accept Yawa’s evidence that  
Malope had read through the entire Wage Curve Agreement before 
signing it. I can find no reason to doubt Molope and Koen’s evidence 
about what had happened prior to the signing of the agreement. In my 
view, Yawa had interrupted Molope from  reading the entire Wage Curve 
Agreement because he did not want Molope to realise that he (Yawa) had 
amended clause 8.3 fundamentally.  
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The reasons why Mr Yawa's evidence must be rejected 
[91] Mr Van der Riet17 also persuasively argued that the evidence of Yawa 
must be rejected on the basis that it is an established principle that a 
witness whose evidence has been shown to be deliberately false on one 
point is liable to be regarded with suspicion and distrust overall.18The 
Court was referred to at least six instances during the trail where Yawa 
deliberately gave false, namely:  
91.1 Firstly, Yawa’s claim that, at the signing ceremony, he told Molope 
and Koen of Forbes' counter-proposal in relation to the re-formulation 
of clause 7.2.3 of the Wage Curve Agreement. This is patently false if 
regard it had to the pleadings: Both IMATU and SAMWU pleaded 
that Yawa did not disclose to the parties at the signing ceremony 
Forbes’s proposal in relation to the re-formulation of clause 7.2.3 of 
the wage curve collective agreement. SAMWU also pleaded that 
Yawa did not disclose that Forbes had responded to his e-mail. In 
both its pleas, SALGA admitted that Yawa did not inform Koen or 
Molope that he had sent the above email to Forbes. Moreover, the 
allegation that Yawa told Molope and Koen of Forbes' counter 
proposal was never put to Molope or Koen for them to answer to. 
91.2 The second deliberate falsehood is Yawa's claim that Forbes' 
response to his e-mail of 12h48 (on 21 April 2010) to the effect that 
‘we have to retain the old 8.1 to indicate what the starting minimum 
is’ was a reference not to the agreement that was the subject of the 
e-mail, but to an old version of clause 8.1 in a previous Bargaining 
Committee draft of the Wage Curve Collective Agreement. Mr Van 
der Riet submitted that this was a patently dishonest attempt by 
Yawa to justify his unilateral deletion of clause 8.2 of the Wage 
                                                 
17 I have relied liberally on the heads of argument submitted on behalf of the applicants in setting 
out the evidence on which the unions relied in support of their argument that this Court should 
reject the evidence of Yawa. 
18 S v Oosthuizen 1982 (3) SA 571 (T) at 577A-B. 
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Curve Collective Agreement despite Forbes's objection. This 
allegation was also never put to Forbes for his comment. 
91.3 The third deliberate falsehood is Yawa's claim that he did not 
receive hard copies of the collective agreements on the evening of 
20 April 2010 after they had been finalised by the Drafting 
Committee. Mr van der Riet submitted that this falsehood is 
revealed by the discrepancies in Yawa's version on this aspect. It 
was put to Forbes that Yawa could not remember whether or not he 
had received hard copies of the agreement. However, when Yawa 
gave evidence he was adamant that he had not received hard 
copies. This falsehood was further confirmed by Adam's detailed 
evidence on this aspect which was left entirely unchallenged. 
91.4 The fourth deliberate falsehood is Yawa's claim that he thought the 
agreements that Molope had with him at the signing ceremony were 
the agreements that he had e-mailed to Theledi at 12H49. That 
claim flies in the face of Yawa's admission in an agreement 
concluded between the parties and read into the record that he was 
unaware of whether Theledi had received his e-mail of 12H49. 
91.5 The fifth deliberate falsehood is Yawa's claim that he sent what he 
asserted to be the final collective agreements for signature to 
Theledi and Koen after he received Forbes's response to his e-mail 
of 12h48. The recorded times at which these e-mails were sent 
revealed this claim to be incorrect yet Yawa refused to admit that 
he had made a mistake and maintained his claim in the face of 
evidence which plainly revealed it to be false.  
91.6 The sixth deliberate falsehood is Yawa's evidence regarding the 
seating arrangements in the drafting team. His evidence in this 
regard was farfetched and was not put to Koen despite the fact that 
it differed dramatically from Koen's version as to how the members 
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of the drafting team were seated. Moreover, SALGA'S own witness 
(Van Zyl) corroborated Koen's version in respect of the seating 
arrangements, thereby confirming the falsity of Yawa's evidence on 
this score. 
[92] I have considered these submissions and I am in agreement that little 
weight can be attached to the evidence of Yawa. Apart from the fact that 
Yawa gave deliberate false evidence, his evidence on other aspects also 
casts serious doubt on his version. Yawa testified that he did not look at 
the screen during the deliberations of the drafting team but that he was 
looking at the hard copy of the agreement reached in the Bargaining 
Committee. It was, however, the uncontested evidence of Koen that 
nobody in the Drafting Committee had seen a hard copy of the 
deliberations of the Drafting Committee. I have also referred to the 
evidence of Yawa that he had phoned George during the deliberations of 
the Drafting Committee and informed him that the parties were not going 
to sign that night. George did not confirm this evidence when he gave 
evidence. In fact, if the evidence of Yawa is properly considered, it 
confirms the Unions’ evidence that all the parties were in fact prepared to 
sign the collective agreement that was finalised that night and that it was 
only when it was realised that not all the parties were there that it was 
decided to defer the signing ceremony to the next day.  Put differently, 
Yawa could not have known at that stage that the agreement’s would not 
be signed that evening. 
[93] I am further also persuaded that Yawa clearly attempted to mislead 
Theledi with his email of 12h49 on 21 April 2010. In fact, if regard is had to 
the e-mail it is clear that he sent the e-mail to Theledi’s secretary. When 
asked during the proceedings on 19 November 2010 whether there were 
any other documents that he wished to place before the court Yawa could 
not have forgotten about the e-mail since it is apparent that he had e-
mailed it to Mr Lebelo's secretary. I am in agreement that the only 
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plausible inference to be drawn from these facts is that Yawa sought to 
hide the e-mail at that stage.  
[94] I am further in agreement that Yawa's version of what had happened in 
the drafting team as far as the agreed date for the adjustment of the wage 
curve scales concerned, should be rejected. It was Yawa’s evidence that 
the Unions took the position that the wage curve scales ought to be 
adjusted on 1 July 2010 and that they formulated clauses 8.2 and 8.3 only 
when they had established that they could not physically adjust the scales 
because the percentage for the impending salary increase had not yet 
been determined by SALGBC. I am in agreement that it is improbable that 
SALGA would have convinced the Unions to alter their position and agree 
to an adjustment of the wage curve scales a year later in circumstances 
where the Unions' view was that if the scales were not adjusted when the 
salaries were increased on 1 July 2010, they would no longer reflect the 
market position the parties chose to base their salary scales on. Moreover, 
I cannot ignore the fact that George went on national television and 
declared to the nation that ALL parties have reached an agreement and 
was ready to sign the agreement.  Yawa's evidence was that if they had 
agreed to an adjustment of the date to 1 July 2010 that would have 
amounted to the impermissible amendment of the Bargaining Committee 
agreement. If this was his view, one would have expected that Yawa 
would have communicated this to the other bargaining partners in his e-
mails. I am further in agreement that Yawa’s version is implausible 
particularly in light of Yawa’s actions after he had discovered the inclusion 
of the date of 1 July 2010 as opposed to 1 July 2010. It is also, in my view, 
clear from the extensive evidence led during this fairly lengthy trial that the 
date of the adjustment of the wage curve scales was a crucial aspect of 
the agreement. It was so crucial that the evidence on behalf of the Unions 
was that they would not have signed the agreement had they known that 
the adjustment date was a year later (1 July 2011). There is no proper 
explanation for the fact that Yawa did not expressly deal with this issue in 
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his e-mails that followed the deliberations on 20 of April. This was a crucial 
aspect, why was it not dealt with in Yawa’s e-mails. Moreover, there is not 
a proper explanation before this Court as to why both Yawa and Lebelo 
did not notice what Forbes were typing into paragraph 8.3 when the 
Drafting Committee deliberated.  The only conclusion that this Court can 
come to is that the parties have agreed that the implementation date was 
1 July 2010.  
[95] What makes matters worse for Yawa is the fact that he conceded in his 
own evidence that he did not tell the Unions that he had changed the date 
in clause 8.3 of the Wage Curve Agreement from 1 July 2010 to 1 July 
2011. Furthermore, he conceded that he did not even tell his own 
principals, George, Mashilo and Somyo that there was, according to him a 
drafting error.  
[96] Mr. Brassey submitted that,  on the probabilities, Yawa could not have 
anticipated that three union representatives namely Koen, Forbes and 
Theledi would be so sloppy to overlook the change to clause 8 particularly 
as clause 8 was under review and could have been picked up by means of 
a file comparison. I am not persuaded by this submission. Firstly, Koen’s 
evidence was that he already was on his way to the venue when the e-
mail was sent. He therefore did not see the e-mail until after the signing 
ceremony. Secondly, Koen pertinently asked Yawa whether he (Yawa) 
had affected any amendments (other than that to the non-contentious 
clause) to the Wage Curve Agreement. Yawa said ‘no’. Both Molope and 
Koen testified that they did not doubt Yawa’s word and that is why they did 
not read the agreement. As already pointed out, Koen stated that this was 
the biggest mistake he has ever made since he has started to work for 
IMATU. Thirdly, Forbes was in Cape Town and his evidence was that he 
merely looked at the e-mail and responded to the e-mail. Fourthly, 
Molope’s evidence was that Yawa interrupted him when he went through 
the Wage Curve Agreement and that he therefore did not continue to read 
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through the agreement. He also testified that he had no reason to doubt 
Yawa assurances.  
[97] The timing of Yawa’s e-mail containing the new amended version of the 
Wage Curve Agreement to Koen and Forbes confirms, in my view, the 
impression that Yawa wanted to conceal the fact that he had changed the 
implementation date. I am further in agreement that this was a poorly 
disguised attempt by Yawa to put himself in a position where he could 
claim that the Unions must have seen his final draft before they signed the 
agreement. I have already referred to the fact that this e-mail was sent a 
little more than an hour before the signing ceremony in circumstances 
where Yawa and Van Zyl conceded that they must have realised hours 
before that the implementation date reflected in the agreement was 1 July 
2010. At that stage, Koen had already left for the signing ceremony. I am 
further in agreement that Yawa’s failure at the signing ceremony to inform 
Koen and Molope of the e-mails finally demonstrates his lack of good faith 
in his dealings with the Unions on this issue. At the very least, it was 
expected of Yawa to have expressly raised the issue of the adjustment 
date, if not in the e-emails, but during the final discussions before the 
signing ceremony. What makes matters worse for Yawa is the fact that he 
was representing SALGA as the chief negotiator in the negotiations with 
the Unions. Parties engaged in a bargaining relationship are entitled to 
accept that their adversaries will bargain and behave in good faith. I am 
not persuaded that Yawa bargained in good faith. The facts in my view 
confirm the opposite.   
[98] Van Zyl and Lebelo also did not support the evidence of Yawa. Van Zyl, 
for example, contradicted Yawa’s evidence on the seating arrangements. 
Lebello confirmed that the Unions wanted to adjust the wage curve scales 
on 1 July 2010. He could, however, not explain how they persuaded the 
Unions to abandon this view. He also could not explain why he did not 
notice that Forbes typed in clause 8.3. Lebelo also confirmed that when he 
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left the deliberations on the 20 April 2010 he was of the view that the 
parties would sign the agreements as prepared by the Drafting 
Committee. George’s evidence also did not support Yawa. He did not 
confirm in his evidence that he had received a call from Yawa to inform 
him that he need not rush back to sign the agreements. In fact, George 
went on national television to confirm that all the parties have reached an 
agreement and that they would sign it later that evening (on 20 April 
2010). Mashilo also confirmed a crucial aspect of the Unions’ case and 
that is that he (Mashilo) had told Forbes that SALGA was prepared to sign 
the agreement on the evening of 20 April 2010.  
[99] I am therefore in agreement that little reliance can be placed on the 
evidence of Yawa. Apart from serious defects in his evidence, Yawa was 
an evasive and argumentative witness and persistently refused to make 
simple concession to simple propositions put to him in circumstances 
where he ought to have made concessions. 
[100] On the evidence, I am therefore persuaded of the following: 
100.1When the parties left the hotel in Kempton Park on the evening of 20 
April 2010, they were in agreement that they have reached a final 
agreement and that that agreement included clause 8.3 which 
reflected the implementation date of the wage curves as 1 July 
2010. I do not accept that the parties left the hotel under the 
assumption that Yawa will still do a ‘quality assurance exercise’. 
George certainly did not hesitate to tell the country on national 
television that all parties have reached an agreement. It is common 
cause that when the parties dispersed on the evening of 20 April 
2010 no further meetings were contemplated between the parties. 
The only meeting contemplated between the parties was the 
signing ceremony at 14H00 the next day. Moreover, if it was so that 
Yawa would still do a ‘quality assurance exercise’ at the very least it 
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was expected that he would have drawn the parties’ attention to the 
fact that he had fundamentally altered a crucial clause to the Wage 
Curve Agreement.  
100.2 Yawa attempted to conceal the fact that he had made amendments 
to a crucial clause of the agreement not only to the trade union 
parties but to his own principals. I am persuaded that none of the 
SALGA decision makers (George, Sonyo or Mashilo) were aware of 
the fact that Yawa had effected changes to clause 8.3 of the 
agreement. George was prepared to sign the agreement as it was 
on the evening of 20 April 2010.  
100.3 When Yawa e-mailed the amended agreement to Forbes, he 
(Forbes) did not read the whole document and merely dealt with the 
issues specifically drawn to his attention by Yawa.  
100.4 Molope did not review the whole agreement when it was handed to 
him immediately prior to the signing of the Wage Curve Agreement. 
Molope did not read the whole agreement because he was assured 
by Yawa that he (Yawa) did not affect any other changes to the 
agreement. The fact that Yawa did not mention to Molope that he 
had fundamentally altered clause 8.3 of the agreement must have 
been a deliberate attempt to induce the parties to sign the amended 
agreement.  
100.5 The Unions and SALGA signed the agreement on the basis that the 
only change to the said agreement was the formulation of clause 
7.2.3.  
[102] I am therefore persuaded on the evidence is that the Trade Union parties 
and SALGA signed the document referred to as the 21 April agreement19 
on the basis that this was the agreement reached on 20 April 2010 subject 
                                                 
19 Pages 61 – 89 of Bundle B. 
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to the amendment to clause 7.2.3 agreed to minutes before the signing of 
the Wage Curve Agreement (and the Disciplinary Agreement).  
The relief sought 
[103] The primary relief sought by the applicants is for an order that the 
agreement concluded on 20 April 2010 constitutes a binding collective 
agreement between IMATU, SAMWU and SALGA. If this order is 
granted the applicants further seeks an order declaring that the Wage 
Curve Agreement signed on 21 April 2010 does not constitute a valid 
agreement. In the alternative, an order is sought that the signed Wage 
Curve Agreement of 21 April 2010 be rectified by substituting (the 
current) clause 8.2 with clauses 8.2 and 8.3 (of the 20 April 
Agreement).  
[104] I am of the view that rectification is the appropriate order in the present 
circumstances. The parties’ intention is embodied in the 20 April 2010 
agreement subject to the one clause that was amended immediately 
prior to the signing of the 21 April Agreement. 
Submissions on behalf of SALGA in respect of rectification 
[105] It was submitted on behalf of SALGA that there is no basis on which a 
resolution of a corporate organ can be rectified especially in the case of 
a statutory Bargaining Council governed by a Constitution. It was 
further submitted that the proper way to correct a mistake is to re-open 
the issue and resolve the issue afresh. I do not agree. As already 
pointed out, I am persuaded that the Unions have made out a case 
that, on the evening of 20 April 2010, all the negotiating parties were 
willing to sign the agreement that was refined by the Drafting 
Committee. I am further persuaded that the agreement that was 
accepted by all the principals that were present at the proceedings was 
the one that Adams distributed. I am therefore not persuaded on the 
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evidence that the principals did not know what was contained in the 
agreements – especially in clause 8.3 thereof. I am further persuaded 
that the evidence overwhelmingly point to the fact that the Unions did 
not know that Yawa had amended the Wage Curve Agreement to 
provide for a completely different date of implementation. The Unions 
were adamant: They would not have signed the agreement had they 
known about the change. I am furthermore satisfied that the evidence 
supports the conclusion that Yawa was not honest in his dealings with 
his bargaining counterparts. 
[106] I am further persuaded that the parties intended to affix their signatures 
to the collective agreements. This much is clear from the evidence. 
However, what is clear from the evidence is that the parties intended to 
affix their signatures to the 20 April Agreement subject to the agreement 
reached in respect of the amendment to clause 7.2.3 just prior to 
signing the agreement. 
[107] I accept that the practice of the parties was that collective bargaining 
agreements could be concluded even after the Bargaining Committee had 
concluded its deliberations. I accept Koen’s evidence that this practice has 
been followed previously when a wage agreement was concluded and 
amended immediately before the signing session after the bargaining 
parties have obtained a mandate from their respective principals. 
[108] SALGA contends that there is no basis on which a resolution of corporate 
organ (errors in verbis aside) can be rectified especially in light of the fact 
that the Bargaining Council is governed by a Constitution. SALGA further 
submitted that the agreement signed on 21 April 2010 amounted to a 
resolution ‘which the members of the Bargaining Committee duly voted in 
favour of or otherwise expressed their endorsement of and ‘in law, a duly 
adopted resolution of a corporate entity... cannot be treated as void on the 
grounds of operative error’. SALGA further contends that such a resolution 
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can also not be rectified on the grounds of operative error and that the 
proper way to correct a mistake is to re-open the issue and resolve the 
issue afresh. 
[109] I am in agreement with Mr. Van der Riet that SALGA misconceives the 
nature of the agreement that was signed on 21 April 2010. The agreement 
that was signed on 21 April 2010 was not a resolution of the Bargaining 
Council. It is clear from the evidence that what was signed was a collective 
agreement concluded by the parties under the auspices of the Bargaining 
Council. Although the Constitution requires a formal vote by the parties to 
the Bargaining Committee, the evidence supports the conclusion that this 
practice was not followed. The fact that the parties have reached an 
agreement in respect of the back-pay issue during the deliberations of the 
Drafting Committee after a mandate was obtained from the principals 
confirms this conclusion. If it was required that this issue had to be 
subjected to a voting process by the Bargaining Committee surely the 
parties would have required that the Bargaining Committee meet before 
the signing ceremony. It is common cause that that did not happen. The 
Bargaining Committee is used as a mechanism to facilitate negotiations to 
achieve collective agreements. Those who participate in the activities of 
the Bargaining Committee are merely agents of the parties they represent. 
Collective agreements concluded in these circumstances constitute an 
agreement between the organisations themselves acting through their 
principal decision makers and not through the individual members of the 
Bargaining Committee and it is the principal decision makers that must be 
satisfied that the agreement is acceptable. Once the agreement is 
concluded by signing the agreement, the signatories sign on behalf of their 
respective organisations and not on behalf of the members of the 
caucuses of the Bargaining Committee. Similarly, where the parties 
conclude an agreement outside of the activities of the Bargaining 
Committee, the parties to the agreement will likewise bind the respective 
parties. Nothing in the Constitution of the Bargaining Council prohibits the 
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conclusion of agreements under the auspices of Bargaining Council in 
these circumstances albeit outside of the activities of the Bargaining 
Committee. 
[110] In the event, the signed agreement is rectified to reflect the intention and 
agreement of the parties on the evening of 20 April 2010 subject to the 
amendment to clause 7.2.3. As far as costs are concerned, I am of the 
view that costs should follow the result and should include the costs of two 
Council.  
Order 
 1. The Categorisation and Job Evaluation Wage Curves Collective 
Agreement signed on 21 April 2010 by the First Applicant and the First 
and Second Respondents is rectified by deleting clause 8.2 thereof 
and inserting clauses 8.2 and 8.3 of the Categorisation and Job 
Evaluation Wage Curves Collective Agreement on pages 42 – 53 of 
Bundle C, subject to the amendment to clause 7.2.3 agreed to just 
before the signing ceremony.  
2. The First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the Applicants 
and the Second Respondent including the costs of two Council.  
 
 
_______________________ 
AC BASSON, J 
Judge of the Labour Court 
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Appearances: 
For the Applicants: Advocate H Van der Riet SC with Advocate Barnes  
Instructed by: Cheadle Thompson & Haysom Inc Attorneys 
For the Respondents: Advocate MSM Brassey SC with Advocate A Cook 
Instructed by:  Tshiqi Zebedelia Attorneys 






